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International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) face increasing 
accountability challenges stemming from past scandals and their claims to advance the 
public good.  Since the 1990s, INGOs have responded with numerous reforms.  The 
creation of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership in 2003 and the INGO 
Accountability Charter in 2009 reflect sector-wide efforts to enhance accountability to 
mission, intended beneficiaries, and peer organizations.  
Many INGOs have adopted a broad range of accountability reforms.  This 
dissertation focuses on how World Vision, the world’s largest INGO, has done so.  
Downward accountability remains elusive due to such factors as INGOs’ lack of 
transparency toward beneficiaries; the power imbalance between them; donor pressures; 
and competition with other INGOs.   
In the first phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 past and 
present staff members across nine countries and a wide range of seniority levels, using 
these sensitizing concepts:  downward accountability, social accountability, humanitarian 
relief, development.  The second phase comprised analysis of an internal dataset 
summarizing annual reports from 64 country offices; and review of documents including 
annual reports spanning 18 years.   
Using a within-case comparison, the study demonstrates that World Vision has 
experienced most progress in the area of beneficiary feedback and complaints (as 
opposed to consultation, participation, or information provision).  This has typically taken 
place within emergency relief rather than development projects.  A principal reason is the 
comparative simplicity of relief aid, contrasted with the difficulty of achieving long-term 
 
 
change through consultation and participation.  Another is the greater role of institutional 
funding (vs. individual donations) in humanitarian relief.  However, these donor 
pressures can lead to a “tick-the-box” mentality in which routinized compliance 
substitutes for authentic accountability.  
This study suggests that current downward accountability practices fall short of 
accomplishing a reconfiguration of power relations between the INGO and beneficiaries.  
They risk becoming another technical component in a large apparatus used to meet donor 
requirements.  This is not surprising when we consider that service delivery comprises a 
significantly greater proportion of World Vision’s work than does advocacy.  
Consequently, the relationships between agency and beneficiaries are potentially more 
susceptible to clientelistic tendencies.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
The INGO Accountability Challenge 
In April 2017, the international humanitarian relief and development NGO, World 
Vision,1 participated in a high-level event at United Nations headquarters aimed at ending 
violence against children, part of a new global campaign for that purpose.  Informed by a 
consultation of 2,000 children from 28 countries, this event embodied the organization’s 
goal of increasing the participation of children and youth in its global advocacy work.  It 
thus vividly exemplified World Vision’s aspiration to hold itself downwardly accountable 
to its primary constituents (World Vision (a)). 
Then in 2018, fellow international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) found 
themselves at the center of controversy when it was revealed that a country director and 
other staff members employed by Oxfam  had sexually abused and exploited women and 
children recipients of the aid being disbursed in Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake.  
International NGOs realized that the issue would come to affect the entire sector, and a 
heightened sense of urgency with respect to safeguarding vulnerable people from such 
abuse followed.  Today hiring of safeguarding experts has increased, and World Vision’s 
own most recent annual report reflects this concern.   
The two events can be seen as corresponding sides of attention to the need to be 
held accountable to the persons whom INGOs set out to serve.  To draw an analogy from 
                                               
1 Throughout this dissertation, “World Vision” will generally be used to refer to the 
global federation known formally as “World Vision International,”  except where the full 
name needs to be used for context.  Where a national entity is discussed, it will be 
referenced as such (e.g., World Vision USA, World Vision Tanzania, etc.).  The list of 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in Table 2-1 refers to the CEOs of World Vision 




the field of human rights, the positive right of project-affected persons to have greater 
agency, expressed as participation in decisions that affect them as in the UN event above, 
may be considered as corresponding to social, cultural, and economic rights; while the 
negative right to be free from exploitation and abuse may be considered analogous to 
civil and political rights.  This dissertation will seek to show that the right and ability to 
present feedback and complaints is, in the case studied, overall better developed than the 
right to participate meaningfully in the envisioning, designing, developing and 
implementing of development and humanitarian projects and programs.   
The analogy, like perhaps all analogies, is inexact, as the feedback and complaints 
typically seem to pertain to the receiving of humanitarian aid, rather than to complaints 
about illicit activity such as corruption or abuse. However, the distinctions among four 
different facets of accountability to beneficiaries – feedback and complaints; information 
provision; participation; and consultation; yields important insights for understanding 
how much has been accomplished and how much yet remains to be done.   
The UN event described above represents but one of myriad initiatives that speak 
to World Vision’s downward accountability commitment. Why has it undertaken, over 
the past eight years in which it has been issuing annual accountability reports, this 
responsibility?  To address this question, it is necessary to reflect on the forces that have 
impelled international NGOs to address accountability needs more generally.   
Background of the Problem 
Since approximately the late 1990s international nongovernmental organizations 
have gone from being lauded by donors as the “magic bullet” to poverty and 




seriously questioned not only by donors but also by the public at large (Dhanani and 
Connolly, 2014; Ebrahim, 2009).  Legislation passed in the United States in the early 
2000s to ensure accountability in the corporate and nonprofit sectors affects INGOs as 
well as domestic nonprofits; but it is only the most salient aspect of the drive for 
accountability, writ large. Yet accountability, whether upward to donors or downward to 
beneficiaries, is increasingly crucial to maintaining – or as it may be, shoring up – 
support to INGOs. When the currency of INGOs is the urgency of their moral mission, 
then efficiency and good stewardship of donor resources, and even more, attention to 
beneficiaries’ self-defined priorities arguably become equally essential to maintaining 
their legitimacy and thus sustaining their existence. 
This dissertation focuses principally on the feedback-and-complaints aspect of 
downward accountability, on the rationale that it is here that communities and individuals 
can most meaningfully call the organization to account.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
this paper, downward accountability is defined in the following way: Downward 
accountability refers to those policies and practices, undertaken by a nongovernmental 
organization, and the procedures used to promote and enforce them, designed to collect 
and act upon beneficiary feedback and complaints.  
The idea that INGOs must practice accountability “downward” – i.e., to the 
persons intended to receive their assistance and benefit from their projects – has in recent 
years been adopted by the leadership of the largest INGOs, in what has been referred to 
as a “normative shift” (Schmitz, Raggo, and Bruno-van Vijfeijken, 2012, p. 1180; 
Hielscher, Winkin, Crack and Pies, 2017).  But efforts to increase downward 




and opportunity costs (Schmitz, Raggo,  and Bruno-van Vijfeijken 2012), to moral 
dilemmas posed by the need for competition for resources (Hielscher, Winkin, Crack and 
Pies, 2017; Cooley and Ron, 2002).   
Statement of the Problem 
Social accountability is similar to, but distinct from, downward accountability.  
While it may sometimes be used to refer to social responsibility more broadly understood 
(e.g., as in relation to the social accountability of corporations), in this dissertation it is 
used to denote the practice of holding the providers of public services accountable to 
those who use those services (Fox, 2015; Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). Social 
accountability has also been applied more broadly to encompass INGOs. Donors at all 
levels increasingly demand greater accountability, but downward accountability has until 
recently received less attention. It is also arguably more difficult to attain, due to the 
inherent power dynamics involved: while donors can – implicitly or explicitly – threaten 
to withhold funding if an INGO does not meet accountability standards, beneficiaries 
have no comparable lever. Put another way, while upward accountability is enforced by 
the donors’ ability to exercise their option to “exit” in the case of unsatisfactory 
performance (Hirschman, 1970), beneficiaries frequently lack such an option, making 
downward accountability more difficult and more rare (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair, 
2014, p. 91).  They can exercise their right to voice feedback and complaints, but without 
the “teeth” of a possible exit option, that voice may prove ineffectual.  Indeed, as will be 
demonstrated, all too often the pull toward loyalty toward the NGO proves the strongest 
impulse, leading beneficiaries to provide positive feedback and/or thanks more often than 




Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to open the “black box” of downward accountability 
processes, in order to illuminate what influences, both organizational and external, shape 
the ways in which downward accountability is carried out.  Because the case selected is 
that of a large and influential INGO, it is anticipated that findings from this dissertation 
may inform what is known about the sector more generally regarding its downward 
accountability practices, and even more important, the prospects for their effectiveness. 
Research Questions 
Despite the structural factors militating against it, increasing numbers of INGOs 
seek to adopt downward accountability mechanisms (Crack, 2014; Crack, 2016; Deloffre, 
2016). This leads to the question of why they aspire to downward accountability and how 
they come to implement it. This paper therefore poses the following research questions: 
RQ1:  How did World Vision come to decide to adopt downward accountability? 
RQ 2:  How is downward accountability being implemented at World Vision? What 
obstacles – if any – is the organization encountering in the course of implementation, and 
how is it addressing them?   
Research Design Rationale 
Case Selection: World Vision  
Scholars have noted the lack of attention to matters of religion and faith in 
mainstream development discourse and practice. International development, as 
conceptualized by economists and financed by governments and multilateral institutions, 
traditionally has seldom made room for religious ways of knowing (Bornstein, 2003; 




organizations “have viewed the work and thinking of development institutions with 
skepticism” (Marshall, 2001, p. 339). Despite the significant presence of faith-based 
organizations among international development NGOs (McCleary and Barro, 2008), this 
split prevailed until the turn of the present century (Marshall, 2001; King, 2011).  
However, even despite the comparatively recent turn within the development 
establishment toward faith-based institutions, “too often, development circles care only to 
know whether an organization is either religious or secular,” without taking pains to 
discern the nature of the organization’s religious identity (King 2011, p. 21).  At most, 
funders such as multilateral development organizations might take an interest in whether 
an organization engages in proselytizing, or whether it is politically liberal or 
conservative (King, 2011).   
Among faith-based NGOs, World Vision has represented something of an 
anomaly, since rather than having its origins in one of the mainline Christian churches or 
other faith traditions, it began as a Protestant missionary organization and is still 
significantly shaped by its evangelical roots (Whaites, 1999; King, 2011). At the same 
time, professionalization and rationalization have characterized the evolution of the 
nonprofit sector generally over the past several decades (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 
2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Hwang and Powell, 2009), and World Vision has not 
been immune to these trends. It therefore presents an arguably unique organization for a 
case study: the largest Christian humanitarian and development organization in the world; 
highly sophisticated and therefore fluent in the grammar of development discourse (King, 
2011, p. 23); yet possessing a strong evangelical religious identity manifested in the daily 




daily staff devotions to the requirement that employees sign a statement of faith 
(Bornstein 2003, pp. 59 – 60).  
Like an increasing number of large INGOs, World Vision functions through a 
federated system, coordinating the numerous entities worldwide that comprise the global 
partnership.  With an annual budget of close to $3 billion, World Vision  and its 
consolidated affiliates (referring to the nearly 100 national-level organizations 
comprising the global partnership) constitute one of the largest U.S.-based INGOs, if not 
the largest.  
World Vision’s efforts to hold itself downwardly accountability to its 
beneficiaries are embedded within a larger system of accountability. World Vision is a 
member of Accountable Now, a peer regulation body, and has signed its ten 
Accountability Commitments comprising the following areas:  respect for human rights; 
ethical fundraising; professional management; independence; responsible advocacy; 
diversity and inclusion; transparency; environmental responsibility; good governance; 
and participation (Accountable Now (a)).  As can be seen, these touch on the political, 
bureaucratic, legal, professional, and managerial aspects of accountability (Williams and 
Taylor, 2013, p. 562).  Moreover, in 2015 World Vision United Kingdom began 
implementation of a pilot project funded by the UK’s foreign assistance agency, the 
Department for International Development (DFID).  The purpose of the pilot project was 
to “design, monitor and implement three different types of ‘beneficiary feedback 





This paper focuses on the practices of downward accountability at World Vision, 
on the assumption that due to the organization’s size and influence, analysis of its 
downward accountability practices can shed light on the prospects for such practices 
elsewhere.  As the largest evangelical INGO, World Vision evolved over six decades in a 
manner distinct in many respects from that of otherwise similar INGOs, including other 
faith-based ones.  For example, its growing connection with global evangelicalism led it 
to decentralize earlier than most NGOs, moving to a federated model as early as 1977 
(King, 2011; Whaites, 1999).  It is worth exploring whether and how World Vision’s 
experiences with decentralization may have affected its propensity to undertake 
downward accountability reforms. In addition, World Vision’s adoption of downward 
accountability takes place in a context in which the role of faith-based organizations, and 
indeed religious faith itself, within international development has become increasingly 
recognized (Clarke, 2006; Lunn, 2009; Marshall, 2001).   
In summary, as a large Christian humanitarian and development INGO, World 
Vision constitutes an exceptionally interesting case among those leading INGOs seeking 
to implement downward accountability.  Firstly, it comprises part of a larger trend toward 
the increased profile of faith-based, and specifically evangelical, INGOs working in 
humanitarian aid and international development.  Secondly, its efforts also comprise part 
of a much broader trend within twenty-first century philanthropy for greater 
accountability.  Due to the power imbalance inherent in relations between INGOs and 
their beneficiaries, implementation of downward accountability presents challenges and 
is worth researching for its possible implications for INGO-beneficiary relations, and for 




potential to contribute to understanding of the processes at work in implementation of 
downward accountability, considered important for program effectiveness (Cornwall and 
Gaventa, 2000; Jacobs and Wilford, 2010) and for the organizational learning so 
important to program effectiveness (Ebrahim, 2005).   
Findings 
This study has the following principal findings.  First of all, downward 
accountability practices are typically strongest in the context of humanitarian emergency 
relief.  Within that context, it is the mechanisms and systems set up to facilitate feedback 
and complaints from beneficiaries that perform the best, as contrasted with those set up to 
promote consultation, participation, and the provision of information to beneficiaries. A 
possible explanation is found in two important forces shaping the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. First is the very nature of such aid,  consisting as it does in large 
measure of discrete material goods whose distribution is easily tracked, and which can 
therefore elicit clear-cut feedback if these are not delivered satisfactorily.2  Secondly, 
humanitarian emergency assistance relies on grants and contracts, as distinct from 
development programming, which in World Vision is largely funded through child 
sponsorship donations.  Because large donors – typically governments or multilateral 
governmental agencies – have strict reporting requirements, including on downward 
accountability, work funded by them typically adheres more closely to the downward 
accountability standards now increasingly common in the international aid field.  
                                               
2 Ramalingam puts the matter thus:  “Many emergency and basic services operate on a linear, or 
focused, theory of change:  get shelter, food and water to people facing a crisis in order to avert 
further disaster… The logistics and process of doing so can be highly complicated, but the basic 




Secondly, the diffusion of the tools and processes of organizational learning – 
handbooks, self-evaluation, and various types of metrics – has increased over time and 
has been placed at the service not only of improving humanitarian and development 
effectiveness generally, but also and more recently, of tracking success in downward 
accountability itself. Where the diffusion of those tools and processes among World 
Vision staff is most successful, downward accountability can be expected to – and does – 
follow, as staff reporting reveals.  Conversely, where the diffusion of the tools and 
processes is lacking, information on downward accountability implementation is also 
lacking.   
Thirdly, the finding that consultation and participation lag behind feedback and 
complaints (and to a lesser extent, information provision) at first seems inconsistent with 
the conclusion reflected in World Vision’s own recent annual accountability report of 
2016. That report observes that it is in the area of feedback and complaint where more 
work remains to be done. However, this is less surprising if the concepts of consultation 
and participation are explored a bit further.  With their roots in development discourse 
and practice, they have a longer history of implementation as elements of downward 
accountability than do either information provision or feedback and complaints.  
Furthermore, the nature of development work is longer-term – and has outcomes 
arguably harder to measure – than is the case with humanitarian emergency relief.  
Even more, development as undertaken by World Vision – as by many of its peer 
INGOs –  is intended to make changes that are not only enduring but transformational – 
indeed, the organization’s approach is termed Transformational Development, as will be 




meant to involve those intended to benefit from development work in all stages of 
programming, from envisioning desired outcomes and setting priorities all the way 
through to working on implementation (even if an intermediate stage, technical design, is 
within the province of agency staff). The problem with translating these to downward 
accountability, however, is this:  in some cases, participation by beneficiaries is used to 
denote only labor provided for projects, rather than a more comprehensive role.  Thus, 
when greater success is reported with feedback and complaints than with consultation 
and participation, it may point to the greater feasibility of attaining effectiveness in the 
former, rather than in the latter.  
Table 1-1, below, summarizes the findings.  The horizontal category refers to the 
degree to which a transformational approach is adopted.  The vertical category refers to 
the degree to which adaptation is employed in enacting downward accountability.  Thus, 
the more that World Vision staff employ cycles of adaptation and iteration in using 
feedback and complaint mechanisms to specific situations – the more that they 
contextualize such mechanisms – the more successful such downward accountability 
practices are likely to be.  This is more likely to be the case in humanitarian assistance.  
However, the less adaptive World Vision is in enacting consultation and participation, the 
less likely these practices are to be successful – and this is more likely in the development 
area of its work.   
Table 1-1:  Summary of Findings 
 Technocratic  Transformational  
More adaptive 
 
Feedback and complaint, 
where they occur, are 
successful (humanitarian) 
Participation and consultation 
would be done more 
authentically 
          Less adaptive  Feedback and complaint are 
limited 
Participation and consultation 






Possible Theoretical Explanations for the Findings 
There are a number of possible theoretical explanations for the findings from this 
dissertation. Recall that the focus has been on the organizational mechanisms, processes, 
and systems, and the organizational learning tools, employed in order to hold the 
organization downwardly accountable to the project-affected persons whom it seeks to 
serve.  In an organization of the scale and scope of World Vision, these become 
necessary due to principal-agent pressures to ensure that downward accountability 
implementation is taking place and is taking place effectively.   
In classic agency theory the goals of the principal and agent are assumed to 
conflict with each other, and because the agent, as the one closer to the implementation of 
the work of the organization, necessarily has more information about that work than does 
the principal, the principal faces the dilemma of ensuring that the actions of the agent 
maximize the gains to the organization and therefore to the principal  (Eisenhardt, 1989;  
Van Slyke, 2012; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
The first observation in the case under consideration, therefore, is that the global 
headquarters; the staff members formally tasked with leading accountability work; and 
those tasked with conducting downward accountability trainings across different field 
offices, all constitute the principals; while the field staff tasked with collecting and 
reporting information about downward accountability implementation are the agents.  
The tasks of aggregating information collected at the program and project level (that is to 
say, “in the field”), comparing it across countries and across time, and making meaning 




such information under field conditions in the first place.  The incompleteness of the 
information and the distance between the principal and agent levels both complicate this 
meaning-making enterprise, and, as principal-agent theory would predict, leave less-than-
satisfying results. The use of all four pillars to improve downward accountability, and 
then the evaluation and reporting of performance in this regard, are all burdens to some 
degree for the agents, as we have seen amply from the data.  One interviewee put it this 
way: 
Program managers and leaders, they don’t see good examples of this done 
properly and they just get resentful and they don’t want to put money in it.  So, it 
just becomes like a check the box exercise, “Okay, we have to do an assessment, 
so we’ll just do it, check the box, boom, it’s done.”  They don’t say, “Oh, we need 
an assessment, so we can understand what communities need.  And we want the 
information to inform our decisions.”  It’s not like that, because they haven’t seen 
it done properly, in a lot of instances.  And with accountability it’s similar.  It just 
seems like a lot of money being put out there for staff to go out and who-knows-
what. Because it’s not done properly as it should [be] (World Vision 
accountability and monitoring and evaluation [M&E] specialist).  
 
The same interviewee expressed that, in contrast, meaningful involvement of 
communities, when it does happen, makes it possible to transcend the problem:  
You know, you’ve got heavy satisfaction when communities are involved in the 
decision-making, they’re participating. You know, they throw complaints out 
there and they actually get feedback from the program staff, they actually get 
answers to their questions.  Communities are deeply, infinitely more satisfied than 
when none of that is taking place.  And certainly, programs are far more relevant 
(World Vision accountability and M&E specialist).  
 
In summary, the problem of downward accountability implementation is, in part 
at least, a principal-agent problem:  the burden of downward accountability 
implementation, when the need for it is not completely understood or appreciated, 
disincentivizes field staff from both implementation and complete reporting, leaving the 




However there are further layers to the phenomenon.  The condition described 
above leads to the question of why World Vision – or for that matter other INGOs – 
should undertake downward accountability in the first place.  Here, a possible 
explanation comes from institutional theory, and in particular from institutional 
isomorphism.  Mimetic isomorphism and coercive isomorphism, as will be shown, are 
likely explanations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
Finally, the role of donors has been a recurring theme, and resource dependence 
theory leads to the understanding that INGOs, dependent as they are on donor funding, 
experience donors as having power over them.  Moreover, as donor agencies are likewise 
dependent on INGOs to implement projects and to make it possible for the donors to 
disburse funding, the two types of entities are interdependent  – even if INGOs 
experience the donors as having more power over them than vice versa  (Davis and Cobb, 
2010, p. 6; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p. viii).  In light of their dependence on donors, 
INGOs’ propensity to implement donor requirements with respect to often onerous 
accountability reporting is to be expected.  But while resource dependence theory would 
lead observers to predict that INGOs would therefore seek strategies to increase their 
autonomy, this dissertation found very little in the data leading to that conclusion.  
Instead, the increased role of grants as a source of income seemed to be more or less 
accepted as given by the interviewees.   
Rather than seek to increase its autonomy with respect to government donors, 
World Vision found itself taking on the aforementioned onerous downward 
accountability reporting burdens in order to comply with grants and contracts 




they shared with their fellow INGOs the concern for survival implied in that resource 
competition (Cooley and Ron, 2002).  That this concern is almost to be taken for granted 
is implied in the following quote from one of the interviewees:   
But the struggle to get any funding in the fragile states – because we had no 
presence.  Because of [the disaster] a lot of the large INGOs who work in conflict-
affected emergencies really opened up huge programs there.  So, this would be 
the CAREs, the Plans, the ACFs, and Save the Children.  [INGO] is the biggest 
NGO in [country] right now.  They’ve got more like 1,400 staff. And they’ve got 
a huge footprint in [state] especially.  And they really monopolize a lot of the 
donor funding available in the country.  They are the go-to partner (World Vision 
program officer, emphasis supplied).  
 
Moreover, the proportion of funding coming from public grants has steadily 
increased in the past few years, as was seen in Table 3 – from 17 percent in 2011, to 29 
percent in 2017.  This leads to the question whether feedback and complaints 
effectiveness is likely to improve as the proportion of funding flowing from such grants 
increases.  
Finally, the cultural differences between the humanitarian project and the 
developmentalist project are another:  as noted, paradoxically humanitarianism, while 
constituting a lofty ideal, is also a very pragmatic endeavor. This pragmatism seems to 
permeate the practices of humanitarian staff, making possible the implementation of 
some downward accountability mechanisms and systems to a greater degree than is the 
case in development work. 
This dissertation therefore concludes that current downward accountability 
practices still fall short of accomplishing the reconfiguration of power relations between 
World Vision and its beneficiaries that World Vision intended when adopting 
transformational development as a mode of carrying out its work.  These practices risk 




downward accountability, particularly those imposed by donors, becomes an end in itself. 
In this way, downward accountability risks becoming merely part of a large apparatus 
used to meet managerialist imperatives.   
The goal of transformational development, in contrast, ambitiously seeks to 
undermine the very power imbalances inherent in the relationship between World Vision 
and its beneficiaries.  In doing so, it seeks to counteract tendencies that in some ways 
parallel the clientelistic relations between citizens and the state, political parties, or other 
elites (Roninger, 2004; Montambeault, 2011; Stokes, 2011).  For transformational 
development to become a reality, downward accountability must be internalized by staff 
trained in its implementation; and must use processes of consultation and participation as 
or more effectively than it currently uses feedback and complaint mechanisms and 
systems.    
Delimitations and Limitations 
With respect to delimitations, the first one is that this is a single-case study.  It is 
also important to clarify that this dissertation, by design, does not purport to address 
whether and to what extent World Vision is actually being held downwardly accountable 
to its beneficiaries. To do so it would be necessary to survey the beneficiaries themselves, 
which, due to resource constraints, falls outside its scope.  Instead, the purpose has been 
to explore and analyze how World Vision’s history has shaped its approach to 
development and humanitarian relief work; how, as an organization, it is influenced by 
trends in development thinking and practice, and also contributes to them; how its 




practices; how staff are working to help the agency hold itself accountable to the persons 
World Vision seeks to serve; and finally, what challenges they still face in doing so.  
The limitations encountered in the course of this study have been those inherent in 
the use of nonrandom sampling, and of a comparatively modest sample size.  However, 
although the use of snowball sampling may have introduced some bias, it has also made it 
possible to access downward accountability experts who might not otherwise have been 
contacted or interviewed.  As to sample size, the increased repetition of themes and of 
recommended names to contact as interviewing proceeded, both indicated that saturation 
had been reached.  In this way, both limitations were addressed.  
Significance 
The findings are significant for the following reasons.  First of all, although calls 
for increased NGO accountability downward have been going on for some time – indeed, 
they appear as early as 1996 – still today too little is known regarding how much progress 
INGOs have made in holding themselves downwardly accountable.  Secondly, the NGO 
“crisis of legitimacy” has, if anything, increased in recent years (Edwards and Hulme, 
1996;  Walton, Davies, Thrandardottir and Keating, 2016).  Getting downward 
accountability “right” is an important – some would say central – component of 
addressing that crisis.  Thirdly, the findings themselves are, if not actually 
counterintuitive, then slightly different from conclusions found in recent reports from the 
agency itself.  If anything, they point to greater success – in feedback and complaints – 
but, crucially, that success is limited by the circumstances of humanitarian aid.  Fourthly, 




requirements, may inadvertently limit the effectiveness of downward accountability 
efforts.  
Chapter Overview 
The dissertation is organized as follows.  The next chapter traces the history of 
World Vision from its origins as a parachurch evangelical missions organization 
dedicated to relieving human suffering abroad, through decades of growth and its 
enthusiastic embrace of an increasingly sophisticated approach to international 
development work.  The narrative is one of distinct – sometimes even contrasting – 
strands in the agency’s DNA, one technocratic and modernizing, and the other idealistic 
and politically aware.  This evolution is placed within the context of changes in 
development and humanitarian assistance in the second half of the twentieth century and 
the early years of this one.  The literatures on development effectiveness; downward 
accountability as well as accountability more generally; and on the role of faith-based 
development organizations in relation to their secular brethren and donors, each inform 
this chapter. 
Chapter Three describes the research design and rationale in further detail, as well 
as the methods used to collect and analyze data from a range of sources both primary and 
secondary.     
Chapter Four presents findings from  annual reports and specialized 
accountability reports; internal data from national-level reports on the state of child well-
being, including on the role of downward accountability; and correspondence between 
World Vision and the peer-review mechanism of which it is a member, Accountable 




Then, Chapter Five further develops these themes by describing the tools for 
performance measurement developed by World Vision.  It then goes on to analyze 
interview data to examine where the humanitarian, development, and to a lesser extent 
the advocacy areas of the agency’s work differ in their approach to downward 
accountability, and where they are similar.  Their relative success, and ongoing 
limitations, with respect to the “four pillars” of downward accountability – consultation, 
participation, information provision and feedback and complaints – is assessed.   
Finally, the sixth and final chapter draws conclusions and their significance, 






CHAPTER TWO: CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 
World Vision and Its Journey to Program Accountability  
 
Downward accountability rests on “the right to say and the duty to respond,” as 
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) attests (Guide to the 2010 HAP 
Standard in Accountability and Quality Management, p. 43).  With these words, the 
statement clearly points to accountability firstly as being grounded in rights, rather than 
its being desirable as a conduit to improved effectiveness in the delivery of development 
and humanitarian outcomes.   
Nevertheless, the imperative of improved effectiveness applies to development 
and humanitarian work as well, as will be discussed below.  Both those two aspects of 
World Vision’s work, then, are required – by donors, as well as by the agency itself.. 
Accountability to project-affected persons is a part of that, but the impulses driving it are 
varied in nature, and rooted in World Vision’s own history as an organization that was 
and arguably remains not only mission-driven, but that began as a supporter of actual 
religious missionaries.  World Vision also became, over time, a highly organized and 
bureaucratically rational organization (Weber, 2013).  
The story of how World Vision was established and evolved over the decades in 
response to those two contrasting impulses forms the first part of this chapter.  Secondly, 
the chapter goes on to situate the organization within the broader context of emerging 
trends in humanitarian and development policy and practice.  These are mirrored in 
alternating influences within the organization:  firstly, a commitment to what it terms 




was subsequently in danger of being marginalized by the ascendancy of an evidence-
based approach, and later returned to primacy in the context of broader donor and 
academic support for arguably transformational and bottom-up approaches (called, 
“Doing Development Differently”).  
Thirdly, World Vision’s three principal areas of work – development, 
humanitarian relief, and advocacy – are described, with particular attention to their 
varying funding sources and the implications of the same.  
This chapter therefore sets the stage for a discussion in the following chapters of 
the various different tools for performance measurement, as well as for organizational 
learning, that have been used by World Vision to measure the effectiveness of downward 
accountability implementation: that make it possible, in short, to observe the 
phenomenon from the distance imposed by geography and – as Robert Chambers would 
put it – language, culture and class (Chambers, 1983, pp. 3 – 4).   
Paradoxically, as Gross Stein argues, “accountability is no panacea” and “is most 
likely to cripple when it becomes mechanical, technical, and routinized, more and more 
divorced from the purposes of an organization, its challenges, and its opportunities” 
(Gross Stein, in Barnett and Weiss, eds., 2008, p. 142).  But the reality of World Vision’s 
being still powerfully shaped both by its mission-driven character and its ever-increasing 
technical sophistication, as well as by the external pressures of donor demands and an 
increasing reliance on grants and contracts, leads to a series of dilemmas and tradeoffs in 




A Tale of Contrasting Impulses 
World Vision describes itself as “the largest Christian-based global NGO,” 
prompting reflection at the very outset on two potentially competing aspects of its 
character:  an explicitly Christian faith-based organization, and an organization so large 
that it has taken on many of the characteristics of a multinational corporation; indeed, 
many of its staff have, particularly in recent years, been drawn from the ranks of 
corporate executives.  As for its leadership, its last two presidents, especially, came to the 
organization from long careers in the corporate sector, as did their counterpart at World 
Vision U.S., Richard Stearns (see Table 2-1).   
From its very inception, the agency appears to have drawn from two impulses:  
one, a passionate and devout response to the suffering of impoverished people – 
especially children – in Asia and elsewhere.  This was embodied in its charismatic 
founder and manifested in its early years in a freewheeling and emotion-driven approach 
to relief work.  The second was also evident almost from the beginning and consisted in a 
readiness to employ technology and modern managerial methods to achieve the 
organization’s goals.  In this second aspect, World Vision was modernist in its impulses 
and observers should not be surprised to find, for example, that little more than a decade 
from its founding the agency would be the first of its kind to take up the use of computer 
technology to help track donations and organize its child sponsorship practices (Rohrer, 
1987).  
Approximately one generation later, these two strands in the organization’s DNA 
had developed into two distinct approaches to carrying out its work: one, termed 




way that development work should be carried out, and emphasized the importance of 
sustainable outcomes and therefore of long timescales.  The other emphasized measurable 
objectives, and as such comprised part of the evidence-based revolution of the early 21st 
century (Barnett, 2015, p. 137). These two impulses in turn have both influenced the 
ways in which World Vision approaches downward accountability, and this chapter will 
argue that one outcome has seen contrasting levels of success in its implementation. 
The reason for the contrasting approaches in some ways reflects the contrast 
between charity and philanthropy throughout American history.  As Robert Gross has 
pointed out, these “two traditions of American humanitarianism… stand at opposite 
poles:  the one concrete and individual, the other abstract and institutional”  (Gross, 2003, 
p. 31).  As described below, charity, rooted in Judeo-Christian teachings, animated the 
Western missioners and local religious leaders whom World Vision founder Bob Pierce 
met in his travels throughout Asia; and it also animated him and the early World Vision 
staffers, funders and supporters who with equal zeal brought the organization into being.  
The increasing introduction of bureaucratic rationalization, even as early as the 1950s – 
and especially the increasing reliance on expertise that became more pronounced in the 
1960s and 1970s –  reflect, on the other hand, characteristics of philanthropy:  “pragmatic 
[and] efficiency-minded” (Gross, 2003, p. 30), and bent on finding and solving the root 
causes of poverty rather than only ameliorating its effects. VanderPol has described as 
“eclectic” the combination of charity and philanthropy that characterized World Vision 
even in the beginning.   In its origins within a charitable model, World Vision not 




generally. In its increasing embrace of philanthropy, it was wholly in tune with the 
broader society:  
It was strongly committed to a supernatural world view in which 
God’s special providences ensured staff that they were doing God’s will, yet was 
equally beholden to Enlightenment modernity, whose gifts of technology, science, 
and organizational bureaucracy were God’s chosen instruments to succor the 
poor.  It was intimately personal and individualistic in its view of the poor, while 
enthusiastically engaged in making the biggest impact possible, using mass media 
of every kind to promote its message. (VanderPol, 2010, p. 87). 
 
Decades later, this pragmatic emphasis on impact would form the backdrop to – 
and perhaps provide the justification for – the adoption of the so-called results agenda 
that overtook the development sector in the first two decades of the 21st century (Natsios, 
2010; Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Ramalingam, 2013).  The list of World Vision’s CEOs 
across the years, found in Table 1-1 below, shows that the organization’s leaders initially 
were drawn from the church, while their successors came from the corporate sector.  
 
Table 2-1:  CEOs/Presidents of World Vision and their former occupations 
 
 
1950 – 1969      Bob Pierce – Evangelical minister 
1969 – 1982      Stanley Mooneyham – Evangelical minister 
1982 – 1987      Ted Engstrom – Evangelical youth leader 
1987 – 1998      Robert Seiple – college president, athletic director, sales executive  
1996 – 2010      Dean Hirsch – World Vision senior executive  
2010 – 2019      Kevin Jenkins – managing director of Canadian investment firm 
2019 -                Andrew Morley – CEO, ClearChannel UK 
 
 
Bob Pierce and Stanley Mooneyham were both evangelical ministers, and as a 
former leader of the evangelistic organization, Youth for Christ, Ted Engstrom likewise 
came from a parachurch background (Rohrer, 1987).  Robert Seiple seems to have been 




president and athletic director, as well as being a military veteran (Chandler, 1986). He 
was succeeded by Dean Hirsch, who had risen through the ranks to become CEO in 1996, 
stepping down from the position in 2010 (Christian NewsWire (a)).   The next three 
heads of the organization all have come from corporate backgrounds. Kevin Jenkins, a 
former executive in the Canadian investment firm TriWest, and former president and 
CEO of Canadian Airlines, followed, serving from 2010 – 2019 (Christian NewsWire 
(b))  He then was replaced by Andrew Morley, a former executive in the 
telecommunications, technology, financial services, and media sectors (World Vision,  
(q)). The turn toward corporate expertise at the top thus reflects a decided shift toward 
corporate efficiency norms within the organization.   
Early Years: Stepping Forward in Faith, Joining the Anti-Communist Crusade 
Far from constituting a new and contradictory development, the affinity with 
corporate expertise was, as noted above, embedded in World Vision nearly from the 
beginning.  Like so many mission-driven nongovernmental organizations, it was founded 
by a visionary, energetic, leader – seemingly larger than life.   
As has been amply documented elsewhere, World Vision was founded in 1947 by 
evangelist Bob Pierce, who while on a mission trip to China met a child named White 
Jade and converted her to Christianity.  Versions of the organization’s origin story vary, 
but most seem to concur that on the following day, a missionary named Tena Hoelkeboer 
confronted him at his doorstep, child in tow, with the news that the little girl’s family had 
thrown her out upon learning of her conversion.  What, asked Hoelkeboer, was Pierce 




month.  In this manner was born World Vision’s model of child sponsorship (King, 2011; 
VanderPol, 2010; Rohrer, 1987, pp. 45-46; Pierce Dunker, 2013, p. 1).   
Through the next six decades, child sponsorship would remain the backbone of 
World Vision’s fundraising, providing it with a steady flow of income that made it 
possible for the organization to make long-term development programming 
commitments, free from the constraints typically characterizing short-term government 
grants and contracts.  From the perspective of individual donors, child sponsorship 
provided a sense of immediacy, connection and efficacy, not to mention fulfillment, that 
other forms of donation presumably do not (Bornstein, 2001). In doing so, it fulfilled the 
role that charity has traditionally done for charitable individuals (Gross, 2003).   
In the years that followed, Pierce traveled frenetically throughout Asia, repeatedly 
encountering missioners who were taking on emergency care tasks in the absence of any 
kind of official church support. Frequently these were European or North American 
women, such as missioners Lillian Dickson, Beth Albert and the aforementioned Tena 
Hoelkeboer (VanderPol, pp. 47-48, p. 55).  It may be difficult for a contemporary 
audience to understand the degree to which social ministry (of even the most apolitical 
sort) was regarded as suspect by evangelicals in the middle of the twentieth century, and 
the extent to which Pierce had to work to make World Vision’s relief activities acceptable 
to its evangelical constituency (King, 2013, p. 75).  As Pierce attested, “One of the big 
questions that often comes across my desk is, ‘Are you really a Bible-believing group of 
folks? Aren’t you a little bit social-minded in the gospel you preach?’ ” (Graham and 




objectionable, this was the reality within which World Vision functioned in its early 
years.  
The explanation is found in what theologian Timothy L. Smith has termed the 
Great Reversal, in which early 20th-century fundamentalist Christians turned away from 
the social commitments championed by their 19th-century brethren (VanderPol, 2010, pp. 
24 – 26; King, 2013, p. 73).  Into this breach stepped World Vision, to the extent that, 
“from 1950 to 1966, [it] was the major force in reintroducing evangelical mission to the 
poor by publicizing the pre-existing charitable ministries of previously isolated 
missionaries”  (VanderPol, 2010, p. 59).  During this first phase of World Vision’s work, 
the emphasis was on charitable assistance, motivated by compassion, to meet urgent 
individual needs (VanderPol, 2010, p. 60; Gross, 2003).  Pierce wrote on the flyleaf of his 
Bible, “Let my heart be broken with the things that break the heart of God”– a prayer that 
would later become World Vision’s motto (Rohrer, 1987, p. 53). 
The World Vision founder had “deep roots” in the faith missions practice, which 
is that one sets out on mission with faith that God will provide.  Accordingly, and in 
keeping with his spontaneous, even zealous nature, he would respond to need with 
immediacy, trusting that the resources would materialize.  He once famously sent a 
telegram from India to headquarters in Monrovia, California, stating: “Have written a 
check for $40,000.  Cover it.” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 83).   
During this time, World Vision remained small in size in comparison with the 
large mainline faith-based development organizations that were, for the most part, formed 
during and after the Second World War:  Catholic Relief Services, Church World 




(King, 2013, p. 75).  As a point of comparison, in 1956, World Vision’s budget was a 
mere $1 million, while the budgets of Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service 
were, respectively, $126 million and $38 million (King, 2013, p. 76).  Yet at the same 
time, the rational use of technology characterized the agency’s work almost from the very 
beginning.  Pierce did not hesitate to use technologies and communication methods in 
innovative ways:  films, which at the time were barely considered morally permissible by 
the evangelical community; and newsletters of various sorts, that went out to individuals 
instead of having to go through church bulletins (VanderPol, 2010, pp.  51 – 53).  When a 
seven-month U.S. tour of a Korean children’s choir, organized by World Vision, resulted 
in an avalanche of mail from would-be child sponsors, threatening to overwhelm the 
capacity of the administrative staff, Pierce saw the necessity of adopting then-novel 
computer technology, and in 1963 the agency leased an IBM 1401 mainframe for $6,000 
per month (Rohrer, 1987, pp. 83-87). 
Bob Pierce enjoyed bringing friends into the computer room where punched cards 
were streaking through like lightning.  He usually had the terminology all wrong, 
but the general idea was correct—God had both man and machine ready to meet 
emergencies. (Rohrer, 1987, p. 87).   
In this, it can be said that World Vision anticipated the rationalization of the 
nonprofit field (Hwang and Powell, 2009).  The professionalization of its staff would 
come later.   
Transformation:  From Missions and Relief Work to Holistic Development; and 
from Charismatic Leadership to Bureaucratic Rationality 
The 1970s were marked by significant shifts in World Vision’s work: firstly, from 
missions and relief work, powered by the vision of a charismatic founding leader and 




on long-term development work, with all the panoply of technocratic expertise that that 
implied (King, 2011, p. 23; Rohrer, 1987, p. 149; VanderPol, 2010, p. 113; p. 118; 
Whaites, 1999, p. 414).  They were also marked by its  internationalization, when in 1978 
the agency created “a new partnership secretariat and implementing body, World Vision 
International (WVI), to be governed collectively by the agency’s constituents by a 
Triennial Council and Board” (Whaites, 1999, p. 415). These constituents comprised both 
those World Vision offices in wealthy countries, responsible for fundraising, and those in 
poor countries, where relief and development programming were carried out.   
A number of factors contributed to these shifts.  Operationally, World Vision had 
expanded significantly in Southeast Asia during the years of the Vietnam War. Indeed, it 
had gone so far as to identify itself with the Americans’ anti-Communist crusade.  This 
was consistent with its stance during the Korean War and in China before 1949 (King, 
2013, p. 76).  With the fall now of the South Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian 
regimes to communism, the organization faced a near-crisis.  World Vision staff fled the 
Communist takeover and “nearly 30,000 sponsors lost touch with their sponsored 
children,” just as revenue was “skyrocketing”  (VanderPol, 2010, p. 108).  The agency 
recovered by shifting its child sponsorship to Latin America, Africa and South Asia,  as 
well as by participating in relief work in the aftermath of war’s end: airlifts of refugee 
children and rescue operations for boat people (VanderPol, 2010, p. 108;  Whaites, 1999, 
p. 414).   
With respect to governance, internationalization and a shift away from a U.S.-
centric model were accomplished by the creation of the secretariat referenced above.  




toward professionalization as well as a new commitment among evangelicals more 
generally toward social action that sought to tackle root causes of poverty, and in so 
doing embraced a critique of the existing international economic order.  
The turn toward rationalization was, as has already been noted above, an early 
development in World Vision’s evolution:   
Only the One for whom we speak knows the special opportunities for enlarged 
Christian witness which are now possible through the utilization of today’s 
satellite communications, global television, the marvels of electronic data 
processing—and in days ahead through the application of tomorrow’s scientific 
achievements . . . opportunities which lie ahead as we seek to “by all means save 
some” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 85).   
 
By the early 1970s, however, the turn toward development had begun in earnest – 
and perhaps this was not so surprising, as the United Nations had declared the 1970s to 
be the Second United Nations Development Decade (United Nations, 1971).  In 1974, a 
retired Army colonel, Henry (“Hal”) Barber, was hired to establish a Relief and 
Development division at World Vision.  It is true that the original impetus for this 
decision was the agency’s response to a cataclysmic earthquake in Nicaragua in 1972, 
which apparently prompted him to propose “a change in World Vision’s approach to its 
relief efforts”  (Rohrer, 1987, p. 149).  However, the elements of what Krause has termed 
“the good project” were there from the beginning:  how to identify a project, then 
determine objectives and set out a logical sequence of activities for attaining them 
(Krause, 2014; Rohrer, 1987, p. 149). In 1978, the turn toward development work 
reached a “watershed moment” when its development staff, numbering over 50 people, 
attended a five-week training course in the Philippines sponsored by the International 




This was also a time during which evangelicalism found itself influenced by the 
“evangelical Left,” led by such figures as Sojourners editor Jim Wallis; the academic Ron 
Sider; and John Perkins, founder of Voice of Cavalry ministries; all of whom, to varying 
degrees, undertook a critique of problems of racism, economic injustice, and 
overconsumption in the global North (King, 2013, p. 79; VanderPol, 2010, p. 135).  
These influences made themselves felt in a series of evangelical conferences, 
culminating in one in Lausanne, Switzerland, in 1974.  The Lausanne Conference – 
VanderPol considers that it can even be thought of as evangelicals’ Vatican II – was 
attended by 2,500 evangelicals and produced a document, called the Covenant, stating 
that “God’s missional concern includes ‘justice and reconciliation throughout human 
society and the liberation of men from every kind of oppression;’ therefore, ‘evangelism 
and socio-political involvement are both parts of our Christian duty.’” (VanderPol, 2010, 
p. 99).  Latin American evangelicals René Padilla and Samuel Escobar urged the 
delegates to go still further (King, 2013, p. 92; Myers, 2011, p. 38; VanderPol, 2010, p. 
99).  
During the preceding years, World Vision had also undergone a change in 
leadership.  Founder Bob Pierce had stepped down in 1967, frustrated by the board’s 
increasing insistence on stricter financial controls, which he saw as “Spirit-quenching red 
tape” (VanderPol, 2010, p. 112). These accountability reforms had been spearheaded by 
the new executive vice-president, Ted Engstrom, mandated by the board to “put World 
Vision into the black” – the organization had grown too much too fast, incurring 
excessive debt and finding itself generally unable to meet financial obligations in a timely 




Pierce had been motivated by charity more than by the desire for technological efficiency 
and efficacy, and the reforms led to sharp conflict between him and the board. After a 
nervous breakdown, followed by a stay in Swiss sanatorium, Pierce came out of 
retirement and went on to lead a small organization called Food for the World, which he 
later renamed “Samaritan’s Purse” and at which he was succeeded by fundamentalist 
Franklin Graham, the son of evangelist Billy Graham.  As King puts it, “From founding 
the organization in 1950 until his departure in 1967, Pierce was World Vision, but World 
Vision had outgrown him” (Davis and King, 2013, p. 83).   
The changes undergone when a nonprofit organization transitions from leadership 
by an original charismatic founder to a more managerial and professionalized style of 
leadership constitute a familiar narrative (Block and Rosenberg, 2002; Stewart, 2016).   
However, in the case of World Vision the change was perhaps especially substantial:  
under the leadership of Pierce’s successor, Stanley Mooneyham, World Vision’s budget 
grew from $4.5 million in 1969 to $94 million by 1982 (King, 2013, p.84).  In the coming 
years, the agency would be led by a succession of presidents who would take it from 
strength to strength.  As with the international NGO sector more generally, the growth in 
size often occurred in the wake of massive responses to equally massive humanitarian 
disasters (Baobab, 2015, p. 2).  The following section will describe the governance of the 
federation that was established in 1978, as well as discuss the growth in revenue it 




Governance: Decentralization in Structure and Practice 
Decentralization in Structure 
According to Tallack’s typology of INGO structures, World Vision is situated 
near the middle of a continuum ranging from a unitary model, consisting of a single 
organization, through to networks and alliances.  As a federation, it consists of “national 
members of a global entity which has (some degree of) control over the members on 
governance, strategy, management, finance, brand, operating rules.” (Tallack, n.d., p. 2).  
Furthermore, “[b]y signing [a] Covenant of Partnership, each national office agrees to 
abide by common policies and standards” (World Vision, (i)).  
World Vision (known internally as “the partnership”) is governed by a 24-
member international board that meets biannually and appoints senior leadership, 
approves strategic planning and budgeting, and sets international policy (World Vision, 
(i)).  The federation is comprised of 65 national offices in which programs take place; 10 
support offices tasked with fundraising via donations and/or child sponsorship; eight 
regional offices; and administrative offices located in London, Brussels, Geneva and New 
York, all listed in Appendix A Of these, the last three – Brussels, Geneva and New York 
–  are dedicated to liaison work with the European Union and the United Nations (World 
Vision (j).   
The London offices contain, in effect, the headquarters of World Vision. 
However, for historical reasons, World Vision itself is incorporated in the state of 
California, and the office located in Monrovia, near Los Angeles, remains its official 
headquarters, although the office is now tasked with mainly administrative functions 




trend toward decentralized offices, the Global Centre – as the London offices are known  
– actually comprises staff persons spread across the globe. This includes, in the case of 
World Vision staff tasked formally with program accountability leadership functions, 
personnel based in Nairobi, and in and near Toronto, as well as in London (World Vision 
accountability specialist).   
Besides the International Board, an executive body that has as its remit the areas 
outlined above, World Vision is governed by the Council of Members, which meets 
every three years. At a lower level, national boards govern many national offices, with 
national directors approving “more than 90 percent of projects within previously 
approved budgets.” (World Vision (i)).  However, the International Board is “the ultimate 
governing body for the World Vision Partnership” (World Vision (k)). The board 
members are elected by regional forums, to which each national board sends a 
representative  (World Vision (k)).  At this writing, the members represent six support 
offices (Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States); 11 
program offices (Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jerusalem/West 
Bank/Gaza, Malaysia, Mali, Philippines, South Africa, Uganda); and two hybrid offices 
(South Korea, Hong Kong).  Australia, Canada, and the United States are represented 
each by two members, with Canada’s representative, Kevin Jenkins, having served as the 
president and CEO until late 2018,  for a total of 24 members.  The greater voting power 
held by those three countries reflects their historical role as the largest funding sources of 
World Vision (Ronalds, 2014, p. 153; Tallack, 2018, p. 11; Whaites, 1999, p. 414).   
The Council of Members is “the highest governing authority for certain 




Triennial Council, constitute key milestones in terms of setting strategic directions for the 
federation (Ronalds, 2014, p. 152).  For example, World Vision’s current strategy 
document, Our Promise 2030, was informed by the Triennial Council held in 2016.  At 
the time of the 2007 Triennial Council, radical evangelical leader and Sojourners editor 
Jim Wallis took the opportunity to remark upon how much World Vision had grown 
since the tsunami disaster of 2004, and on the added responsibility this conferred on the 
organization: “World Vision’s size, influence, and credibility positions [sic] the 
organization very well to be a prophetic leader in that movement for justice on the global 
stage that speaks truth to power – not just as a service provider when disaster strikes”  
(Wallis, 2007).  
Decentralization in Practice 
Among federations, World Vision is one of the more decentralized. It perhaps 
comes the closest to equality among all its affiliates (with the significant caveat above 
regarding the voting power of the Australian, Canadian and U.S. affiliates), as well as 
equality between affiliates and the international secretariat, but with “reserve powers” 
held by the secretariat, “such as involvement in appointment of member CEOs or veto” 
(Tallack, p. 5).  This has its roots in the original decision to form a federation.  Whaites 
notes that, “Even in 1976, internal voices were calling for [the concept of partnership] to 
be taken to its logical conclusion with strict equality between North and South” (Whaites, 
1999, p. 415).3   
                                               
3 Complicating this picture of decentralization and devolution, however, is a country-
level study of World Vision Tanzania, which analyzes the paradox involved in promoting an 
empowerment discourse while failing to appreciate that an individualistic interpretation of 
empowerment overlooks the potential for conflict among different subgroups within a community 





With respect to accountability, World Vision like other INGOs faces the 
challenges involved in juggling what Koppell has memorably termed “multiple 
accountabilities disorder,” that is, the need to be accountable to multiple stakeholders at 
the same time (Koppell, 2005). However, while “[s]everal INGOs have put in place tools 
and processes to address the issues of holding the different entities to account for 
delivery… World Vision stands out as the one that has gone furthest in achieving the goal 
with its vertically integrated [a]ccountability mechanisms” (Tallack, 2018, p. 4).  
Paradoxically, this is so even in the context of decentralization – exemplifying the larger 
paradox of the duality that is a theme of this dissertation:  between technocratic and 
transformative approaches to development and humanitarian work. 
It was noted above that the tsunami that devastated Banda Aceh, Indonesia; Sri 
Lanka; and parts of southern India on Christmas Day in 2004 was a key milestone if not a 
turning point in World Vision’s growth.  The next section will consider the ways in 
which World Vision grew in scale over the decades, the connection of that growth with 
the occurrence of complex humanitarian emergencies, and the case of the emergency 
response to the tsunami in particular.   
Budgeting: Decentralization and Growth 
Revenue Trends in the 21st Century 
Figure 1 below illustrates the trends in World Vision’s revenue, measured in 
millions of U.S. dollars, over the twenty years from 1998 to 2017, inclusive. During that 
time (these are the years for which data are readily available), revenue more than 
quadrupled, increasing from $665 million in 1998 to $2.76 billion in 2017.  While the 




of the Iraq war – sharp increases are also apparent in 2005 (just after the tsunami of 
December 2004); in 2008 (the year that Cyclone Nargis made landfall in Myanmar); in 
2011; and in 2014, after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in late 2013.  Less notable is 
the increase in 2010, when an earthquake struck Haiti in January of that year.  
 
Figure 1-1: Trends in World Vision Annual Revenue, millions of dollars 
 
 
Nevertheless, this observation is consistent overall with conclusions reached by 
the research organization, Baobab, which in a briefing paper on international civil society 
global financial aid trends of 2015, asserts that the largest increases (across the INGO 
sector, not only at World Vision) typically take place after humanitarian disasters:  
“These have had a much bigger impact on rates of income growth than the [2008] global 












in new supporters, and providing the stimulus for strengthening global capacity”  
(Baobab, 2015, p. 2).   
In other ways, however, World Vision has differed from other large INGOs.  
Although its income is the largest among the seven leading INGO federations surveyed 
by Baobab, its rate of growth has been among the slowest, at 3 percent compared with 
Save the Children’s 12 percent. In part this may be attributed to its still minimal reliance 
on government funding, which in some cases has fueled the growth of other federations, 
of which Save the Children is only the most notable.  However, the proportion of funding 
coming from grants and contracts – whether from the government or foundations – 
comprises an increasing proportion of World Vision’s funding sources (Baobab, 2015).  
Finally, World Vision finances microfinance institutions around the world 
through its VisionFund, established in 2003 for that purpose (World Vision (l), 2015, p. 
27).  As of 2016, VisionFund’s network of those institutions had disbursed over 1.44 
million loans; held a global loan portfolio of $509 million; and had a global staff of 7,254 
persons (World Vision (m), 2016, p. 41). With a reported global average repayment rate 
of 97.9 percent, and a majority of clients being women – particularly in Asia – the 
VisionFund paralleled similar initiatives, along the lines of the classic model pioneered 
by the Grameen Bank (World Vision (m), 2016, p. 41).   
Conceptualizing Transformational Development 
With respect to World Vision’s new-found focus on development,  increased 
social consciousness was reflected in an impulse toward what Bryant Myers, director of 
the field development division in the 1980s, called “transformational development.”  He 




We’re not in the business of developing institutions, infrastructures, roads, dams, 
and that kind of thing… Our focus is on people.  And all people are created in 
God’s image… So, there’s no room for paternalism.  We’re not going to help the 
person “over there;” we’re going to extend hands to brothers and sisters.  They 
have a right to expect that and we have an obligation to act in that way (Quoted in 
Rohrer, 1987, p. 148).   
 
The focus on transformation had, on the one hand, theological roots.  Following 
the Lausanne Conference, evangelicals, having accepted the importance of social justice 
concerns as something mandated by the Bible, went on to debate their relative importance 
with respect to evangelism.  In response, Wayne Bragg of the Wheaton Hunger Center 
elaborated the concept of transformation, as encompassing the “material, social and 
spiritual change” envisioned in the Gospels (Myers, 2011, p. 48).  The concept went by 
several names:  “holistic mission, holistic development, integral mission, holistic 
ministry…” (Myers, 2011, p. 49; Sen, 1999).  If, on balance, the emphasis seemed to be 
on social dimensions of transformation more than individual, nevertheless the individual 
dimension remained inseparable from the larger understanding of the concept:  
The argument over whether evangelism or social action was prior in the mission 
of God was resolved to a certain extent by the use of the term transformation in 
the following way. The difference between the two positions turned to a large 
extent on people’s view of humanity – either as autonomous individuals 
(evangelism) or as persons in relationships (social action). The term 
transformation assured those concerned for evangelism that their vision for 
changing or transforming people would not be lost in the concern to transform the 
social relationships in which people were set (Sugden 2003, p. 71).   
 
Thus, in transformational development the beneficiary is changed; but also and 
(arguably) more importantly, the society in which beneficiaries are living in deprivation 




But in addition, in developing the concept of transformational development, 
Myers drew upon the work of a host of  experts in international development and related 
fields, whose work ranged across decades.   
The experts include Robert Chambers, whose framework for development 
incorporated responsible well-being, encompassing livelihood security, capabilities 
(drawing on the work of Amartya Sen), equity, and sustainability. (Myers, 2011, pp. 164-
165).  Myers also drew directly on Sen’s concept of development as freedom, based on 
instrumental freedoms necessary to the support of individual freedoms, including 
political freedoms, economic capabilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, 
and protective security in the sense of safety nets, “as well as the protection of the rule of 
law”  (Myers, pp. 167-168; Sen, 1999).  World Vision’s transformational development 
emphasis drew inspiration, too, from the work of David Korten, whose people-centered 
development critiqued the classic model based on economic growth promoted by most aid 
donors.  Korten set out a typology of four responses to poverty, ranging from relief and 
welfare, through small-scale, self-reliant local development and sustainable systems, and 
culminating in people’s movements (Myers, 2011, pp. 154-156). 
However, while valuing the work of these and still other thinkers, Myers and by 
extension World Vision saw shortcomings in the propensities of each of them to 
sometimes neglect the role played by religion, whether for good or ill.  This critique went 
further, objecting to the inclination to put faith in human perfectibility rather than 
acknowledging humanity’s fallenness (Myers, 2011, p. 167).  For an orthodox and 
explicitly Christian organization, this constituted an obvious shortcoming  (Byworth, 




these thinker/practitioners and declared “the twin goals of transformation:  changed 
people, who have discovered their true identity and vocation; and changed relationships 
that are just and peaceful” (Myers, 2011, p. 202).   
The practice of transformational development also shared assumptions with the 
Human Rights-Based Approach (HRBA) to development, which emerged in the early 21st 
century (Schmitz 2012, p. 524).  HRBA (also sometimes termed RBA), envisioned 
development not as charity nor yet as a technocratic exercise, but rather as the fulfilling 
of people’s human rights.  A corresponding assumption held that government 
representatives were therefore duty-bearers, who could be held accountable by their 
constituents for fulfilling those rights (Schmitz 2012, p. 528).  Based on the above 
analyses, World Vision pioneered its Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) methodology, a 
social accountability practice whereby it trained community members to, first of all, 
ascertain the obligations of local governments for providing services; determine whether 
these were being met adequately; and lobby for redress if they were not (Walker, 2018).  
CVA had its precedents in the citizen scorecards and social audits that emerged from 
countries of the global South in the 1980s and 1990s, and its origins can therefore be 
traced to grassroots struggles for transparency and accountability (World Vision senior 
development researcher). As shall be seen in the discussion below, this social 
accountability work would become a key component of the operationalization of 
Transformational Development (henceforth capitalized, to denote the official World 




Operationalizing Transformational Development 
The question remained as to how Transformational Development was to be 
operationalized.  Curiously, this entailed the use of that classic tool of development 
planning, the logical framework, or logframe. The logframe, devised by a management 
consulting firm fifty years ago for use by USAID, can be understood as the epitome of 
rationality in development planning (Krause, 2014, p. 84).  Its purpose is to provide a 
framework whereby development planners articulate the goals and objectives of a project, 
determine the inputs (i.e., activities) needed to reach them and the outputs that will result, 
and set forth assumptions undergirding the plan as well as risks to be mitigated (Krause, 
2014, pp. 70-75;  Myers, 2011, pp. 240-241).   
The use of logframes remains prevalent throughout World Vision, owing mainly 
to donors’ requiring them (according to interviewees in both the development and 
accountability areas of work within World Vision).  This is true despite the Theory of 
Change having become increasingly popular in development planning – a comparatively 
new approach in which assumptions, rather than being treated as something external as in 
the logframe, are “brought into the narrative of the theory” (Valters, 2014, p. 14).  In 
using theories of change, agencies begin by describing the desired outcome, then work 
backward to determine the objects and activities that will be needed to attain it (Valters, 
2014).   While World Vision now uses both logframes and theories of change, financing 
becomes the determining factor with respect to deciding which one will predominate:  
“[W]hereas a grant-funded project in an office would have a logframe, they would 
sometimes have a Theory of Change as well.  But I think it’s unusual to have a grant-




(World Vision accountability and learning specialist). The logframe, as a technical 
product, would be likely to be devised by staff rather than beneficiaries, with an eye to its 
consumption by donors as an indication of the rigor of World Vision’s planning process.  
This has clear implications for downward accountability, as the logframe can be 
interpreted as adding a layer of distance between beneficiary input and the agency’s 
programming. Referring to the logframe’s counterpart within domestic nonprofits, 
Mirabella points out that “the rationalist approach emphasizes a logic model that falls 
short of meeting its objectives when applied across diverse cultural, social, and political 
settings. One approach does not fit all programs” (Mirabella, 2013, p. 91).   
Thus, Myers himself acknowledged the limitations of logframes, pointing out that 
“social change is neither linear nor logical,” and that “the key to mitigating [the] potential 
weaknesses of the Log Frame is to focus first and foremost on the goals of transformation 
– changed people and changed relationships” (Myers, 2011, pp. 242 – 243). Currently, 
both the logframe and the theory of change have been used and have even on occasion 
been merged into hybrid documents that incorporate assumptions into projected 
sequences of events, the fulfillment of which would lead to desired objectives. The theory 
of change, as a more flexible instrument that is not as closely tied to inputs and outputs as 
is the logframe, is potentially more conducive to downward accountability.  Nevertheless 
the interviewee’s remark above that donors continue to insist on a logframe even in 
combination with a theory of change is indicative of the degree to which instruments 
supportive of downward accountability remain subject to constraints.  
In order to operationalize Transformational Development, World Vision’s 




dissertation has already referenced Sen’s capabilities approach; in addition, 
Transformational Development made use of the concepts of sustainable livelihoods; 
community organizing; participatory learning and action; appreciative inquiry; and 
positive deviance (Myers, 2011).  Table 1, below, outlines selected highlights from each 
of those six approaches, together with the contributions that each makes to the mission of 
transformational development, and potential drawbacks and caveats (from World 
Vision’s perspective).  It also selects a few of the key leaders for each, and the 
institutions with which they are perhaps most closely associated (although the list is not 
by any means exhaustive).  The range of institutions is arguably indicative of the breadth 
of the sources of inspiration for Transformational Development.  The various approaches 





Table 2-2:  Approaches Informing/Inspiring Transformational Development 
 
Approach Characteristics Advantages (from WV 
viewpoint) 
Disadvantages/ 








Vulnerabilities affect community 
response to shocks and disasters.  
Capacities are long-term strengths. 
Both apply to these domains:  
physical and material; social and 
organizational; and motivational 
and attitudinal. Analysis should be 
disaggregated by class and gender, 
to overcome bias. 
Aids an understanding of 
root causes.  
 
Prevents the increase of 
vulnerabilities caused by 
development projects 
(“Do No Harm”).   
None identified.  Mary Anderson and 
Peter Woodrow (co-
directors of the 
International Relief and 
Development Project at 
Harvard University at 
the time the approach 
was elaborated; later 
associated with CDA 
Collaborative, led by 
Anderson).   
Sustainable 
Livelihoods 
Five different types of capital:  
financial, human, physical, natural, 
social, and spiritual. Goal is to 
increase these assets and mitigate 
shocks/seasonal variations that 
undermine them.  Forms of capital 
are examined with respect to public 
policies, social institutions, & 
institutional processes. Strategies 
devised to improve livelihood 
outcomes.  
Expands capabilities 
beyond the personal to 
include the social and 
environmental contexts.  
None identified.  Robert Chambers (IDS 
Sussex), Gordon 
Conway (IDS Sussex, 
Rockefeller Foundation, 
Gates Foundation)   
Community 
organizing 
Five steps include: networking, 
coalition-building, action-
reflection-action, leadership 
empowerment, birth of a 
community.  
Proven effective in 
creating participation and 
ownership; is especially 







Saul Alinsky (Industrial 
Areas Foundation); 
Robert Linthicum 
(Partners in Urban 
Transformation).   
Participatory 
Learning and 
Action (PLA)   
Outsiders help rural people to 
identify their own knowledge, thus 
helping them recover their identity, 
increase their agency.  
Community can develop 
its own analysis, become 
its own advocate.  
None identified.  Evolved from Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (Robert 
Chambers, IDS Sussex).   
Appreciative 
Inquiry 
Is based on an assumption of health 
and vitality.  Asks what went right, 
how to increase it, what gives life, 
what might be, what should be 
(Delivery, Discovery, Dream, 
Dialogue).   
Adds energy to that 
which is already 
effective; avoids retrying 
that which is not.   
Unclear whether 
benefits can be 
sustained, especially 
in the face of 
potential resistance 
from those with a 
stake in the status 
quo.   
David Cooperrider and 
Suresh Srivastva 




Positive Deviance Explores diffusion of innovation in 
communities by seeking early 
adopters: those who are mitigating 
the problem.  
Promotes empowerment.  
Behavioral change 
research suggests new 
behaviors will result.  
Approach is very 
time-consuming; 
success depends on 
highly-skilled 
facilitation. Is not for 
all problems.  
Jerry and Monique 
Sternin (Save the 
Children Vietnam) 
 





Transformational Development was ultimately adopted as an official policy at the 
highest level in the agency:  defined in a document presented to and approved by World 
Vision’s governing board in 1995, then revised in 2002 and again in 2017.  The dates are 
worth noting:  World Vision adopted Transformational Development in the mid-1990s, at 
a time when participatory development methods were arguably in their ascendancy, and 
revised the policy seven years later. However, in the early 2000s the approach decreased 
in importance within the organization, relative to new priorities (according to World 
Vision specialists in accountability and learning). Those new priorities, in turn, reflected 
changes within the development community just as much as had the emergence of the 
currents that fed into transformational development.  In order to contextualize each of 
these, a discussion of the international development enterprise, and World Vision’s place 
within it, is necessary.   
Changes in the International NGO Sector:  Emerging Trends in Development and 
Humanitarian Policy and Practice 
What we might term the international development enterprise originated in the 
construction of the post-war international order. These origins are variously ascribed to 
President Harry Truman’s Four-Points speech in 1949 (Escobar, 1995); and to the 1944 
meeting in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, which by founding the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later 
one of the two concessional lending arms of the World Bank Group), established much of 
the international financial architecture that governs multilateral lending and, arguably at 




so doing, that architecture also set the stage for the disproportionate influence of wealthy 
donor governments on the same.  
By the start of the 21st century, World Vision had grown exponentially in the 
wake of the humanitarian emergencies of the 1980s and 1990s, as noted above, and had 
reached a budget of more than $886 million (World Vision 2000, p. 4).  This moment 
coincided with the rise, within the broader philanthropic community, of an emphasis on 
outcomes and results rather than mere outputs (Brest, 2010). The World Bank, as a 
source of policy advice and professional expertise, as well as – most importantly – the 
conditions it attaches to its loans, is tremendously influential (Santiso, 2001; Clemens and 
Kemerer, 2016).   Its embrace of the results agenda has proven problematic, as the 
approach rewards form over function – in other words, and paradoxically, the enactment 
of institutional reforms without due attention to whether the reforms are functioning and 
delivering results (Buntaine, Buch, and Parks, 2013).   
However, the World Bank, too, has in places acknowledged that a more 
sophisticated way of evaluating results is needed:   
 While few would argue that results are not important, the unintended 
consequences of the reporting systems that are created to prove those results are 
problematic. These consequences include short-termism and a desire to fund 
quick wins over long-term institution-building and transformational engagement 
(Bain, Booth, and Wilde, 2016, p. 21).   
 
Within World Vision, this emerging trend found expression in the creation of 
Child Well-Being Targets (later termed Child Well-Being Objectives and Aspirations), 
by means of which the organization as well as its donors would be able to track its 
success in fulfilling its core mission of improving child well-being – a mission expressed 




heart, the will to make it so” – itself derived from the Biblical verse, “I am come that they 
may have life, and have it abundantly,” John 10:10. 
In addition, like many INGOs during this period, World Vision had embraced 
organizational learning as a broader and more holistic approach to the monitoring and 
evaluation of projects (M & E), ultimately moving to the practice of monitoring, 
evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL).  The tool that World Vision began using 
for implementing MEAL was termed LEAP, for Learning through Evaluation in  
Accountability and Planning. The purpose of LEAP was to “align strategy and 
programming” by setting forth the ways in which technical programs both support and 
inform national strategies, and, ideally, “[bring] quality, consistency, and scale to 
programming” (World Vision (d), p. 4).  In doing so, World Vision hoped to bring 
adaptive learning through iteration to its work (World Vision senior staffer in 
development).   
Doing Development Differently 
World Vision’s Transformational Development approach, which had entered 
something of a lull upon the arrival of the results agenda within the development 
community, found new energy when bilateral and multilateral donors as well as 
development academics launched the Doing Development Differently (DDD) community 
in 2014 (according to a World Vision accountability specialist and a World Vision senior 
staffer specializing in development).  DDD then issued a manifesto that encompassed, in 
the first place, concepts and practices familiar to advocates of grassroots development 
approaches going back decades (consultation, participation, local ownership, 




value – seemed to consist principally in two elements:  first, in its being espoused not 
only (or even principally) by NGOs or civil society organizations (CSOs), but rather by 
government donors, who by definition are in a position to support approaches that human 
rights-minded NGOs and CSOs have long championed; and secondly, in combining 
grassroots approaches with distinctly 21st-century concepts of iterative learning via “rapid 
cycles of planning, action, reflection and revision,” with the aim of delivering better 
impact (Overseas Development Institute). Thus, at the present time, World Vision’s 
Transformational Development approach has found new support and energy from DDD, 
while the evidence-based inclination of the Child Well-Being Objectives remains 
essential, and likewise finds support in DDD.  
Moreover, in 2014, World Vision undertook a review of its performance in doing 
development differently.  The resulting report concluded that World Vision’s existing 
focus on transformational development aligned with a number of DDD principles, 
principally those revolving around iteration and adaptation. Importantly, the review 
recognized the importance of a long-term perspective:  “It often takes years, rather than 
months, before trust reaches a level where taboos are uncovered, and traditional beliefs of 
world-views can be identified and openly discussed.” (World Vision (f), p. 14).  Yet 
donor pressures for timely reporting can undermine commitment to long-term change.  
The twin donor mandates for long-term, sustainable results and “significant agility in 
producing them,” on the one hand, and the equally exacting – or even more so – donor 
demands for the grantee “to deliver projects as agreed, on time and under budget” 
resulted in an all-too-familiar dilemma. (World Vision (f), p. 35).  In addition, the 




and monitoring, and field staff expected to engage the same tasks but without the same 
level of formal training, was found to result all too frequently in a “tick-the-box” 
mentality that ran counter to the flexible and iterative approach expected to be embedded 
in transformational development no less than in “doing development differently.” (World 
Vision, p. 35; World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist).  
Perhaps most important, the review concluded by signaling three areas of concern 
going forward – developments that constitute challenges facing the international 
development sector as a whole.  First of all is the increasing need to work in what are 
termed “fragile contexts;”  or rather perhaps the increasing fragility (due to armed 
conflict or natural or human-caused disasters) of the contexts in which NGOs work.  
Second is the increasing pressure, discussed above, exerted by donors on NGOs to 
deliver evidence of impact, all the while minimizing risk.  Here, the review candidly 
asserts, “we are challenged by the pressure to reduce risk and implement prescribed  
activities in a linear mode.  This works against our desire to allow for complexity, to be 
flexible and responsive, and to empower local stakeholders” (World Vision (f) p. 43).  
Finally, and relatedly, the review acknowledges the challenges posed by the increasing 
need to rely on short-term funding (arguably owing to the trend in decreasing child 
sponsorship funds in recent years.).  One proposed solution would be for various NGOs 
to work in one community so that that community’s vision for the changes it wants to see 
happen can be realized (World Vision (f), p. 43).  Presumably this would not take place 
in the context of humanitarian emergencies, where the cluster approach, in which 
different international NGOs take on different areas, is increasingly adopted by 




The four trends discussed above  – the focus on results, also thought of as the 
evidence-based revolution; transformational development; organizational learning; and 
Doing Development Differently – are summarized in Table 2-3, below.  
 
Table 2-3:  Trends Affecting Downward Accountability in World Vision  
 
Trend Characteristics Protagonists Time span 
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Of the four, it will suffice to select one – Doing Development Differently – as an 
example of how the trend is manifested. The review that World Vision conducted of how 
it has applied Doing Development Differently contains myriad examples of the DDD 
approach.  The need for contextualization is a common theme found in that publication, 
and the rather blunt assessments in it attest to what a challenge it can often prove.  For 




 World Vision is trying to carefully manage a risk of applying standard project 
models… without appropriately adapting them for context. Each project model 
now has clear guidance around which aspects can be contextualised and which 
aspects need to be consistent with the design. We are learning that field staff need 
continual assurances and reminders that communities and partners can influence 
which technical programmes are introduced and how they are contextualised. 
Without intentional communication, field staff perceive rigidity and do not have 
the confidence to adapt in response to local realities (World Vision (f), p. 19).   
 
 Nevertheless, there are cases of successful contextualization.  Self-evident as 
it may seem that projects and plans should be adapted to the local context, implementing 
this in practice is challenging, and demands taking seriously local priorities in ways that 
Western observers might not at first expect, as the following example attests:  
 [I]n Burundi, every community identified and adapted the technical programmes 
that were relevant to their priorities.  In this process, many communities identified 
that the programs were unlikely to be successful because they were not designed 
to work in a context where alcoholism and witchcraft undermine any progress 
made.  As a result, the technical programs were re-designed to address these 
issues. (World Vision (f), p. 19).  
 
Who Will Pay?  Development, Humanitarian, and Advocacy Work at World Vision 
Development Programming:  Child Sponsorship and Stability of Funding 
Before going further into a description and analysis of the development 
effectiveness tools that World Vision uses for tracking whether it is attaining success at 
its stated goals and objectives, a further overview of the organization’s work is necessary, 
this time with a view to its operations.   
As noted earlier, World Vision carries out work in the following three broad 
areas: development programming, humanitarian relief, and advocacy.  In 2016, the 
agency operated in 99 countries with a budget of $2.72 billion dollars (this includes cash, 
food aid, and gifts-in-kind), sponsored 3.2 million children, and calculated that 41 million 




Of this, grant funding comprised $460.49 million (World Vision 2016 Annual Review, p. 
35).   
World Vision’s Development Program Approach shapes its work in the area of 
development and is set out in a handbook published in 2011. It is elaborated further in a 
100-page handbook of “good practices.” Development Programming Areas (DPAs) are 
the basic unit in which such work unfolds.  A DPA comprises a geographic area with a 
population density ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 persons in the case of programs funded 
through child sponsorship, and up to 100,000 in grant-funded programs (World Vision 
(g), p. 21).  A still further handbook provides guidance to national offices on how to 
conduct annual review and programming meetings, and it is these meetings that figure 
prominently in the reporting on how well downward accountability is being implemented 
(World Vision (h)).  
However, the Development Program Approach is not implemented in all 
Development Programming Areas.  Instead, the review referenced above (Doing 
Development Differently: What Have We Learned?) found that “of those area programs 
practicing our Development Program Approach, 73 percent were stimulating 
transformational development. Of those not practicing our approach, 53 percent were 
stimulating transformational change” – presumably prompting an inclination to 
disseminate the DPA to the remaining area programs.  (World Vision (f), p. 38).   
The distinction between child sponsorship funding and grant funding is key for at 
least two reasons:  child sponsorship provides a steady stream of funding that enables 
DPAs to implement programs with, ideally, a 15-year timeframe. This is in contrast to 




Vision accountability specialist).   In addition, child sponsors do not impose the exacting 
reporting requirements with respect to outcome measurements that official donors do. In 
contrast, bilateral agencies such as the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), multilateral donors such as the World Bank, or large private foundations such as, 
famously, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation all bring with them an emphasis on 
outcomes measurement as a condition of aid.  Individual donors, on the other hand, give 
for expressive reasons – i.e., giving is an expression of their values and identity – and 
because they trust the object of their benevolence to do the right thing (academic expert 
interviewee). Child sponsorship could in this way be considered a way of reconciling the 
personal and/or religious impulses behind charity with the large scale and technocratic 
aspirations of philanthropy (Gross, 2003).   
 It could be argued that in providing the child sponsors with regular reports on the 
progress experienced by the recipients of their benevolence, the agency provides a 
“good” in exchange for funds. Where Krause’s conception of “the good project” posits 
the development or humanitarian relief project itself as the good being provided by 
NGOs and consumed by donors, in the case of child sponsorship it is arguably the 
relationship between sponsor and child that constitutes such a good (Krause, 2014).  
Bornstein and others have conceptualized this practice as constituting the potential 
commodification of children, of their innocence and vulnerability (Bornstein, 2001, p. 
597; Li, 2017; Noh, 2018, p. 3).  Whether or not one wholly accepts this analysis, child 
sponsorship, in providing stability of unrestricted income, may be thought of as a type of 
income-generating activity that helps to partially free the child sponsorship agency from 




funds long-term development programming as distinct from emergency humanitarian 
relief (World Vision accountability specialist).   
Additionally, in a development that perhaps typifies the changes in the 
international development sector more generally, the rise of middle-income countries, 
with a concomitant rise in the proportion of middle-class citizens, has also led to an 
increase in the number of persons in those countries willing to sponsor children.  As an 
example, the number of child sponsors in India is growing at 25 per year on average, and 
25 percent of World Vision’s global revenues are raised in Asian nations, compared with 
10 percent only 10 years ago (World Vision Annual Report 2013, p. 96).  
Humanitarian Relief:  Reliance on Grants and Contracts 
Humanitarian relief, in contrast, is more typically funded by government and 
foundation grants and contracts. As noted above, these entail much more stringent 
reporting requirements and outcomes measurement (World Vision accountability 
specialist).  The implications for the efficacy of downward accountability mechanisms of 
these contrasting funding models will be explored in the next chapter. But the 
prominence of standard-setting in the realm of humanitarian action is especially clear.  As 
Calhoun has put it, “[H]umanitarian action has become the province of large-scale 
organizations, donors with demands for evidence of efficacy and efficiency, and a 
profession with its own standards of good performance” (Calhoun, 2008, p. 95).   
There exists a staff perception that in recent years the balance between the funding stream 
provided by child sponsorship funds and the stream provided by grants and contracts has 
been changing, tipping increasingly in the direction of the latter. At this writing, 




summaries, did not yield confirmation of this perception.  It was possible however to 
review the Form 990 tax forms of World Vision U.S.   While its experience does not 
necessarily reflect the experience of the entire federation (although its revenues comprise 
somewhat more than one third of the federation’s total), the five years between 2011 and 
2017, inclusive, demonstrated a slight upward trend, as reflected in Table 2-4, below.   
Table 2-4:  Government Grants as Proportion of Total Revenue, in millions of dollars  
 Government Grants Total Revenue Percentage 
2017 $ 303         $ 1,044 29% 
2016 $ 220         $ 1,014 23% 
2015 $ 220         $ 1,006 22% 
2014 $ 172         $    998 17% 
2013 $ 195         $ 1,027 19% 
2012 $ 179         $    975 18% 
2011 $ 175         $ 1,000 17% 
 
Note:  Percentages are inexact due to rounding.  Sources:  World Vision, Annual Reports.  
Reports for 2016 and 2017 are found in brochure form, a format different from that used in 
previous years.  
 
If this trend is borne out across World Vision, it can be expected that grant 
donors’ expectations of demonstrable effectiveness will increasingly affect programming 
across both humanitarian and development work.  World Vision UK, at least, in its 2017 
annual report candidly addresses the decline in sponsorship funding, pointing to the need 
to increase such funding as a challenge, and also acknowledging the increased 
importance of grant funding (World Vision UK, 2017, p. 2).  With a budget at nearly the 
equivalent of $104 million in 2017, it comprises a not insignificant part of the federation; 
as importantly, the influential nature of its government donor, DFID, has larger 
implications for the organization as a whole (as well as the INGO sector more generally).   
The proportion of funding going toward humanitarian work, as reflected in World 




result of large humanitarian disasters on a given year.  Thus, no clear trends emerged 
from the time that these reports started disaggregating funding for humanitarian work in 
2008, through 2017.   
However, the areas covered by grant funding go beyond the context of immediate 
humanitarian emergencies.  Instead, grants typically go to fund work in “the most 
vulnerable communities, including fragile, urban, remote or nomadic populations” 
(World Vision (g), p. 24).   
Advocacy:  Transferring Responsibility for Service Provision to the Duty-Bearers? 
Finally, the advocacy arm of World Vision’s work encompasses advocacy at the 
global, national, subnational and local levels.  For example, global advocacy included, in 
2017, the completion of a seven-year campaign promoting child and maternal health, 
entitled Child Health Now, and another campaign against violence against children – the 
Global Partnership to End Violence against Children, alluded to on page 1.  As for the 
other levels, in the interests of promoting the sustainability of their interventions after the 
conclusion of World Vision involvement, the organization developed the program of 
social accountability work, Citizen Voice and Action, referenced earlier.  The purpose of 
this area of work, originally entitled Community-Based Performance Management, was 
to coach community members to demand greater accountability on the part of 
government service providers. In this way, rather than remaining dependent on World 
Vision for service provision the community could come to rely on government, the 
official duty-bearer.  (World Vision senior development researcher; World Vision social 




The distinction between development work on the one hand, and humanitarian 
relief on the other, is not necessarily always precise.  This is more and more the case in a 
world in which humanitarian emergencies are increasing not only in number but also in 
the length of the recovery period (Barnett, 2008). This has implications not only for the 
relationship between humanitarian and development work, but also for the relationship 
between each of them and advocacy work, at least at the local and subnational levels.  
One interviewee, specializing in social accountability work, explained it as follows.  In 
the immediate aftermath of an emergency, priority is placed quite naturally on saving 
lives, and in such a context it is infeasible to simultaneously train people to advocate for 
better service provision.  As a community transitions from the disaster, however, 
government agencies are expected to incrementally take on greater responsibility for 
service provision, and thus social accountability begins to take on importance.  Once 
stability has been reached, ideally government can be held one hundred percent 
accountable for service provision (World Vision social accountability specialist).  This, 
of course, begs the question of how often such a situation occurs.   
Conclusion  
This chapter has set out the history of World Vision’s evolution from a 
missionary and relief organization, fueled by one man’s passionate if sometimes 
unorthodox zeal, into a multibillion-dollar global federation and industry leader.  It has 
also situated that evolution within the broader trends shaping the international 
development and humanitarian relief sectors, trends themselves shaped by changes in 
philanthropy as well as in foreign aid (i.e., government aid) more generally. That 




originated:  “fascination with technology, especially with the almost magical force of 
mass media, and an uncritical patriotism that saw the American Way of Life as a cure for 
the ills of the world” (VanderPol, 2010, pp. 87-88).   
The story of World Vision’s spectacular growth is in many ways the story of post-
Second World War growth experienced by many of the other international NGOs.  The 
story of its (partial) secularization is, however, different from the experience of 
mainstream NGOs.  Organizations such as Church World Service or Catholic Relief 
Services, which likewise flourished in the postwar context and subsequently 
professionalized by adopting mainstream international development thinking and 
practices, seem to have exerted little influence on World Vision (VanderPol, 2010, p. 90, 
p. 345; Gerstbauer, 2010, p. 854).  For example, as long ago as 1967, Catholic Relief 
Services could see fit to find inspiration in the motto, “Development is the new name for 
peace,” from the papal encyclical Populorum Progressio (Paul VI, 1967). In contrast, 
World Vision’s own turn toward development did not begin until the next decade.  
In sum, World Vision’s response and adaptation to the same forces that shaped 
the evolution of other international NGOs during the Cold War was indeed sui generis.  
Arguably, World Vision’s strong sense of itself as an evangelical organization allowed it 
to continue to identify itself as such, even as it increasingly took up a philanthropic 
approach to its work in the decades that followed the transition from its original 
leadership.  
In similar fashion, World Vision’s response to the trends prevailing in the post-
Cold War period was also shaped by its own internal priorities.  While the emergence of 




agency’s very public commitment to a transformational approach to development and 
humanitarian work constitutes a not insignificant countervailing internal force 
(Gerstbauer, 2010).  Nonetheless, the evidence-based revolution in the development and 
humanitarian sectors in general, and with respect to downward accountability 
specifically, has led to the establishment of a host of tools and processes within World 
Vision that are intended to enable it to meet donor requirements.  The next chapter will 
consider these artefacts in some detail.  The description of these will serve to set the 
context within which to then discuss findings from a review of the evidence from the 
documentary record and from the field, as reflected in selected Child Well-Being 
Reports; annual accountability reports;  and semi-structured interviews of past and 
present World Vision staff members and academic experts.  The findings from those 
sources, and the interpretation of those findings, comprise the content of that chapter and 






CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
Research Questions 
This dissertation poses the following research questions:  How did World Vision 
come to decide to adopt downward accountability?  How is downward accountability 
being implemented at World Vision? What challenges – if any – is the organization 
encountering in the course of implementation, and how is it addressing them?  It is 
anticipated that by shedding light on these questions, it may be possible to draw broader 
implications regarding the still comparatively nascent field of downward accountability. 
Research Design 
The dissertation comprises a within-case comparison of experiences in downward 
accountability within World Vision across countries and over time. Thus, data were 
collected from internal reports produced by 64 country offices, and from publications 
spanning 18 years. The rationale for case selection was described in Chapter One  and 
thus will be only briefly recapitulated here.   
World Vision is a self-described “Christian relief, development and advocacy 
organization dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome 
poverty and injustice” (World Vision ). Its federated system has been in place 
significantly longer than those of many of its peer INGOs, having been established in 
1978.  Its annual budget of nearly $3 billion makes it the largest INGO.   
Whaites (1999) has chronicled how World Vision’s ideological differences with 
INGOs such as Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, and Plan 




contrasted with  its somewhat paradoxical position as one of the first INGOs to 
decentralize and thus ostensibly devolve power back to its Southern offices.  Thus, 
writing as early as 1999, he captured its complex and sometimes contradictory nature in 
this way:   
a partnership of development NGOs that is Christian, but free from church 
sectarianism; an agency which is large, but whose Southern partners wield 
enormous influence within its corporate structures; an NGO which has moved 
from political conservatism to being criticized by the Christian right for its 
advocacy work and partnership with Marxist regimes; an organization which has 
become global, with some 17 industrialized-country partners and over 80 in the 
South (Whaites, 1999, pp. 411-412).  
 
There is sufficient evidence to conclude that World Vision constitutes, despite its 
large size and prominent position, something of an outlier case.  It is, in any event, an 
exemplar of the concept of downward accountability, not necessarily because of having 
achieved success in that area – the question of its success or not is, after all, the focus of 
this inquiry. Rather, it is because of having undertaken downward accountability in an 
explicit and carefully planned way; having tracked these efforts in an ongoing manner; 
and having taken the efforts seriously enough to commission an external study on the 
subject.4   
This dissertation employs purposive sampling, using exemplars sampling since it 
is expected to illuminate the sensitizing concepts discussed on page 65, below (Charmaz 
and Belgrave, 2007; Patton, 2014, pp. 264 and 269) 
Positionality 
The researcher’s own positionality should be noted, as she was for some years a 
staff person at the association of U.S.-based NGOs that engage in international relief and 
                                               




development, the Association for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), and had 
worked for some of its members – although not World Vision – in previous years.  
Indeed, professional contacts made during those years facilitated the initial access to 
World Vision for purposes of this research.   Also worth noting are the researcher’s 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in international development and a history of policy 
advocacy and activism in support of issues that might be loosely classed under 
“transformational development,” such as improved food security policies and poor-
country debt relief.   
All of the above informed the researcher’s understanding of the issues being 
discussed by the interviews, as well as her review of the extant literature on development 
and humanitarian relief.  In these ways, positionality can be understood to have been an 
asset to the research.  Conversely, of course, this positionality also potentially introduces 
bias. Even more conducive to bias is the experience of having been a participant in, and 
observer of, INGO advocacy and countless debates with multilateral donor agency staff 
precisely during the years that INGO ascendancy was reaching its peak,  followed by 
INGOs rapidly coming under heavy criticism and the questioning of their own 
accountability.  Thus, efforts were made to mitigate any bias through the following 
means: member-checking of the interviews; the writing of analytic memos; the use of 
diverse types of data – interviews as well as published and unpublished reports; and 
review of the extant literature, including and importantly literature critical of NGOs.     
Population, Participants, and Sampling Technique 
In the first phase, twenty-two semi-structured interviews were conducted, 




selected academic experts. Institutional Review Board approval was sought on an 
expedited basis, as no harm was anticipated to the interviewees from the process.  Written 
permission from them was waived, as oral permission was deemed sufficient.  The 
interview guide can be found in Appendix I.   
The interviewees were selected using purposive sampling – specifically, snowball 
sampling (Merriam and Tisdell, 2016, pp. 97 – 98;  Patton, 2015, p. 289.  They included 
staff members from the three different program areas of the organization: development, 
humanitarian relief, and advocacy; across various levels within the organizational 
hierarchy, from program officers in the field to senior management at global 
headquarters; and across nine countries on five continents.  
The nature of the interviewees’ positions as development and humanitarian 
experts, both within and outside World Vision, is similar to that of elites. In elite 
interviewing, snowball sampling is preferred to random sampling for the reason that it 
makes it possible to reach interviewees to whom the researcher might not otherwise have 
access (Noy, 2007, p. 331; Tansey, 2007). In addition, when the researcher selects the 
initial set of interviewees based on their positions, snowball sampling makes it possible to 
then select further interviewees based on their reputations for being knowledgeable about 
the subject under study (Tansey, 2007, pp. 18 – 21).  This was in fact the process 
followed in this dissertation:  an initial list of ten interviewees generated after the first 
interview with an acknowledged expert in the organization led to further interviews of 





A total of 22 interviews were conducted.  Interviews averaged one hour in length, 
were audio recorded and transcribed, and then sent to the interviewees for member-
checking. Twelve of the interviewees availed themselves of the opportunity to return 
either comments or their affirmation that they had reviewed the transcript of their 
interview and had no comments.  The semi-structured interviews were supplemented by 
five informal interviews conducted with current and past staff and academic experts, the 
content of which was captured in written notes. The lists of interviews are found in 
Appendix B. 
Data Collection 
Data were collected in roughly three phases and from three principal sources.  
First, the interviews referenced above, both informal and semi-structured, were 
conducted with key World Vision staff members and other experts.  Secondly, data were 
extracted from the annual reports and annual accountability reports published by World 
Vision.  Thirdly, internal datasets summarizing accountability results were provided by 
World Vision. The data from these three sets of sources were analyzed in the manner to 
be discussed starting on page 73, below.    
In addition, a range of specialized publications (located on the World Vision 
website) and internal documents (provided by the agency), and comprising a toolkit, a 
pilot study, and other documents relating to transformational development and to 
downward accountability, were reviewed prior to conducting the interviews.  
The sensitizing concepts initially used to guide data collection were as follows: 
downward accountability,  social accountability, humanitarian relief, and development.  




also used to guide the inquiry:  power, transformation, and organizational learning 
(Patton 2014, pp. 358-363). 
Sensitizing concepts by their very nature are not intended to be definitive, but are 
instead intended to be suggestive, in that way eliciting ideas (Bowen 2006).  Indeed, 
[a] sensitizing concept lacks … specification of attributes or benchmarks and 
consequently it does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its 
relevant content.  Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and 
guidance in approaching empirical instances.  Whereas definitive concepts 
provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest 
directions along which to look (Blumer, 1954, p. 7).   
 
The sensitizing concepts listed above, therefore, are used in the following manner.  
Downward accountability,  to reiterate the description in the introduction to this 
dissertation, refers here to those policies and practices, undertaken by a nongovernmental 
organization, and the procedures used to promote and enforce them, designed to collect 
and act upon beneficiary feedback and complaints. This description, devised for the 
purposes of this dissertation, is informed by existing definitions of downward 
accountability in the literature (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Bendell 2006; 
Kilby 2006; Lloyd, Warren, and Hammer 2008).   
Social accountability, reiterating the discussion in the introduction, refers here to 
the practice of holding the providers of public services accountable to those who use 
those services (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Fox, 2015; Walker, 2018). 
Humanitarian relief indicates humanitarian action to ensure crisis-affected people 
receive the assistance and protection they need (UN OCHA).  
Development is used here to refer to INGO efforts to promote a better quality of 




number of sectors such as:  health; education; water, sanitation and hygiene; livelihoods; 
agriculture; forestry; and others.  It is used in contradistinction to humanitarian relief.   
Power is used to refer to “the ability to act or produce an effect,” as well as 
“possession of control, authority or influence over others” (Merriam-Webster).  It also is 
meant to evoke Amartya Sen’s concept of capabilities, which is to say, the freedoms 
enjoyed by persons to secure lives they find beneficial in some meaningful way (Sen, 
1999).   
Transformational development evokes the approach to development espoused by 
World Vision starting in the 1970s, one “reflect[ing a] concern for seeking positive 
change in the whole of human life, materially, socially, psychologically and spiritually” 
(Myers, 2011, p. 3).  It is distinguished from, simply, development by its holistic 
approach as well as by its emancipatory aspirations as described in Chapter Two.  
Finally, with respect to organizational learning, Fiol and Lyle’s definition 
provides a good starting point:  “the process of improving actions through better 
knowledge and understanding” (Fiol and Lyle, 1985, p. 803). In the context of this 
dissertation, the concept is used to designate the organizational tools developed and used 
by World Vision to do just that: improve its effectiveness in development and 
humanitarian work by gathering data and ultimately increasing knowledge about its 
performance generally and in particular with respect to downward accountability.  
In addition, several interviews made reference to data from 64 annual, national-
level reports on the state of child well-being. The Child Well-Being Report is a document 




(or field office) as measured by the Child Well-Being Indicators.5  As will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, a planning tool called the Performance Effectiveness Self-Review Tool 
(PE-SRT) is used to track progress toward the indicators, and staff are expected to 
include in each Child Well-Being Report a discussion of the use of the PE-SRT.  Each 
report is also expected to include data on the degree to which downward accountability 
measures are being implemented according to another planning tool called the Program 
Accountability Framework (PAF), which is embedded within the PE-SRT.  The Child 
Well-Being Report is therefore the single tool available to the organizational learning and 
accountability staff at global headquarters that enables them to capture effectiveness data, 
including downward accountability effectiveness data (former World Vision staffer 
specializing in accountability training).  Country programs differ across a relatively broad 
range not only in terms of the degree to which they are downwardly accountable, but 
even as to whether they report on downward accountability at all. Chapter Four draws on 
the data from the 64 Child Well-Being reports to extend the analysis developed from 
coding of the annual reports and accountability reports. Typically only one or two pages 
if any (out of, generally, 30 pages or slightly more) at the end of each Child Well-Being 
report are dedicated to discussing downward accountability.  This content is then 
abstracted by World Vision staff and organized into spreadsheets.  It is the resulting 
datasets, comprising data compiled from the Child Well-Being reports for the years 2016-
2017, that were analyzed during research for this dissertation.  
                                               
5 Although in most cases a field office, and its corresponding Child Well-Being Report, 
corresponds to a country, there are a few exceptions.  For example, Albania and Kosovo are 
served by a single office which produces a single report.  The same is true of Jerusalem/West 




The sections below describe how the data were analyzed.  Instead of being 
organized chronologically, which would place the interviews first, the sections are 
organized thematically.  Thus, the first section addresses the data from the accountability 
reports, correspondence with Accountable Now, and Child Well-Being reports; while the 
second section focuses on the interview data.    
Data Analysis  
The Accountability Reports 
The accountability reports were coded thematically using the codebook 
constructed for use with a subset of the interviews, which will be described below.  The 
initial number of 137 codes in that book was reduced after thorough readings and re-
readings of the interviews (Saldaña, 2016). Codes assigned to phenomena identified by 
the interviewees and unlikely to be found in a public document such as the 
Accountability Report were excluded from the initial 137, to arrive at 74 codes, which 
were deemed to be useful for coding those publications.   
The codebook constructed for purposes of the Accountability Reports was thus 
limited to codes designating broad concepts such as objectives, results, consultation or 
transformation; or the names of organizational learning tools such as LEAP 3 or Design, 
Monitoring and Evaluation.  Because of the voluminous nature of the data, the 74 codes 
thus generated were assigned through a combination of automatic and manual methods.  
Correspondence with Accountable Now 
Since the publication of its 2009 Accountability Report, World Vision has been in 
correspondence with the peer-review mechanism, or accountability club, Accountable 




accountability reports and responds to them with acknowledgements of what it deems to 
be good practice; requests for further information; and suggestions on how to improve 
accountability practices and reporting.  World Vision in turns responds to this feedback.  
In this way, the years from 2009 until the present have yielded a trove of additional data 
that were used to supplement the sources above.    
The correspondence between World Vision and Accountable Now was therefore 
also coded using the 74 codes referenced above. As not all of the 74 codes corresponded 
to the data, they were reduced to 57.  These 57 codes were then used to code the data, and 
the results are, as with the results from coding the other data sources, reported in Chapter 
Three.   
Finally, data were obtained from the annual Child Well-Being reports. These data 
consisted of text previously extracted (by World Vision) from the reports, organized into 
spreadsheets, and subdivided into four categories corresponding to World Vision’s four 
pillars of downward accountability:  Consultation, Participation, Information Provision, 
and Feedback-and Complaint mechanisms and systems.  Thus, there was a cell for each 
of the four pillars with respect to each country (of those whose reports contained 
downward accountability data).  
However, not all of the 64 countries produced data in every one of the four pillars.  
Instead, as can be seen in Table 7 below, within Information Provision, only 37 countries, 
or 58 percent, were represented;  for Consultation, the figures were 36 countries (56 
percent); and for Feedback and Complaint, 35 countries (55 percent). Only within 





Table 3-1:  Child Well-Being Reports that Contain Downward Accountability Data 
Downward 
Accountability Pillar 
Number of Country Child 
Well-Being Reports 
Percentage of Country Child 
Well-Being Reports 
Feedback and Complaint 35 55% 
Information Provision 37 58% 
Consultation 36 56% 
Participation 47 73% 
 
Of the 64 field offices, 58 produced within their Child Well-Being reports data on 
any one (or more) of the downward accountability pillars.  Thus, six field offices 
produced no such data at all (the 58 field offices are listed in Appendix G).  This is not so 
surprising when we consider that, as described by some of the interviewees in Chapter 
Five, the introduction of the Programme Accountability Framework intended to structure 
reporting of downward accountability implementation was still unevenly adopted across 
the countries, and that downward accountability reporting was frequently experienced as 
an additional burden emanating from the federation’s headquarters rather than necessarily 
an intrinsic part of relief and development programs.  
Text describing downward accountability experiences for each of countries in 
each of the four pillars was coded separately by country, in order to enable cross-country 
comparisons (the codebooks for these data are found in Appendix G).  Coding then 
proceeded as follows:  the 137 codes derived from the analysis of the interview data 
described in Chapter Five were applied to the Child Well-Being data in first-cycle coding 
(Saldaña, 2016, p. 55).   In the second cycle, new codes were added, principally 
evaluative codes.  All the codes were then grouped into eight categories, as follows: 1) 




engagement; 4) evaluative comments; 5) feedback and complaint mechanisms and 
systems;  6) humanitarian practice influence; 7) management issues; and 8) metrics and 
quantification. 
These eight categories were used to organize the data in each of the four pillars.  
Feedback and complaint mechanisms and systems, while constituting one of the pillars in 
itself, was applied to the data for each of the four pillars, due to its importance for 
downward accountability. For the same reason, closing the feedback loop and getting 
results was also used.   
The Interviews  
The 22 semi-structured interviews were divided into three categories:  nine 
interviews of humanitarian programming staff; 10 interviews of development 
programming staff; and three interviews, classed in a third category comprised of outside 
experts and staff working in administration, fundraising, or other areas not directly 
connected to program and project work. A word frequency count was then conducted of 
the two first sets of interviews. Based on the words appearing most frequently, keywords 
were selected that were then subsumed into the following themes:  effectiveness and 
metrics; emancipation or transformation; funding from grants and contracts; 
management; organizational learning; and technology. These inductively derived themes 
were used to inform the first round of coding.   
In this first round of coding,  in vivo codes and some descriptive codes were used 
(Glesne, 2016; p. 197; Saldaña, 2016, p. 55).  These first-cycle methods were selected as 
a “method of attuning [oneself] to participant perspectives and actions,” since the 




the phenomenon being studied, and their actions constituted the phenomenon itself 
(Saldaña, 2016, p. 73).   
In addition, process codes were used, as they are both more vivid than descriptive 
codes and also help to build a narrative of the process of change being studied – i.e., the 
adoption and implementation of downward accountability over time (Saldaña, 2016, p. 
78).  The 10 interviews of development staff yielded, as noted,  137, to which new codes 
were added for a total of 140 codes.  The nine interviews of humanitarian staff yielded 
166 codes.  Each set of codes was then grouped into a set of categories, which overlapped 
to a certain extent between the two sets of interviews.  For the development staff 
interviews, the categories were as follows:  1) culture of compliance; 2) consultation; 3) 
funding and resources; 4) humanitarian sector; 5) information provision; 6) management 
issues;  7) power; 8) results orientation; 9) safeguarding; and 10) training.   For the 
interviews with humanitarian staff, the codes were distilled into the following themes:  1) 
complaint and feedback mechanisms; 2) complaint and feedback more generally 
considered; 3) culture of compliance; 4) consultation; 5) funding and resources; 6) 
humanitarian sector; 7) information provision; 8) management issues; 9) organizational 
learning; 10) participation; 11) power; 12) results orientation; 13) safeguarding; and, 14) 
training.  Finally, the themes that emerged from the categories were:  culture of 
compliance; funding; humanitarian aid; organizational learning; power; and results.  
These appear in Table 3-2 – the categories disaggregated by type of interview, as 





Table 3-2:  Themes and Categories Derived from Interviews 
Development Staff Interviews Humanitarian Staff Interviews	
CULTURE OF COMPLIANCE Complaint and feedback mechanisms 
Consultation Complaint and feedback generally  
FUNDING AND RESOURCES Culture of compliance 
HUMANITARIAN SECTOR Consultation 
Information provision FUNDING AND RESOURCES 
Management issues HUMANITARIAN SECTOR 
POWER Information provision 
RESULTS ORIENTATION Management issues 
Safeguarding ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Training Management issues	
Safeguarding	 Participation	
RESULTS ORIENTATION POWER 	 RESULTS ORIENTATION 		 Training	
 
Quality Assurance  
The following methods were employed to help ensure quality: the writing of 
analytic memos and the member-checking of transcripts. Four of the interviewees took 
the opportunity to return edits for accuracy, which were subsequently taken into account 
in finalizing the interview transcripts. An additional eight took the opportunity to respond 




respond had been presented to them as optional in any case). In addition, selected World 
Vision staff were invited to read and comment on a draft of the first four chapters of the 
dissertation manuscript. The methods described above were used to support the 
credibility of the research, which is – very broadly speaking – situated within the 







CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS FROM SECONDARY DATA 
Enhanced Attention to Feedback Mechanisms, but at What Cost? 
This chapter will summarize findings based on data gathered from three sources:  
first, from two series of annual reports published by the agency:  its overall annual report 
(2000-2017), and its annual accountability report (2010-2017).  Secondly, from the 64 
annual country reports on Child Well-Being, as summarized in internal datasets.  And 
thirdly, from correspondence between World Vision and the peer review organization, 
Accountable Now.  In Chapter Five, these findings will be triangulated with those from 
the interview data.  
The data were richest with respect to feedback and complaints.  It is in this pillar 
that the Child Well-Being Report data showed the greatest self-reflection on effectiveness 
and on what was and was not being achieved, and why.  However, in a perhaps 
unexpected development, participation  was found to not be necessarily confined to later 
stages of programming, i.e., only to implementation, but apparently just as often took 
place at the initial, visioning stage (although not at the technical design stage).   
Although the greatest volume of data relevant to the research questions were those 
from the Child Well-Being reports, a review of findings from the annual reports, the 
accountability reports, and the correspondence with Accountable Now will serve to set 
the stage for discussion 
The Role of Annual Reports in Relation to Nonprofit Accountability 
If the public at large is to be considered a stakeholder with respect to nonprofits, 
then the annual organizational report becomes a key component with respect to nonprofit 




availability of financial information online via 990 tax forms has arguably put a greater 
onus on the organizational – as opposed to financial – annual report to convey substantive 
information that can be easily understood by the public:  “Organizations seeking to 
enhance their public reporting should not view the release or even widespread 
dissemination of their 990s as fulfilling the purpose of public reporting.  For the lay 
public, columns of numbers do not present useful information”  (Lee 2004, p. 178).   
The purpose of annual reports is, on the face of it, to fulfill a duty, if not to 
absolute transparency, then at least – in one memorable formulation – to “translucency,” 
or the idea that “nonprofit organizations can partially implement their accountability to 
the citizenry through public reporting, albeit at levels lower than expected of government 
agencies” (Lee 2004, p. 178).  Implied in some descriptions of such annual reports is the 
idea that they exist to convey a favorable impression of the organization and thus garner 
support for it (Lee 2004, p. 179).  Too often, “reports are… focused on the user needs of 
powerful funders, influenced by media attention, sometimes misleading or more in line 
with an [sic] impression management than providing an overall, unbiased picture of 
NGOs’ performance” (Traxler, Greiling, Hebesberger 2018, page not numbered).    
In terms of how to approach the content of annual reports, while a high volume of 
“organizational annual reports, CEO speeches, corporate press releases, advertisements, 
and stand-alone environmental, triple bottom line and sustainability reports” is now 
extant, much of the analysis of such reports “is still dominated by rather mechanistic and 
somewhat reductionist analyses of texts which often fail to adequately consider issues of 
quality, meaning and accountability” (Tregidga, Milne, and Lehman, 2012). The 




be evaluated is therefore an important new development, and opens up a potentially 
fruitful avenue for exploration.    
The use of sustainability reporting by nonprofits has been recommended since 
some time ago (Lee, 2004, p. 179-180).  In the latter part of the last century, the Coalition 
for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) Principles came into effect as a 
voluntary mechanism for corporations to monitor their own performance with respect to 
environmental protection and sustainability (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development; Smith III, J.A., 1993).  The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) later 
emerged from that organization as a stand-alone entity, in a process described as being 
shaped by “institutional entrepreneurs” who leveraged their strong networks into the 
creation of the GRI (Levy, Brown and DeJong, 2010).  Today, the GRI principles are 
employed by AccountableNow, the peer review mechanism of which World Vision is a 
member, and which will be described below.   
Sustainability reporting raises the stakes of the reporting process, since rather than 
controlling the narrative exclusively by limiting itself to the production of its own annual 
reports, an organization hands over at least partial control to the rating entity.  Moreover, 
a tension may be found to exist between the desire to envision accounting as a purely 
rational activity, steeped in the ethos of the modernizing project, and a postmodern 
approach that is willing to consider multiple interpretations of the activities being 
reported (Oakes and Oakes, 2012).    
The evenness of annual reports varies across organizations and across time.  
World Vision’s annual reports, as will be seen below, began to refer explicitly to 




Accountability Emerging, Part One:  The Annual Review   
Like most international NGOs and indeed most nonprofit organizations, World 
Vision publishes an annual report of its activities, outlining goals, detailing outcomes  
attained, and providing financial reporting on the fiscal year recently concluded.  This 
report, called the Annual Review, is available online starting from the year 2000.  Thus 
18 such reports are now available (from the year 2000 through the year 2017, inclusive), 
allowing a glimpse of how accountability has emerged alongside the results agenda as 
salient within the broader development community.  
Viewed first simply on the basis of length, the Annual Reviews were of a standard 
length – 20 pages – for the first five years of their publication (years 2000 – 2004, 
inclusive).  Subsequently they began to vary in length and format, peaking at 71 pages 
with the 2014 review; with later reports subsiding back to shorter lengths, and the latest 
one (from 2017) comprising only eight pages.  A word frequency count revealed that the 
word “accountability” was not used at all for the first five years of the report’s 
publication (despite, of course, being implicit in the report’s existence), but started to 
appear in 2005.  After that point, accountability was mentioned generally more and more 
frequently in successive reports, although increasing in some years while declining in 
others.  
Because the reports varied in length, Table 4-1 presents the word frequency count 
numbers both in absolute numbers and proportionately by page.  Figures 4-1 and 4-2 
present these same data in graphical form.  At first glance, it is apparent that there is a 
significant spike, in both absolute terms and also in per-page terms, occurring in the 




significantly in absolute terms in the year 2017, they increase proportionately quite 
markedly.  
The sheer number of mentions of the word “accountability” is, of course, only a 
rough proxy for the level of attention paid, and importantly does not distinguish among 
upward, downward, and lateral accountability – lateral accountability being 
accountability to other stakeholders such as staff, board, and volunteers (Christensen and 
Ebrahim, 2006, p. 8).  Nevertheless, it serves for the purpose here, which is to highlight 
the emergence of accountability, broadly understood, as a topic worth singling out in 
World Vision’s external communications.  This in turn implies an awareness of the value 




Table 4-1:  Mentions of “Accountability” in World Vision Annual Reviews,  
2000 – 2017  
 






2000 0 20 0 
2001 0 20 0.00 
2002 0 20 0.00 
2003 0 20 0.00 
2004 0 20 0.00 
2005 3 12 0.25 
2006 0 28 0.00 
2007 2 8 0.25 
2008 0 20 0.00 
2009 3 6 0.50 
2010 2 6 0.33 
2011 1 30 0.03 
2012 27 59 0.46 
2013 19 15 1.27 
2014 18 71 0.25 
2015 9 18 0.50 
2016 9 25 0.36 





































For comparison, Figure 4-3 demonstrates the number of mentions of 
“accountability” in the annual report of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
organization comprising 36 wealthy donor countries, for the years 2000 – 2017. The 
DAC was selected as a proxy for donor thinking in order to illuminate parallels between 
World Vision and the community of official donors with respect to their views of the 
importance of accountability, and the evolution of those views over the first two decades 
of the 21st century.  As Eyben has observed:   
the DAC, as a constituent part of the OECD, seeks to influence how the world 
thinks and acts by identifying and finding good practice solutions to problems;  
these become standards against which member states’ actions are scrutinized 
through peer review (Eyben and Savage, 2013, p. 80).   
 
Figure 4-3 also shows the number of times per page that “accountability” is 
mentioned in the annual World Vision reports for the same time span. It is evident from 
the chart that the two series of data points track relatively closely for the years 2000 – 
2011.  After that point they diverge significantly, with World Vision increasing its 







Figure 2-3:  Mentions of “Accountability” per page, DAC and WV annual reports 
 
It perhaps should not be surprising that mentions of accountability in World 
Vision’s Annual Review increased significantly starting in 2012.  As discussed in 
Chapter One,  the late 2000s and early 2010s saw an increase in public interest in the 
accountability of institutions generally, and nonprofit organizations and NGOs in 
particular.  This was also the period that saw the emergence of the results agenda that will 
be discussed in Chapter Five.  Accordingly, in 2009, World Vision began publishing for 
the first time, in addition to its Annual Review, an annual report dedicated exclusively to 
accountability.   
Besides taking place in the broader context of increased calls for accountability 
and evidence of effectiveness within the development enterprise generally, the year 2010 
was significant for a number of reasons particular to World Vision.  Firstly, 2010 was the 
year that World Vision adopted its Child Well-Being Indicators. The foreword to the 









contribute, as a leading NGO, to efforts within the development community towards an 
evidence-based approach: 
During 2010, we endorsed targets related to our child well-being aspirations and 
outcomes. In the years ahead, we will measure the impact of our programmes 
towards these targets. We intend to play our part in contributing to enhanced 
standards across the relief and development sector (World Vision (s), p. 1).  
 
Secondly, by that time World Vision had joined the INGO Accountability Charter 
(since 2016 renamed “Accountable Now.”).  Joining meant a commitment to the 10 
Accountability Commitments listed on page 24, expressed in measurement across a range 
of indicators.  These indicators addressed the areas of:  1) governance; 2) stakeholder 
engagement; and 3) performance.  Performance was measured across program 
effectiveness, economic resources, environmental and social impacts, labor relations, and 
a category termed “product responsibility,” related to “ethical marketing and 
communications” (World Vision (s), pages 63-66).  Joining meant a commitment on the 
part of World Vision to holding itself accountable to its own principles and thus was 
itself an example of internal accountability (Ebrahim 2003, p. 194). 
As to the DAC, 2010 saw preparations for the High-Level Forum on 
Effectiveness that took place the subsequent year in Busan, South Korea.  The High-
Level Forum was the fourth in a series of such fora, and represented the culmination of 
an intergovernmental process for increased aid effectiveness begun at the OECD in Paris 
in 2005.  In short, those years represented arguably a high-water mark for the 
development effectiveness agenda.  But for the DAC, evidently 2015, the target year for 
completion of the Millennium Development Goals, was the watershed year for attention 
to accountability – at least, for attention to accountability as reflected in its annual report.  




declining in the next year).  As to World Vision, mentions of “accountability” remained 
high in the years after 2012, although not as high as in that peak year.   
The above exercise suggests the influence of mimetic isomorphism on World 
Vision’s attention to accountability as reflected in a key external document such as the 
annual review.  As the DAC, a principal driver of donor thinking and practice, increased 
its attention to accountability, so did World Vision (and presumably other major INGOs).  
It is always possible that both World Vision and the DAC alike were themselves being 
influenced by a third actor, but in either case, the main point holds:  the prioritization of 
accountability in development aid increased in the second decade of this century.   
Accountability Emerging, Part Two:  The Accountability Report 
At the same time, the foreword to this first Accountability Report also evinced an 
awareness of the need to make greater strides in downward accountability:  
We pay special attention to our accountability to this community, but the degree 
to which children, community members and local partners can set the direction of 
programmes, monitor progress and evaluate our work varies. The report 
highlights areas in which we intend to improve practices which promote child and 
community participation and enhance community feedback and complaint 
mechanisms (World Vision, 2011, page 1, emphasis supplied).  
 
Thus, encapsulated within the same document are the twin impulses that this 
dissertation maintains have been driving World Vision’s work in (downward) 
accountability:  the determination to prove effective development outcomes, coupled with 
the espoused intention of transferring  power to the most vulnerable by instituting, in 
particular, practices of gathering and responding to feedback and complaints.  
The next section explores the prevalence of attention to those two aspects of 




Transformational Development and Results Agenda in Accountability Reports 
 
The categories that emerged most often across the accountability reports for 2000 
– 2017 to explain the ways in which World Vision understands accountability were the 
following:  transformational development, closely followed by the results agenda, then 
organizational learning.  The first of these, transformational development, owed its 
prominent place almost exclusively to the salience of the concept of advocacy across the 
reports.  Very often the mention of advocacy was merely descriptive (as when citing the 
existence of advocacy campaigns, or explaining that Citizen Voice and Action is a social 
accountability program that consists of advocacy).  Nonetheless, evaluative comments 
regarding the desirability of improving advocacy practice include the following:   
Collaboration with NGOs, governments, universities are perceived by staff as 
more consistent across [emergency assistance programs]. However more work is 
needed in prepositioning partners, and strengthening our level of advocacy and 
policy influence should better reflect our investment in those areas. 
(Accountability Report 2010).   
 
What is telling, however, is that participation was also particularly salient, and yet  
its categorization within transformational development is not as uncomplicated as that of 
advocacy.  As we have already noted, participation can oftentimes be limited only to 
participating in implementing a project that has already been designed by agency staff, 
and based on priorities other than those that might have been chosen by the most 
vulnerable within the community of project-affected persons.  The Accountability 
Reports referenced Citizen Voice and Action, World Vision’s social accountability 
program, numerous times.  These included reflection on CVA’s relationship to other 




power into its program decisions, albeit within the context of relations with government 
service providers rather than with the agency itself. 
National offices are also intentionally building social accountability approaches 
such as CVA into the programming work, as it may be an effective way of building an 
enabling environment, holding power-holders accountable for basic services, and 
promoting inclusion of vulnerable groups in policy and decision- making processes. 
Recent studies that include CVA also indicate sustainability of child well-being outcomes 
because it builds local skills and capacity for collective action that will remain after 
World Vision’s contribution to the programmed has ended. 
This joint analysis and exploration process is intended to enable WV staff to build 
strong relationships with all key stakeholders. In the process staffs develop a good 
understanding of the activities, power dynamics and linkages that exist in the 
local area. (World Vision (n), p. 14).   
 
Nevertheless, the significant level of attention paid to advocacy is in striking 
contrast to the proportion of the budget dedicated to it, which in the 2017 report, at 22 
million out of 2.7 billion, constituted 1 percent of the budget (World Vision (o), page 8).  
Finally, one extended passage in the 2010 Accountability Report was particularly 
intriguing for what it revealed regarding either the organization’s propensity for 
remarkable candor, or adroitness at pre-empting public criticism, or perhaps an 
understandable combination of both.  The passage described a process whereby, in the 
context of the humanitarian emergency response in Haiti in the wake of the devastating 
2010 earthquake,  camp management committees had sprung up more or less 
spontaneously. World Vision, in keeping with its approach in other contexts, seems to 
have initially allowed or even supported this rather organic development of local 




various kinds of abuse, both financial and sexual, of those within the camp.  In response, 
World Vision brought in a team of experts in humanitarian emergency accountability and 
set up a series of corrective actions, with this result:  
By the end of 2010, World Vision had embedded specific Humanitarian 
Accountability Officers into each of the programs and projects that comprised the 
overall earthquake response. [They were] charged with operationalizing standards 
for humanitarian response, especially those established by the Humanitarian 
Accountability Partnership. (World Vision (p), pages 42 – 43).   
 
The standards were the (by now familiar) four pillars that have been under 
discussion throughout this dissertation:  information provision, feedback and complaints 
mechanisms, consultation, and participation.  The discussion of the incident concludes 
thus:  
Independent evaluation found that World Vision’s efforts to mitigate challenges 
to beneficiary processes were implemented across several or all of the specific 
individual programs and projects that comprised the overall earthquake response. 
In this sense, this can be thought of as a “systemic” approach (as opposed to a 
case-by-case approach) by the agency to mitigating challenges. Together, these 
systems appear to have significantly mitigated the challenges that arose in the 
aftermath of the earthquake. (World Vision (p), page 44).   
 
As for the results agenda, it was, if anything, even more salient.  The 
accountability report made frequent references to evidence; indicators; results and 
outcomes; incentives; efficiency; and benchmarks.  The references to these concepts 
began with the 2010 report and continued throughout the years.  For example, the 2010 
report states:   
A focus on fostering timely, scaleable local capacity has often brought measurable 
results. (Although it was also found that several offices continue to face 
challenges of transition from response.) A consistent recommendation for offices 
is to enhance disaster risk reduction and community resilience alongside response 





This quote illustrates the importance of a results orientation within humanitarian 
emergency response, but also shows evidence of the importance of a broader 
understanding of disaster relief, extending it to include long-term recovery as well as the 
capacity to withstand disasters.  Processes of recovery and reconstruction in turn place 
emergency response along a continuum that extends to include development work at the 
other end.   
Before moving on to an extended discussion of findings from the Child Well-
Being reports, it is necessary to delve into the tools that World Vision has devised for 
measuring performance and diffusing organizational learning.  The tracking of downward 
accountability practices is carried out through tools embedded within the tools of 
performance measurement and of the diffusion of organizational learning, and obeys the 
same logic of fidelity to metrics.  Performance measurement is a part of the larger 
phenomenon called the evidence-based revolution, while organizational learning, as it 
appears to be practiced at World Vision, constitutes a practice that ensures that learning 
from evidence helps the agency to improve its performance.  
What are the Results?  The Evidence-Based Revolution 
 
The researcher who seeks to understand how World Vision came to undertake 
downward accountability, and the reasons why, soon enough encounters a paradox.  This 
paradox consists of the coexistence of the Transformational Development approach with 
the effectiveness imperative, both described in the preceding chapter.  Furthermore, the 
paradox extends beyond one organization to affect the entire INGO sector, as exemplified 
in the following quote:   
The number of agencies, particularly international NGOs, using rights language 




and their political and process approach to intangible goals such as empowerment 
and the increasing popularity of results-based management has become very 
apparent.  It is harder to manage support for transformation approaches when 
one is required to report tangible, easy-to-measure changes… (Eyben, Guijt, 
Roche and Shutt, eds., 2015, p. 9, emphasis supplied).   
 
Furthermore, an exploration of the reasons for this paradox leads us to consider 
the very different ways of knowing at the heart of the contradiction.  Put simply, those 
development thinkers and practitioners who espouse an approach that seeks to transform 
relationships – an approach, emancipatory at its core, that seeks human empowerment – 
also tend to embrace a conception of knowledge that regards explanations as contingent.  
This epistemology takes into account the impact that power differentials have on which 
groups’ knowledge is considered valid and therefore used to inform future practice.  In 
contrast, “ ‘[e]vidence’ and ‘results’ have a common intellectual heritage of 
‘methodological individualism’ that economics shares with medicine; in this they differ 
from the holistic social sciences, which are concerned with relations between people and 
the culture and history that shape them.” (Eyben, Guijt, Roche and Shutt, eds.,  2015, p. 
25).  
In light of the tension between these two epistemological approaches, this 
dissertation is, in part, inspired by the critical realist approach as it seeks to explain the 
paradox identified above:  an organization that has endorsed at its highest level a 
commitment to an emancipatory agenda (Transformational Development) simultaneously 
embraces the evidence-based revolution by developing the indicators and objectives, and 
tools and systems to measure them, that are so characteristic of the positivist approach 
undergirding the evidence-based turn (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 139).  Critical 




positing that an external reality exists and is knowable. However, the ways of 
apprehending this reality are themselves shaped by social relationships, as “[s]cience or 
the production of any kind of knowledge is a social practice” (Easton, 2010, p. 120).  
Tools for Performance Measurement 
 
Child Well-Being: From Targets to Objectives, From Evidence to Reporting 
 
In approximately 2007, World Vision established an Office of Global Knowledge 
Management, tasked with “bring[ing] together people, processes and technology to 
enable World Vision to change data into information, information into knowledge, and 
knowledge into learning”  (World Vision Annual Review (t), p. 110).  This was prompted 
perhaps in part by the reflection that in 61 years of operating, the organization had 
accumulated 1,800 databases and tens of thousands of documents – most of them 
inaccessible to the organization as a whole, and therefore unusable as a source of 
knowledge and capabilities for improving effectiveness. (World Vision (t) , p. 110).  
By 2012, the organization had set itself the goal that by 2014 each Regional 
Office would be regularly reporting on its contributions to Child Well-Being Targets 
(World Vision, p. 111).  By 2014, far beyond only the Regional Offices, enough National 
Offices had begun producing Child Well-Being Reports that it was possible for World 
Vision to begin compiling them into one global report which it then began to publish 
annually.   
In taking up the use of Child Well-Being Targets, World Vision was reflecting the 
movement within the aid community toward greater aid effectiveness and more “effective 
development cooperation,” articulated at high-level fora of the OECD, held in Rome in 




through the Global Partnership for Effective Cooperation (OECD/DAC). The Global 
Partnership, a joint platform of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
the OECD, had been formed after the arrival of the 2015 target for meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals gave way to the Sustainable Development Goals and a 
new target date of 2030 (UNDP).  
However, World Vision eventually concluded that targets themselves were too 
limiting, and ought to give way to objectives and, even more, to aspirations: “There was a 
long conversation in the mid-2000s about how World Vision should articulate its focus, 
and are we a rights-based organization, or are we looking to aspire to something more 
than that.  So, not just fulfill children’s rights, but actually pushing more toward a vision 
or a dream, of child well-being in fullness” (World Vision senior development staffer).  A 
focus on objectives, however, was still important as it would clarify whether it was only 
output targets that were being achieved, or the results which those outputs were intended 
to support: “I was in some of the meetings where they said, ‘Well, what should we aim 
for?  Should it be the number of children in school, or going beyond that, say, number of 
children able to read? Because there’s no point putting them in school if the school is so 
bad that they can’t read’” (World Vision senior development staffer). 
The transition from Child Well-Being Targets to Child Well-Being Objectives 
came within the context of a new strategic plan at World Vision, focusing on goals to be 
achieved by 2030.  The Targets are summarized in Table 1, and the Objectives, which are 






Table 4-2:  Child Well-Being Targets 
 
 
• Target 1: Children report an increased level of well-being (12–18 years) 
•  
• Target 2: Increase in children protected from infection and disease (0–5 years) 
•  
• Target 3: Increase in children who are well nourished (0–5 years) 
•  
• Target 4: Increase in children who can read (by age 11 or end of primary schooling) 
 




Starting in 2010, World Vision began applying the targets to the work of its 65 
field offices (i.e., offices in countries where programming takes place, as distinct from 
offices, typically located in middle- or high-income countries, that are dedicated to 
fundraising). Subsequently, World Vision required each one of those offices to report on 
its progress toward Child Well-Being Objectives (World Vision (a)).  The findings are 
now summarized annually in one global report, first published in 2014, followed by 
reports in 2015 and (most recently), 2016-2017 (World Vision (a)).  Since 2017, a highly 
detailed Child Well-Being Report Template outlines how each office is to complete the 
report (World Vision accountability specialist; World Vision (b)).   
Not all of the 65 national offices contribute to all of the eight Child Well-Being 
Objectives.  Objectives 5, 6 and 7, pertaining to nutrition, health care, and education, are 
targeted by 75 percent, 78 percent, and 83 percent of national offices, respectively (World 
Vision (a), p. 5).  However, all of the eight Child Well-Being Outcomes are supported to 





Table 4-3:  Child Well-Being Objectives 
 
1. Children report an increased awareness of God’s love (Target 1)  
2. Increase in children who have positive and peaceful relationships in their families 
and communities (Target 1)  
3. Increase in girls and boys protected from violence (Target 1)  
4. Children ages 12-18 report an increased level of well-being (Target 1)  
5. Increase in children who are well-nourished (Target 2)  
6. Increase in children protected from infection and disease (ages 0-5) (Target 3)  
7. Increase in primary school children who can read (Target 4)  
8. Increase in adolescents’ education and life skills (Target 1 & 4)  
 
Source:  World Vision.  Child Well-Being Summary Report 2016-2017  
 
Assessing Progress: The Program Accountability Framework 
World Vision has also developed a tool to assess progress toward the effective 
implementation of downward accountability, called the Program Effectiveness Self-
Review Tool (PE-SRT), and developed within the past five or so years (World Vision 
accountability specialist).  The PE-SRT, applied to the national Child Well-Being reports 
described above, generates a score for how well a country is performing with respect to 
downward (i.e., program) accountability, by means of a metric called the Program 
Accountability Framework, or PAF (World Vision accountability specialist).  Applied to 
a host of performance criteria, the PAF is used to measure whether a program is 




progress in meeting the criterion; or maturing, or consistently meeting the criterion 
(World Vision (c) ). With respect to downward accountability – which is only one of the 
many criteria evaluated by the PE-SERT – the PE-SRT measures performance in each of 
four pillars:  consultation; participation; information provision; and complaint and 
feedback mechanisms and systems. World Vision, from staff experience and from an 
external review conducted of its Program Accountability Framework, concluded that of 
those four areas, two were strongest:  consultation and  participation – that is, the 
practices of gathering input and opinion from project-affected persons; and of involving 
them in project implementation, respectively.  In contrast, World Vision further 
concluded that with respect to information provision (i.e., the provision of information 
not only about programs and projects but also about where and how to provide feedback 
and/or register complaints about them); and in particular, those feedback and complaint 
mechanisms, themselves, its projects and programs performed somewhat more weakly 
(World Vision Accountability Report 2016).  World Vision has compiled internal data by 
collecting the Child Well-Being Objective reports from 64 of its field offices and 
analyzing them for reference to the performance of each country office within each of 
those four pillars of program accountability.  While not all 64 Child Well-Being reports 
are published, some are, and often constitute a point of pride for the national offices that 
produce them (World Vision accountability and M&E specialist).  Of the 64, a selected 
12 full reports were available for inspection. These were the reports for programs in the 
following twelve countries or areas: Afghanistan; Albania and Kosovo; Jordan; 
Jerusalem/West Bank/Gaza; Lebanon;  Nepal;  Romania; South Sudan; South Caucasus; 




practices of 58 out of the 64 were made available, and a list of those countries is found in 
Appendix C. 
Guidelines for Planning: The Development Programming Approach 
Like many INGOs, World Vision has developed a system of tools, guidelines, and 
approaches for planning, learning, accountability, and measurement. They comprise 
different types of constructs, but function in such a way that they can be viewed as parts 
of a larger system, nested one within the other.  Figure 4-5 on page 99 shows how these 
different types of instruments and subsystems fit together.  They culminate in the 
Programme Accountability Framework, which is used for reporting progress in 
downward accountability.  What is interesting about these various elements is the way in 
which they reflect the two influences shaping World Vision that have been discussed 
earlier:  they may be termed the technocratic and the transformational – to use a type of 
shorthand.   
To begin with, World Vision has developed what it calls the Development 
Programme Approach, or DPA (formerly, the Integrated Programming Model) (World 
Vision (h), p. 6).   It comprises: i) principles; ii) approaches; and iii) aspirations and 
outcomes, all of which are intended to promote the agency’s ultimate goal:  “sustained 
well-being of children within families and communities, especially the most vulnerable” 
(World Vision (h), p. 5). These are set out in a 34-page handbook to be used in all aspects 
of its programming.  Although the name, Development Programme Approach, implies 
that the approach refers only to development work, in fact the handbook covers disaster 
management and advocacy as well as development.  Reflecting its nature as a somewhat 




Indicators, Aspirations and Outcomes; as well as on evidence-based practices.  At the 
same time, for example, it sets out World Vision’s Critical Path, a series of eight 
questions to be asked over the course of program design and implementation and to be 
used in working with local partners, which emphasizes the relational nature of the work 
to be undertaken.  This emphasis on relationships constitutes an important element of the 
Transformational Development approach, as discussed earlier.  
In addition, and again like many INGOs, World Vision has undertaken to expand 
monitoring and evaluation into monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning, or 
MEAL.  Its particular framework for this, however, is termed LEAP, i.e., Learning 
through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning. (The agency recently transitioned 
from an earlier iteration of this framework to its third and current one, and so the data 
often refer to LEAP 3, as well as to what has turned out to be an onerous process of 
adjusting to it: “the LEAP 3 transition”).   
The  DPA shares an affinity not only with Transformational Development, but 
also with elements of Doing Development Differently. For example, the Critical Path (see 
Appendix F), is meant to be “iterative rather than linear” – thus reflecting a key principle 
of DDD (World Vision (h), p. 25).   With respect to program effectiveness, the DPA 
handbook sets out thirteen standards (World Vision (h), p. 8). These standards in turn 
serve as the inspiration for nine questions posed by the Program Effectiveness Self-
Review Tool, which is used for calculating levels of downward accountability attained by 
a program, as reported in the Program Accountability Framework.  Again, Figure 4-5 












Key:   
LEAP = Learning through Evaluation with Accountability and Planning 
PE-SRT = Performance Evaluation Self-Review Tool 














The Journey to Downward Accountability Assessment 
 
Despite the existence of a plethora of planning documents, tools, handbooks, and 
processes, World Vision’s journey toward assessing its attainment of downward 
accountability effectiveness has been circuitous.  Between 2014 and 2016, the United 
Kingdom’s foreign assistance agency, the Department for International Development 
(DFID) commissioned a pilot study of downward accountability, led by World Vision 
UK and carried out by seven NGOs, located in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, India, Tanzania, 
Somaliland (an autonomous region of Somalia), India, and Pakistan.  The pilot focused 
specifically on complaint and feedback mechanisms, identified as the area facing the 
greatest challenges, and concluded, among other things, that the need for 
contextualization was both extremely important for judging the success of the pilot, and 
also made it difficult to generalize observations. It is context that determines the type of 
feedback mechanisms preferred by project-affected persons (e.g., not surprisingly, areas 
of low literacy preferred focus-group discussions and other face-to-face interaction, 
including phone calls).  
In addition, it is important to “close the feedback loop,” by responding to 
feedback and complaints, whether to resolve the issue presented, or at minimum, to 
acknowledge that the feedback or complaint was received and explain why a further 
response is not possible or warranted.  The pilot study found that the feedback loop was 
frequently closed at low levels in the staffing hierarchy, rather than having complaints 
referred up the chain.  It was not known whether this was due to complaints being 
responded to at the lower levels, or to staff reluctance to refer them upward.  




feedback mechanisms considered in the pilot study made possible “real-time adaptation,” 
i.e., timely course corrections based on the feedback, for example in the areas of staff 
accountability (INTRAC, n.d., pp. 74-81).    
The Child Well-Being Reports: Wide Variety in Effectiveness Across  
Four Accountability Pillars  
Perhaps the most striking finding is that by far the richest results were found, as 
noted earlier, in the data on feedback and complaints. One simple indicator of this is 
immediately apparent in Table 8, which sets out the number of codes and number of 
documents coded in each category and shows that feedback and complaints registered 
118 codes, while the number of codes for the other three pillars ranged between 53 and 
63.   
 




Number of Child 
Well-Being Reports 
 




Participation 46 63 1.37 
Consultation 35 58 1.66 
Information 
Provision 
37 53 1.43 
Feedback and 
Complaint 
35 118 3.37 
 
In contrast, 46 Child Well-Being reports (recall that the downward accountability 
data had been extracted from these reports) contained data on progress (or lack thereof) in 
the area of Participation, while only 35 – 37 reported on their performance in the other 
                                               
6 Recall that the number of documents for each pillar varies, because not all Child Well-Being 




three pillars.  This may point to participation’s longevity as a programming goal, as will 
be remarked on in Chapter Five; or to the wide range of activities that are counted as 
participation, while performance in the other three categories is more difficult to attain.  
To ascertain whether this is so, and to glean information about the nature of country 
office attainment in all four pillars, the next section offers a more in-depth analysis of the 
data, pillar by pillar. 
Feedback and Complaints:  Rich Data, Ample Self-Reflection on Effectiveness 
The data on the Feedback and Complaints pillar yielded the richest results for 
various reasons.  First of all, it yielded a high volume of evaluative comments, that is, 
observations on whether feedback and complaints were being effectively received and 
acted upon.  While it may seem obvious that data on all four pillars would be expected to 
consist of such evaluative comments, in fact the data from the other pillars tended more 
often to be descriptive rather than evaluative.  This may owe something to the fact that 
while feedback and complaints comprise a relatively new practice, consultation and 
participation, in contrast, are practices of long standing and there is by now a wide 
consensus on their desirability (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  Therefore, it may be that 
evaluative comments are not thought to be needed, or not needed as much as they are for 
feedback and complaints. 7 
Moreover, among the evaluative comments, very frequently observations were 
found regarding plans to improve performance in the coming year, rather than reporting 
on performance in the year just concluded. This was true in all four pillars, not just 
Feedback and Complaints.  One rather representative example (from Feedback and 
                                               




Complaints)  is as follows:  “[This National Office] plans to set up complaint and 
feedback boxes or hotlines in each [Area Programme] with clear response loops to ensure 
confidentiality and prompt response” (emphasis supplied).  Or again, “The next action 
plan is to design feedback mechanism[s] integrated into [Area Programme] planning 
according to its context” (emphasis supplied).  
Some comments reporting on prospective changes, however, were more detailed 
and set out specific plans for implementing changes that could help improve 
performance, for example:   
The greatest limitation in full application of [the Programme Accountability 
Framework] is lack of mechanism[s] that enable regular community feedback. 
Therefore, in [Fiscal Year 2017 this National Office] developed [the] Community 
Feedback and Response System (CFRS) in order to strengthen accountability to 
communities by providing a channel for children, community members and 
partners to easily report Child Protection incidents, raise questions, suggestions 
and concerns about [its] activities, outlining a process for action to be taken in 
response. The application of this system will start in [Fiscal Year 2018].  
 
There was considerable candor about areas where effectiveness in handling 
feedback and complaints was lacking, for example:  “[This National Office] … needs to 
explore ways to enhance accountability by establishing community feedback mechanisms 
(CFMs) to ensure community complaints are systematically collected, analyzed, feedback 
provided, and action taken as this is currently not strong enough.”  The degree of 
sophistication regarding how to go about making such improvements varied across 
countries.  A minority – but a significant minority nonetheless – used the recommended 
three-level rating system (Emerging, Growing and Maturing) and furthermore, quantified 
the proportion of programs that attained each level, as in the following excerpt: “This has 
been one of the standards that has [experienced] the least progress in recent years, only 




Often, as in the first example cited above, it was the lack of feedback and 
complaints mechanisms themselves that were pointed out as the reason for lack of 
effectiveness:  “Presence of functional community feedback mechanisms… were among 
the lowest rated at 39%...”  Where positive results were reported, there was an explicit 
description of what is necessary in order to achieve effectiveness, as in the comment 
below:   
All 18 [Area Programmes] applied community feedback and response 
mechanism[s]. Jointly with the communities [World Vision] defined and enforced 
a context sensitive mechanism for feedback and complaints that is accessible, safe 
and effective. It includes having a procedure in place for writing an e-mail, calling 
or visiting the office in person for complaints, suggestions and recommendations, 
including on staff behavior misconduct towards children.  
 
A report from another country was even more detailed, and reflected that both 
face-to-face and anonymous methods were used for delivering feedback and complaints:     
[This National Office]  deploys a variety of feedback collection approaches 
including focus group discussions, key informant interviews, post distribution 
monitoring, complaint and help desks, face to face forums and hotlines. All of 
these approaches have helped to improve beneficiary participation and feedback 
collection has improved to help inform more responsive, effective, efficient and 
relevant interventions across the relief, recovery and development spectrum.  
 
As may be surmised from the reference to “the relief, recovery and development 
spectrum,” this particular program was located in what is known as a fragile country 
context, indicating that, as will be discussed at length in Chapter Five, the presence of 
humanitarian emergency response programming was likely responsible for the 
implementation of effective feedback and complaint mechanisms and systems.   
Several of the above examples point to another important characteristic of the 
Feedback and Complaints data:  the degree to which they incorporated quantitative data 




they reflected the use of organizational learning tools such as the Programme 
Accountability Framework, or referred to important organization-wide processes such as 
the transition to LEAP 3.  One rather notable example of this is found in a “fragile 
context,” where a humanitarian emergency response is being implemented:   
As a result of this, 48 projects in [Fiscal Year 2017] (28 in the North & 20 in the 
South) have complaints and feedback mechanisms which captured a total of 127 
… actionable complaints (59% came through hotline, 22% through staff, 8% 
through community help desks, 6% suggestion boxes), of which on average 77% 
… were responded to on time.  
 
These numerical data were further disaggregated by regions within the country. 
Although this country’s report does not indicate whether the responses to the feedback 
and complaints were found to be satisfactory by the complainants, that there are data on 
timely responses at all is in itself remarkable.  Where country reports concluded that 
implementation of feedback and complaint mechanisms had been ineffective or 
nonexistent, they gave various reasons, such as the lack of awareness of the Program 
Accountability Framework; lack of application of the PAF where awareness exists; lack 
of feedback and complaint mechanisms; and lack of collection of feedback and 
complaints even where mechanisms do exist.  This last was due to lack of 
systematization, as in the below example:   
Collecting feedback or complaints from the community is the area where 
[National Office] staff identified the greatest need for improvement. This is 
because we do not yet have a clearly established system, so any issues which arise 
are dealt with as is deemed appropriate by the ADP manager and team. Stronger 
support and guidelines for this will need to be developed within [the National 
Office] (emphasis supplied).  
 
The lack of systematization as a possible reason is left implicit in the following 
example, which like many others points to prospective rather than actual improvement 




Community Feedback and Complaint Handling Policy and Procedures Manual. In [Fiscal 
Year 2018], this will be applied and emphasized during Annual Community Review and 
Planning process.  
Most interesting of all were the findings categorized under “closing the feedback 
loop, attaining results,” referring to the practice of responding to feedback, either by 
incorporating the requested changes or at least explaining why further action could not be 
taken.  Several of the National Offices that reported progress in implementing feedback 
and complaints mechanisms and systems referred explicitly to the closing of the feedback 
loop, which is the final litmus test of whether the organization is indeed being held 
accountable to the program-affected people whom it aspires to serve.  Data from one 
country report noted:   
Claims and complaint[s] are responded [to] immediately and according to the 
topics in question. When necessary, the person lodging the complaint is 
approached directly. Some programs have designed communication pieces to 
[help] children and their families express their opinion[s] about the processes 
developed in their community.  
 
Another also quantified the feedback received, at least in general terms, and was 
able to address at least the binary question of whether complaints and feedback received a 
response, even if not to indicate how many responses were deemed satisfactory by the 
complainants: “As an illustration, the [Area Programme] received more than 156 
feedback and comments from the communities and responded to all of them in 2017.”  
Another country report was more precise:  “More than 84% of the feedbacks received a 
timely response. The remaining 16% required follow- ups.”  This was from a country 
which had recently experienced a disaster and where a humanitarian emergency response 




One country report, also from a fragile country context, stated, “Community 
feedback and complaints received were quickly acted on and also used to inform program 
adjustments where feasible.” Another country report, interestingly, quoted from 
community members who both reflected the (problematic) tendency to use feedback 
channels to express gratitude, yet simultaneously pointed to the practice of the 
organization’s responding to their complaints:  “We  thank World Vision since they ask 
us what we feel about what they do with us and when we complain, they hear us and give 
us feedback.”   
Finally, one country program reported that, “[c]hildren’s complaints helped 
[Name] primary school in [Name] Area Programme to get new roofs and storage tanks” – 
an impressive account of success not only in responding to complaints and feedback, but 
also of including children in decision-making, a stated World Vision goal.   
It must, however, be borne in mind that examples such as the ones above still 
constituted the minority. The majority reported only prospective improvements, and/or 
flatly reported a lack of feedback and complaints mechanisms and systems.   
Nevertheless, the apparent connection between effectiveness in feedback and complaints 
implementation, and the application of organizational learning tools as well as the 
presence of humanitarian emergency response, is worth noting as it suggests that 
diffusion of such tools leads to effectiveness. 
Information Provision:  More Information Provided about Programs than about 
How to Give Feedback and Lodge Complaints 
With respect to the Information Provision pillar, the country report data were not 




Feedback and Complaints. Nevertheless, there were comparatively plentiful comments 
regarding the provision of information; the  inclusion of the most vulnerable, especially 
children; and the prevalence of consultation.  In addition, the use of organizational 
learning tools was relatively pronounced, with numerous national offices reporting the 
use of the Programme Accountability Framework, as well as quantifying their 
information provision practices.   
The chief trend, however, was the reporting on information provision without 
specifying whether the information provided was on projects and programs generally, or 
on how to register feedback and complaints specifically.  This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the definition of information provision found in World Vision’s 
accountability webpage, which states in part, that accountability includes “the 
commitment of an organization to… provide information, listen and empower its diverse 
stakeholders to actively participate and hold to account.”  (World Vision (r)).  That 
definition assumes, not unreasonably, that an important first step to being able to hold the 
organization accountable consists in knowing what programs and projects are planned to 
begin with, what they hope to achieve, and what beneficiaries can expect from them.  The 
following excerpt illustrates this approach and also encapsulates a number of important 
priorities, such as the diversity of stakeholders who are to be kept apprised; the 
importance of traditional leaders; the role of partners (local NGOs) in validating data; and 
the importance of inclusion of the most vulnerable:   
[The National Office] reports to communities and donors through various 
mechanisms that are put in place: sharing of information through program reports, 
meeting with partners on the validation of program data, consultation with 
administrative political authorities, consultation with religious leaders and other 





However, access to information about what services or goods the organization has 
committed to delivering is only one component of the type of information that 
beneficiaries need in order to hold the organization accountable.  Therefore, information 
about how to give feedback and lodge complaints – and, ideally, what types of responses 
to expect and in what timeframe – is at least a central part of the information provision 
pillar and needs to be documented as thoroughly.  As it happens, some of the Child Well-
Being reports did make specific mention of the role of information provision in 
facilitating feedback and complaints. The following quote details the various components 
of programming of which beneficiaries need to be made aware:  
Providing Information: Since 2013, [this National Office] has piloted 
accountability in fragile context. Towards that end, we ensure that start-up 
workshops are conducted at the inception of every project to: (i) keep all the 
stakeholders aware of the project activities, implementation requirements, the 
resources available; and (ii) solicit commitments of each stakeholder to the 
implementation, project duration, target locations, beneficiary selection criteria, 
key activities as well as beneficiary feedback and complaints mechanisms 
(emphasis supplied).   
 
This same country office reported: 
 
[D]uring the distribution process, it is standard practice that at every distribution 
(food, non-food items and vouchers) we give a pre-distribution address on the 
entitlements and equally display the ration sizes/entitlements (ration boards, 
posters, and banners) at the distribution sites for beneficiar[ies] to know what they 
are supposed to receive. 
 
Again, the nature of humanitarian emergency response, and the role of 
humanitarian assistance in delivering detailed feedback and complaint mechanisms and 
systems are here clearly evident.   
Participation:  Not Confined to Later Stages of Programming  
Analysis of the participation data revealed that, as with the previous two pillars, 




use of metrics and organizational learning tools was especially salient.  Contrary to what 
had been expected, it appeared that participation was not necessarily limited to 
implementing projects and programs previously designed by World Vision.  Descriptions 
of that type of participation were no more frequent than descriptions of participation 
more broadly understood as including helping to shape programming from its earliest 
stages.  For example, one country program – in a fragile context – reported:  “At the 
[Area Program] level, plans are developed on the basis of community shared vision and 
[Child Well-Being] priorities with shared responsibilities in which [National Office] is 
one of the local partners.”  The following quote likewise illustrates the role of 
humanitarian emergency response in a fragile context; in this case, it is a food assistance 
program that provides the context for participatory processes at all stages:  
[This National Office’s] projects involved beneficiaries in activity planning, 
implementation, monitoring. A total of 1,326 beneficiaries are part of food 
assistance project management committee practice that has been replicated in all 
other programming across other sectors. In addition, use of participatory targeting 
models that involved community members, partners, minority organizations, 
government was critical in improving quality of targeting the most vulnerable 
households and children… 
 
However, there are instances where the limited nature of community participation 
is tacitly acknowledged, as in the example below:   
Community leaders, mothers, faith actors…  often participate in activities as 
active implementers, mobilizers or volunteers… [This National Office] plans to 
organize quarterly meetings …  to jointly monitor implementation progress in 
order to further increase ownership and make participatory adjustments to the 
plans as well as boost participation levels (emphasis supplied).  
 
Consultation:  The Role of Community Meetings is Key 
Within the Consultation pillar, the most commonly reported experience was that 




stakeholder input that was subsequently used to shape programming.  The following 
example is perhaps fairly typical:  
During the design of [technical programs] and contextualization of [Area 
Program] plans, project stakeholders at local community level and national level 
were consulted using [Development Programme Approach] approach to identity 
and discuss community needs, the most vulnerable and the programme partners. 
[Ghana]  
 
The Annual Community Review, a principal if not the principal vehicle used 
across the World Vision federation to solicit community input, was sometimes explicitly 
referenced but just as often not.  More often, only “community meetings” in general were 
cited as an important consultation tool.   
Furthermore, in the consultation data the use of organizational learning tools such 
as the Programme Accountability Framework (PAF) and the third iteration of Learning 
through Evaluation for Accountability and Planning (LEAP 3) was very salient.  The 
following excerpt illustrates this well:  
For consulting with communities or adapting [technical programs] to the local 
context, all of 25 [Area Programs] that will enter LEAP 3 in [Fiscal Year 2018] 
have [technical program logframes] and relevant outcomes based on assessment 
of community needs relevant to child well-being priorities. However, as shown in 
Figure 5.2, 44% of APs still rated themselves as emerging in this criterion.  
 
Even more important than showing awareness of the LEAP 3 transition was the 
use of the three levels in the PAF– emerging, growing, and maturing – to assess the level 
of quality of the consultation that was taking place. The use of that framework was 
evidenced here:  
At least 11 out of 28 ADPs rated themselves at level 1 that communities are 
consulted on project activities through community meetings, program annual and 
semiannual reviews. 5 ADPs were rated at level 2 that communities have regular 
consults through [focus group discussion], reviews on program outcomes, 




implementation. 8 ADP rated at level 3 that they have regular consultation and 
share outcomes with communities and beneficiaries (emphasis supplied).   
 
Indeed, the use of organizational tools and of metrics and quantification used in 
reporting consultation effectiveness occurred almost as frequently as did the descriptions 
of consultation processes via community meetings.  However, as the above example 
indicates, quality of consultation varied.  The annual and semiannual community review 
meetings represent one end of the spectrum, that which may be considered the least 
consultative.  Nevertheless, the finding that consultation, even if of varying quality, was 
taking place in numerous countries is consistent with the conclusion in World Vision’s 
2016 Accountability Report that there were more examples of good practice in the areas 
of consultation and participation than in the areas of information provision and feedback 
and complaints.   
Reporting to a Peer Review Mechanism:  Accountable Now and  
the Global Reporting Initiative 
As has been noted before, World Vision is a member of Accountable Now, an 
organization comprised of peer NGOs and tasked with what it terms “sustainability 
reporting,” i.e., reporting on a range of NGO policies and practices.  Since 2009, World 
Vision has, like other members, provided the Independent Review Panel (IRP) of 
Accountable Now with an annual accountability report.  The IRP subsequently issues a 
series of comments evaluating the content of that year’s report.  The correspondence 
between both bodies – World Vision’s senior accountability leadership and the members 
of the IRP – is posted on the World Vision website as well as on the Accountable Now 
website.  This correspondence therefore constitutes a rich vein of data reflecting World 




Vision’s 2016 Accountability Report even includes an appendix outlining how that report 
aligns with Accountable Now’s reporting requirements (2016 Accountability Report, 
page 33).   
Accountable Now uses for its sustainability reporting standards the sustainability 
reporting framework developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the body that 
produces “principles and performance indicators” used by organizations of all types, 
including corporations and governments (Accountable Now (b); Global Reporting 
Initiative).   
These GRI guidelines are arguably “the most widely accepted standard,” with 
over 90 percent of the G250, the largest companies in the world, publishing a 
sustainability report, and nearly 75 percent of those companies using the GRI guidelines 
to do so (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010, page not numbered); and the GRI itself is 
“commonly regarded as the world’s leading voluntary scheme for corporate non-financial 
reporting”	(Traxler, Greiling, and Hebesberger, 2018, page not numbered).  
Notwithstanding, some analysts hold that the GRI ultimately “fails to empower” 
(Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010, page 1); that its growth has plateaued in recent years 
because of the inherent tensions in its institutional model, which rests on using 
multistakeholder participation for developing its guidelines (Brown, DeJong and 
Lessidrenska, undated); and that, importantly, it has failed to fulfill its early promise 
because “its trajectory reflects the power relations among members of the field, their 
strategic choices and compromises, their ability to mobilize alliances and resources, and 
constraints imposed by the broader institutions of financial and capital markets” (Levy, 




Nevertheless, Accountable Now has chosen to use GRI indicators for its 
members’ reporting.  In 2008, Accountable Now commissioned GRI to develop reporting 
guidelines specific to the NGO sector; and in 2010, GRI finalized the NGO Sector 
Supplement, which Accountable Now members are required to use for their reporting.  
The supplement is divided into “profile disclosures,”  and “performance indicators.”  The 
profile disclosures are further subdivided into four categories, and consist of standards 
regarding the organization’s strategic commitment to accountability; data about its 
organizational profile; a description of the report’s parameters;  and details regarding the 
organization’s governance structure and key stakeholders.  The performance indicators 
cover the following areas:  program effectiveness; financial management; environmental 
management; human resource management; management of impacts on the wider 
society; and ethical fundraising and communication. (Accountable Now (b)).   
Finally, program effectiveness is subdivided into six sets of indicators. All six are 
found in Appendix H.  The first three of the six, which will receive here particular 
attention, are as follows:   
NGO1 – Involvement of affected stakeholder groups to inform the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs… NGO2 – 
Mechanisms for stakeholder feedback and complaints to programmes and policies 
and in response to policy breaches… NGO3 – System for programme monitoring, 
evaluation and learning. (Accountable Now, p. 6)  
 
NGO2, focusing on feedback and complaint mechanisms, will form the principal 
focus of the following analysis of correspondence between World Vision and the 
Independent Review Panel of Accountable Now.  However, NGO1 – which can be seen 
to correspond more or less closely to both the consultation and participation pillars – will 




learning in World Vision’s work.  NGO4 refers to gender and diversity, and while these 
themes do not constitute one of the four downward accountability pillars, they will also 
be considered, as will the two remaining program effectiveness performance indicators 
from the NGO Supplement, NGO5 (advocacy positions and awareness campaigns), and 
NGO6 (coordination with other actors).   
Correspondence between the Independent Review Panel  and World Vision  
The correspondence between Accountable Now’s  Independent Review Panel and 
World Vision was coded both inductively and deductively:  the text was examined 
closely, and new codes generated as appropriate; at the same time, codes used for 
analysis of the data from the Child Well-Being reports, as described in Chapter Five, 
were also used.  In this way, 57 codes were generated.  They were then grouped into the 
eight categories used for the analysis of the data from the Child Well-Being reports, with 
a few adjustments.  From that original list of eight, the categories, “evaluative codes” and 
“closing the feedback loop and getting results” were omitted, and two new ones added, 
“transformational development,” and “safeguarding”  and “consultation.  Only the text 
focusing on the six performance indicators – NGO1 through NGO6 – was considered.   
Of the eight coding categories, the following yielded the richest data:  metrics, 
effectiveness and quantification; management issues; and transformational development. 
Within management issues, the concept of stakeholders recurred as an extremely salient 
one.  It was categorized as a management issue because very often it was discussed in the 
context of governance;  it was also often frequently clear from the context that 
“stakeholders” referred not only to program-affected persons and direct beneficiaries, but 




the like.  Standardization was also considered important, and some of the most interesting 
findings came, perhaps not surprisingly, from the most recent exchanges.  For example, 
the IRP noted that monitoring, evaluation and learning at World Vision were being 
guided by the LEAP framework, “of which the latest iteration introduces more national-
level standardisation into programming” (Feedback from IRP on 2016 Accountability 
Report).  Similarly, with regard to metrics and effectiveness, the panel paid significant 
attention to evidence and outcomes.  For example, it noted:  
World Vision invests in their [Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning] systems and 
uses a sound system of global measurements for programme progress and national 
entity capacity improvement (see also page 28 or evidence of child- well- being 
improvements on page 34). It will be important to report against the same 
parameter in future years to compare developments over time. (Detailed 
comments on IRP feedback on 2014 Accountability Report.)  
 
Interestingly, Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) received quite a bit of attention, as 
exemplified by the following comment:   
Results from Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) showed positive results; 
improvements in communities’ services and increased development outcomes. 
Additionally, the Panel would be interested in other general feedback from 
communities to World Vision – some of which was mentioned throughout the 
report (e.g. external evaluation by communities). (Detailed comments on IRP 
feedback on 2014 Accountability Report).   
 
It seems natural that a social accountability program, especially one with the long 
track record that CVA has, would elicit attention from a peer review mechanism set up to 
monitor accountability.  And indeed, the panel further observed that  
Social accountability whereby citizens are given a voice versus their governments 
but also World Vision as a service provider has been considerably widened in the 
activities. Findings from baselines and evaluations are shared with communities, 
partners and project staff to validate (or question) and discuss the findings 





Consistent with this study’s observation that much of the data from the Child 
Well-Being reports regarding downward accountability were prospective, rather than 
documenting improvements that had already taken place, the panel commented, “Overall, 
less information on processes and more on outcome / evidence is welcome in the next full 
report” (Detailed comments on IRP feedback on 2014 Accountability Report).   
Accordingly, by the time of the 2016 report, the panel could report with some 
satisfaction progress on complaint and feedback mechanisms. Referring presumably to 
the DFID-funded pilot project referenced earlier, the panel noted: “The results of a pilot 
project on beneficiary feedback mechanisms indicated that feedback and complaints 
mechanisms should be contextualised to each programme location, and complaints are 
therefore handled on a programme basis,” before going on to observe,  
However, the Panel requests more information on the different channels available 
to submit feedback and complaints – e.g. online forms, surveys, face to face 
consultations – as well as evidence that these are well known and lead to positive 
management response. There are some commendable examples provided of how 
World Vision has been listening to communities and dealing with complaints and 
feedback in Nepal, Somalia, Cambodia and Iraq and the Panel commends World 
Vision for the additional information provided in addressing such issues. 
(Feedback from IRP on 2016 Accountability Report).   
 
The last accountability report for which panel feedback was available was the one 
from 2017.  The panel made no comments on NGO1 – 6 under performance indicators, 
instead focusing on performance indicators in other areas:  environmental management 
and human resource management. From this it may be surmised that performance under 
standards NGO1 – 6 was satisfactory.  Because the 2017 report was produced in the 
subsequent year, and the sexual abuse scandal in the humanitarian relief and development 
sector came broadly to light in February 2018, the 2017 accountability report paid 




foreword: “[We are]  aware that we have a vital part to play in helping to rebuild trust in 
our sector following revelations of sexual exploitation and abuse in some quarters” 
(Accountability Report 2017).  The panel responded by urging that policies stated to be 
available on request be made available proactively on the website. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has drawn on internal data and public artefacts to outline in some 
detail the path that World Vision has taken to first institute and then improve its 
accountability “downward” to the beneficiaries whom it seeks to serve.  The finding that 
feedback and complaint is the area that has generated the richest data and prompted the 
most critical self-reflection will be seen to support the following chapter’s finding that it 
is in feedback and complaint – typically within humanitarian emergency response 
programs – that the most progress has been achieved, to the extent that it has been 
achieved at all.  This is partly in contradistinction to the conclusion found in World 
Vision’s own 2016 accountability report, which concluded that the most progress had 
been achieved in the areas of consultation and participation and therefore it is these 
factors/pillars that account for improvement in downward accountability.  
This dissertation contends that the reason for the discrepancy lies in a number of 
factors. Chief among them is the greater difficulty of achieving long-term change through 
processes of consultation and participation.  Another  is the greater role of government 
funding in humanitarian relief as opposed to development programs, coupled with the 
significant role of donor requirements in shaping downward accountability processes and 
systems.  These donor pressures have been found to potentially lead to a “tick-the-box” 




findings comport with findings from the literature:  “The danger of HAP’s model of 
accountability, founded on routine verification, is that it may have the unintended 
consequence of tempting its members to pursue tokenistic policies that can be portrayed 
in written reports as examples of good practice” (Crack, 2016, p. 51). 
In addition, through an examination of the series of annual reports and 
accountability reports produced by World Vision over the years it has been possible to 
trace the evolution of accountability as an explicitly articulated theme in the agency’s 
external communications.  This development tracks the almost simultaneous emergence 
of accountability generally, and then downward accountability, within the field of 





CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS FROM PRIMARY DATA  
The Distinction Between Humanitarian and Development Work 
The first pattern to emerge from the data was as follows: there are significant 
differences in the way that downward accountability takes place in the humanitarian and 
development spheres. The interview data reveal a complex interplay between factors that 
alternately constrain and promote World Vision’s ability to effectively implement 
downward accountability mechanisms within each of the two areas.   
Humanitarian emergency relief – known in the aid industry as “humanitarian 
emergency response” –  is different from ongoing development work in at least two 
ways.  After a natural disaster8, or in the context of violent conflict and/or refugee flows, 
a large apparatus of foreign assistance frequently descends on the affected region.   As 
noted in Chapter Two, these humanitarian emergency responses are typically funded by 
grants, rather than by the steady flow of child sponsorship funds (recall that World Vision 
is a child sponsorship organization). Because donors impose strict conditions on reporting 
and effectiveness, humanitarian staff give priority to using donor metrics, and this 
includes collecting data on downward accountability –  in particular, on the use of 
complaint and feedback mechanisms.  
In addition, the nature of humanitarian emergency aid, by focusing on tangible 
deliverables like food aid, housing, and the like, simplifies the task of downward 
accountability because accountability mechanisms can focus on concrete, discrete goods 
and services. The accountability mechanisms used to collect feedback on the delivery of 
                                               
8 Scholars have noted that many so-called natural disasters taking place in the global South 
cannot be truly considered natural, in that they reflect societal choices that lead to fragility and 
thus to more devastating impacts than they would in a more prosperous society (Cohen and 




those goods and services include, for example,  suggestion boxes, helpdesks, hotlines, 
and even accountability officers who walk through the project area wearing special vests. 
Those on the receiving end of humanitarian aid are more likely to speak up if for some 
reason they fail to receive the emergency assistance  on which they depend: for example, 
a food ration card if their name was mistakenly left off a food aid distribution list. 
Operational problems such as being left off of a list for the distribution of food aid are 
susceptible to technical solutions (through post-distribution monitoring) and thus tend to 
emerge more frequently in the organization’s internal data as complaint-and-feedback 
loops.  As one interviewee put it,  
[Y]ou can send people with clipboards to elicit feedback when people are 
receiving blankets or shelter, or something like that, I think more easily… 
Whereas actually the long-term development stuff about participation and 
empowerment, etc., that’s a slightly different thing (World Vision senior 
development staffer).  
Humanitarian Emergency Response Context 
In the interviews with humanitarian staffers, the following six themes emerged 
more strongly than they did in the development realm:  complaint and feedback, with 
particular attention to the mechanisms used for collecting and dealing with complaints 
and feedback; funding and resources; organizational learning; management issues; and, 
to a slightly lesser extent, information provision. In contrast, development staffers gave 
greater attention to the three themes of compliance culture; power; and results 
orientation.  Consultation and safeguarding were of approximately equal salience in the 
two areas.  The residual category (interviews of outside experts and fundraising 
managers) was chiefly interesting for the light it shed on issues of culture, language, and 




Complaint and Feedback 
Complaint and feedback, and the mechanisms used for dealing with them, were 
more salient, and the discussion of them significantly richer, on the humanitarian side.  
This indicates that attention to complaint and feedback mechanisms and systems is more 
fully developed in humanitarian work, arguably in part for the reason given above:  the 
nature of humanitarian aid lends itself to the use of those mechanisms more easily than 
does long-term development work.    
However, ultimately data were mixed on whether and to what extent complaint 
and feedback mechanisms were effective in actually garnering beneficiaries’ viewpoints 
and responding to those viewpoints effectively: some interviewees maintained that 
complaint and feedback mechanisms were effective, while others asserted they were not. 
Nonetheless the important point to note here is that, to reiterate, complaint and feedback 
– the most crucial of the four pillars of downward accountability – was given significant 
attention on the humanitarian side, more so than on the development side.  
Interviewees expounded at length on the various types of complaint and feedback 
mechanisms used, and on how to determine which ones were most appropriate – whether 
suggestion boxes, helpdesks, cell phone technology, focus groups, face-to-face 
discussion, community meetings, or others.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the question of 
which mechanisms to use for collecting complaints and feedback was identified as being 
highly context-dependent. 
It became apparent that seasoned accountability champions know to contextualize 
the mechanisms that they use in order to collect complaints and feedback. They maintain 




than another – for example, technology-dependent ones such as text messages or 
telephone hotlines, rather than face-to-face meetings. Rather, it is knowing enough to 
select which mechanisms to use based on what the community says it prefers.  (Of 
course, this begs the question of how to know whether consultations with communities to 
determine the best mechanisms truly are accessing the perspectives of a broad range of 
community members, and in particular, the most vulnerable). An early champion of 
downward accountability, trained in the use of various mechanisms designed to collect 
feedback over a decade ago when World Vision had recently begun its endeavors in that 
area, describes the various types of feedback mechanisms in use and notes something 
about the process involved in selecting which ones to use in a given community. This 
interviewee’s observations are worth quoting at length because they indicate how that 
person and their staff gather information, specifically feedback from the community 
being served: 
We have a basic rapid assessment tool that we use for the needs assessment... 
Once we’ve done the assessment, we ask the communities, “How do you want to 
file the complaints?”  
 
[W]hat we’ve discovered to be mostly preferred – again, it’s not one-size-fits-all, 
it has to be contextual – we find that people say, “Okay, we want to use” – maybe 
it’s the traditional leaders.... [Others] will say, “No, traditional leaders we can’t 
trust. We want to use [text messaging], because we have got the phones” ... Some 
will say, “No, put the suggestion boxes at strategic points. Then, whenever we 
have got an issue, [we’ll] write on a piece of paper and put it there” ... Or, some 
will say, “Come, face-to-face.” When there are problems with distribution… 
approach this person who’s wearing this type of a vest who is moving around, 
who is collecting the feedback and complaints from the different stakeholders...  
 
So…what I’ve been trying to do is to come up with complementary mechanisms, 
knowing that one mechanism cannot save all. But key things, key principles: we 
have to make sure that the mechanisms that we put in place are accessible. They 
offer confidentiality. So that at least someone will not be victimized because 
someone raised this complaint… [W]e always make sure that those principles are 





However, context was not necessarily all, and a particular complaint and feedback 
mechanism might be found to be generally preferable.  For example, there was a place for 
suggestion boxes as they offered anonymity, particularly valuable in the case of sensitive 
complaints:  
And in [this country] context it’s primarily been the face to face interaction, that 
is number one.  Followed by number two, hotline, and number three is basically 
suggestion box for any inputs.  The reason why these suggestion boxes are very 
effective in this context, in a fragile context, is that it’s anonymous.  People prefer 
to remain anonymous if they want to give anything in writing (World Vision 
accountability specialist and trainer).  
 
In addition, the agency’s experience of having participated in a massive 
humanitarian emergency response was also shown to have informed the way in which 
downward accountability was implemented in subsequent humanitarian emergency 
responses . One interviewee stated, “[C]ombined with what came out of [the 2004 
tsunami response in] Sri Lanka, what came out of the [Food Program Management 
Group] globally, I think that really pushed the program accountability framework 
development, and that’s where that came [out of] (Former World Vision humanitarian 
staffer). Indeed, numerous interviewees named food assistance as a key context for 
complaint and feedback mechanisms, usually one in which these were successful in 
addressing complaints about food aid – particularly in contrast with one or more of the 
other four pillars.  For example, “[O]ur food assistance programs have some very clear 
instructions and processes for setting up complaints mechanisms and for information 
provision. But sometimes we might be weaker on the participation piece” (World Vision 




The use of face-to-face methods was the most salient of the feedback 
mechanisms, with numerous interviewees pointing to the importance of in-person 
feedback – as the following example rather vividly indicates:  
[H]elpdesks are really, really, really good. That’s where you’ve got staff at a 
helpdesk during a food distribution (or whatever the case may be), and people 
love that.  They love it.  They can go up and talk and get information and 
complain and chat and throw ideas around.  They love it (Former World Vision 
staffer and M&E specialist).  
 
The most notable aspect of the data on complaint and feedback in the 
humanitarian realm was, to repeat, its richness and depth – whereas discussion of 
complaint and feedback in the development realm tended to be less voluminous and also 
less detailed, and more prone to discuss the issue in abstract rather than specific terms.  
Two apparent reasons – the concrete nature of humanitarian aid’s lending itself more 
readily to complaint and feedback mechanisms, and in particular the nature of food aid 
and the experience imparted by food assistance programs – have been cited above.  A 
third reason is  the imposition of donor requirements, which will be discussed further 
below.  
Organizational Learning 
Overwhelmingly, the theme of organizational learning was more salient in the 
data from interviews of the humanitarian aid staff, than in interviews of development 
staff.  This theme was defined to comprise all of the organizational learning tools 
discussed earlier – particularly PAF and LEAP 3, but also monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E).   These tools, designed to track progress toward objectives and also to 
incorporate whether downward accountability efforts were effective,  were referenced 




staffers.  Chief among these tools to improve effectiveness, including World Vision’s 
effectiveness at holding itself accountable, was M&E broadly understood (not only as 
exemplified by World Vision’s tools). And within M&E, there was significant attention 
to the recent emergence of  MEAL – in other words, M&E has been evolving into 
monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL).  One of the earliest staffers 
to be trained in downward accountability (starting in approximately 2007), subsequently 
became a downward accountability champion.  This interviewee explains his/her 
observation:  
Over time, what I’ve noticed is there is a, maybe, a huge improvement in the uptake 
of accountability across the board, yes.  And then, if we think in terms of expertise 
within our organization, you know I have quite a lot of people that are now, one, 
taking accountability  as a career – whose role is accountability. But … what has 
also been happening is the blending of accountability with monitoring, evaluation, 
and learning (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer). 
 
This is consistent with the trend in the literature:  accountability increasingly is folded 
into monitoring and evaluation (Eyben and Gujit, 2015).  Learning is added, with the 
objective of feeding monitoring and evaluation into programming, so that agencies can be 
held accountable – and in this way (ideally), the cycle is complete.  
 However, donor exigencies mean that not all the components of MEAL are given 
equal weight, as another interviewee observes:  
The person and the funds [for implementing downward accountability] may not be 
included at the beginning, and if there isn’t one focal point it becomes one of many 
things that need to be done by people who are already under severe pressure… 
MEAL staff have many things to do.  And the monitoring and evaluation part might 
be prioritized, especially because they need that information to complete donor 
reports – apart from anything else.  And whereas donors do have accountability 
requirements, maybe they would not be seen as high a priority, as getting the basic 
M&E information in place to complete the reports (World Vision humanitarian 





 Yet another interviewee also pointed to the challenges involved in putting all the 
components together:  
[E]nsuring that, whether it’s the country managers, or other folk, really think and 
integrate accountability and M&E into the program, is, I think, a huge part of it.  
Yes, and really ensuring that M&E and accountability are joined up, creating that 
culture (former World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist). 
 
 In all of this, the power to enforce downward accountability implementation lies 
only with the donors.  To reiterate – and encapsulate the central dilemma at the heart of 
this dissertation –  because beneficiaries lack anything resembling the leverage that 
donors have for enforcing downward accountability, its implementation depends on the 
will of the organization as well as on donor imperatives or at least donor support.  
 It is perhaps slightly ironic that the organizational learning indicators, chief among 
them MEAL, or LEAP in World Vision terminology, were discussed more frequently in 
the humanitarian side, given that LEAP originated in the development side.  As one 
interviewee described it,  
LEAP was put together not for humanitarian projects at all, it was put together for 
the sponsorship programming.  Because… those child sponsors were sending 
money in, but…  there was no structure around that. And so, they put together the 
LEAP framework so that those sponsorship programs could have structure around 
them.  And so, then during the tsunami response they wanted to take that LEAP 
structure and see if it would work in a humanitarian context.  So, we… brought that 
into the humanitarian part of the organization. Which was fine, but it wasn’t nearly 
as necessary because grants basically come with a built-in structure (former World 
Vision staffer and M&E specialist).   
 
 Another described it this way:  
So, from grant-funded programs, we have always had, generally, a higher level of 
accountability to donors, right?  And I can remember when we first brought in 
LEAP.  And one of the key rationales for bringing in LEAP was, “We want to bring 
the level of reporting within our non-grant-funded programs, up to the level of what 
we’re doing in our grant-funded programs. How can we do that?” And that’s one of 





 Both observations, then, point to the longevity of downward accountability 
processes (embedded within LEAP) as an additional reason for their being better-
developed in humanitarian work than in development work.  Lest this conclusion be 
thought to merely reveal bias on the part of humanitarian staff’s recollections, 
development staff also recognized the same chronology, for example: “I was involved in 
some of the early stages when the question of [downward] accountability first came up… 
And it originated with the Humanitarian Accountability Standards… and the need for 
World Vision to be accountable to communities when it was involved in humanitarian 
emergencies (World Vision humanitarian staffer).  
Funding Structures and Donor Requirements 
 Second only to the importance of organizational learning in explaining why 
downward accountability was better-implemented in the humanitarian side, were the 
weight of donor expectations and, sometimes, the structure of funding – particularly with 
respect to grants.  Already noted previously is how humanitarian emergency responses 
are more often funded through grants and contracts.  This funding stream has a direct 
impact on the level of accountability required from the agency:  upward accountability, 
but also downward accountability because donors also want the receiving agency to track 
how well it is holding itself accountable to beneficiaries. One interviewee drew a contrast 
between the effects of being funded by child sponsorship funds and external grant funds 
in this way:  
So, lots of trust, from [individuals] who give to the organization, and give their 
money, trusting the organization to do the right thing… And so, you could work 
in a place for ten years and know, instinctively and intuitively, from having  seen 
the changes that happen there; but maybe have very little capacity for 




wouldn’t get a grant again (World Vision humanitarian accountability and M&E 
specialist).   
 
This distinction has led to an interesting phenomenon whereby the development arm of 
the organization found itself obliged to create organizational learning tools to capture 
downward accountability and fold them into existing monitoring and evaluation 
processes to create the panoply of organizational learning tools and processes described 
in Figure 4-5 on page 99.  Meanwhile, in humanitarian emergency responses, donor 
grants and contracts come with their own pre-existing accountability frameworks that the 
implementing NGOs are obligated to fulfill.  In World Vision’s experience, LEAP 
ultimately had to be incorporated across both arms of the agency, with the result that 
reporting requirements grew burdensome and duplicative.  One interviewee working in a 
large humanitarian emergency response in a fragile context described the burdensome 
nature of reporting in this way:  
But what really struck me with the LEAP 3 transition is that it is just so – there was 
so little space for contextualization that it was sometimes really hard to make the 
designs work [here].  In [country] we are about 50 percent grant-funded and 50 
percent sponsorship-funded... And so then, LEAP 3 becomes this really interesting 
process where we have to kind of merge the two.  And show how the grants are 
contributing to our objectives in a more clear way, but a lot of the requirements of 
the donor got left out of the framework.  And so, it’s really difficult, it creates a 
huge amount of work for the managers to cope with both systems (World Vision 
program quality specialist).   
 
 Beyond the inefficiencies involved in merging systems – symptomatic of a broader 
problem in development aid and pertaining to the onerousness of donor requirements 
generally – there is the tension between the need to be cost-efficient in order to keep 
grants and contracts flowing to the agency, and the desire to invest time and resources in 




 See, what has happened is [that] some of these agencies who are donors or semi 
 donors... they need to actually trust the system that we have in place. So, what has 
 happened is [the donor agency] has their own mechanism. And then it’s a challenge 
 for us…. they actually downplay the system that we have created, saying that we 
 are not cost-effective… [T]hey find [another] partner cost-effective, and we have 
 lost out on opportunities to take on programming. Because we have a high cost, 
 having all of this system in place… for us to be reasonably responsible to the 
 beneficiaries whom we serve, there is a cost that World Vision has paid 




 The data from the humanitarian sector were also distinguished from those of the 
development sector by the degree to which management issues emerged as salient.  
Management issues were selected as a theme that loosely grouped a number of categories 
including, most importantly, 1) capacity-building; 2) leadership buy-in; 3) 
systematization; and 4) the use of organizing tools such as logframes and the Area 
Development Programs.  Each of these connect to downward accountability, in the 
following ways: 1) Interviewees regarded it as important to build the capacity of staff to 
hold the agency accountable to its beneficiaries; 2) Support from senior leadership for 
downward accountability was identified as a key factor in the success of such 
accountability initiatives; 3) Systematization in downward accountability systems was 
sometimes flagged as lacking;  and 4) Organizing tools, as noted earlier, were used for 
reporting on downward accountability and are hence important for tracking 
accountability’s success or lack thereof.  
 The issue flagged by the interviewee above, who noted the burdensome nature of 
downward accountability reporting, recurred as a broader management theme as well.  
Interviewees spoke to both the perceived and actual burdens of implementing, and 




Inasmuch as the PAF is an instrument emerging from the central offices to track 
not only downward accountability but program effectiveness in general, interviewees 
indicate that it can be seen by country office staff as an additional burden on top of their 
existing responsibilities, or even as something devised to “catch them out.”  One 
interviewee stated:  
Design, monitoring, and evaluation – so, DME – and accountability [are] both 
very similar in this regard... Neither one of those has overall, widespread buy-in. 
DME especially is seen as burdensome, and as a big burden without a lot of value. 
And accountability is kind of seen that way as well (former World Vision staffer 
and accountability specialist). 
 The perceived burdensome nature of downward accountability was closely related 
to the idea of  downward accountability’s becoming part of a “culture of compliance,” or 
a “tick-the-box” exercise, whereby staff members tasked with carrying it out were 
incentivized to merely go through the motions rather than using it as a tool for authentic 
engagement with project-affected persons.  This observation was voiced repeatedly by 
World Vision staff and former staff. The sense that downward accountability was 
extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the mission – even going so far as to indicate that they 
viewed downward accountability requirements as threatening – came through in the 
words of one interviewer who said, “There’s a tendency of people to feel that this thing is 
there to spy on what they’re doing, what they’ve been doing… there’s that feeling of 
insecurity” (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).  For this reason, as the 
same interviewee emphasized, proper training becomes all the more essential, so that the 
value of downward accountability can be better understood as essential to the mission 




 Another challenge implied in tales of the burdensome nature of downward 
accountability was the sheer number of other reporting requirements competing for staff 
attention.  As one interviewee put it, 
If you’re just reporting and then you say, “Well, we have 30 percent coverage for 
accountability,” and the Global Centre says, “Well, you’ve got to [increase] that to 
80 percent,” who cares?  They have a hundred things they have to [raise] up to 80 
percent.  So, accountability is not going to get the same level of attention [if] the 
focus becomes a [mere] compliance mechanism for the Global Centre to say, “Ah, 
you’re not doing this well enough” (Former World Vision humanitarian staffer).   
 
 At the heart of this dilemma lies the nature of incentives.  In the view of the same 
interviewee, the strongest incentive to implement downward accountability rests in 
changing the perception of downward accountability as compliance to a necessity to the 
accomplishment of effectiveness goals:   
Because the value, I think, is in people’s self-critical reflection around what they’re 
doing in their programming… If you’re the National Director, and you’re trying to 
bring about child well-being outcomes and you find that there’s a big obstacle in 
your way, which is that your DME system can’t even tell whether you’re doing 
that; or you don’t have a functioning feedback and complaints mechanism, if that’s 
something that becomes a big obstacle, then you want to change it (Former World 
Vision humanitarian staffer).   
  
 However, another interviewee questioned whether downward accountability ought 
to be valued principally for its (as yet, in their view, unproven) link to development 
effectiveness:   
I think that the relationship between [downward accountability and development 
effectiveness] is so indirect and so complicated.  It takes so much effort to try and 
do that. That’s not why we set them up.  We didn’t set up accountability 
mechanisms so that children could read better, right?  We set up accountability 
mechanisms so that we could ensure that we were actually really – especially the 
feedback and complaints – that we were actually really listening to people and 
making our programs responsive to the kinds of issues that were affecting 





Another management issue related to downward accountability was the  key role 
that champions play. From the perspective of the interviewees’, when champions pushed 
downward accountability forward, it was more likely to be undertaken successfully and 
sustained. 
Capacity-building was also was identified as a significant issue that management 
needed to address if downward accountability was going to be viewed as essential. 
Several interviewees described slow but essential processes of building capacity among 
staff for designing and implementing downward accountability systems.  Initially when 
setting up such systems, capacity was low and the learning curve was steep, even among 
the champions tasked with setting them up.  For example, one interviewee described the 
establishment of downward accountability for an emergency food program in this way:  
We started in January 2018, and we started from scratch in [country].  I had to put 
together a team, and then start off by saying that we start with information 
provision, especially setting up of helpdesks, for people to raise complaints, to 
give us feedback and suggestions, and also to give them a platform to ask 
questions and inquire about the program… There were many examples of 
improvising, innovating, and also seeing that we simplify and make ourselves 
approachable for the beneficiaries whom we serve.  And over a period of twelve 
months we were able to do these accountability processes well (World Vision 
humanitarian accountability specialist and trainer).   
In short, the greater attention to capacity building and the role of management in 
the humanitarian arm implies a greater tendency toward managerialism within this 
section of the organization (Mitchell 2018) and it is possible to conclude that increased 
managerialism may lead to greater efficacy in the implementation of feedback and 
complaint mechanisms, if not in the deeper processes of beneficiary empowerment 




 Within the issues loosely grouped under management, as noted above, the role of 
senior leadership support for downward accountability was included.  This pivotal role of 
senior leadership support emerged repeatedly throughout the interviews.  It is categorized 
here within management – rather than as a separate leadership element – because senior 
leadership support is understood as a complex interplay of influences being exercised 
both by the field staff and those senior to them.  As one interviewee noted,  
Field staff might be really keen, but they don’t have the senior leadership-level 
support.  For example, in [country], I had so many – well, one in particular, just 
wanting to do these.  And we got so much pushback from the senior leadership.  
But as soon as a new senior leader came in, who incidentally had a humanitarian 
background, she was like, “Go ahead and do this.” And that’s [country], and 
they’ve just done amazing things since then (Former World Vision staffer and 
M&E specialist).  
 
Senior leadership support went hand-in-hand with the prospects for implementing 
the appropriate training (which, in turn, required sufficient resources).  Again and again, 
this was emphasized in those interviews that mentioned leadership support.  For example,  
When you see teams that are actually trained, and you see real resources put into 
DME and accountability and you have buy-in from the leadership, you can really 
heavily see a difference, a positive impact on the overall quality of the program. 
(consultant, M&E specialist, and former World Vision humanitarian staffer).  
 
Finally, as the same interviewee pointed out, the humanitarian emergency 
response context brought those three elements – senior leadership support, staff training, 
and resources – together in a way that made success possible:  
In the [disaster] response, where indeed there was capacity, there was buy-in, and 
there were resources, so all three of these things came together in the [disaster] 
response. Leadership was very bought into it, into accountability and DME.  
There was tons of money; and that [country] staff, we actually trained them.  But 
they already have strong capacity, they’re good, they’re strong.  And they were 






Development Programming Context 
Data from the interviews of development staff overwhelmingly revealed an 
interest in issues of power (including power imbalances) as it affected downward 
accountability.  This was followed by a markedly higher interest (relative to that of the 
humanitarian staff) in the culture of compliance, and a slightly higher interest in a results 
orientation. The category, culture of compliance was formulated to capture codes relating 
to staff’s tendency to comply with reporting requirements in a rote manner, instead of 
internalizing the reasons that downward accountability is desirable and aiming to 
implement downward accountability measures in a more authentic manner.  The 
category, results orientation was formulated to capture codes relating to donor 
requirements for results reporting, as well as to codes relating to results reporting for its 
own sake.  On the whole, it captures indications that the “results agenda” embraced by 
the international development community has been internalized by World Vision staff 
(Eyben, 2013).    
Power 
Interviewees from the development side of World Vision’s work raised the issue 
of power and particularly power imbalances more frequently than did those involved in 
humanitarian work.  They situated downward accountability within a broader context 
than that of results reporting.  Instead, “doing” downward accountability effectively 
meant, for them, having an awareness of the role of the power imbalance between World 
Vision and its beneficiaries. This imbalance complicates the ability of the organization to 
collect feedback that goes beyond rote expressions of thanks and that would instead 




Not surprisingly, then, the discussion of power and related themes brought in such 
topics as World Vision’s embarking on Transformational Development as well as its 
advocacy work; and in addition, its CVA program, the participatory budgeting work that 
had preceded that program, and the broader social accountability work of which the 
program is a part. Although interviewees paid most attention to those topics 
(Transformational Development and CVA), they also pointed to the importance of 
partnership, empowerment and sustainability – not only in relation to downward 
accountability, but in general.  
The question of power emerged from the very beginning in various discussions of 
how to train World Vision staff in downward accountability practices.  Interviewees 
among the development staff emphasized that it was essential for staff to understand the 
imbalance of power inherent in the relationship between the agency and its beneficiaries, 
in order to appropriately design and implement downward accountability.  To begin with, 
cultural norms often led beneficiaries, when given the opportunity to provide feedback, to 
express gratitude.  This was coupled with the perceived need to keep the NGO happy and 
engaged with the community, and thus overcoming the imbalance presented a 
fundamental challenge:  “The assumption of course is that you don’t bite the hand that 
feeds you. [Beneficiaries fear that] the NGO is going to withdraw, so they don’t rock the 
boat. We recognize in the sector there’s a long way to go” (World Vision accountability 
specialist).  Another interviewee stated,  
I would say, the single most important thing [for World Vision to learn about 
downward accountability], I think, would be that the practice of program 
accountability needs to take the imbalance in power relations more seriously 
because, you know, World Vision is a large international NGO, and so World 
Vision needs to be more conscious of the imbalance in power relations. So, I think 




consultation, participation and feedback, that model is not sufficiently – well, I 
think it’s partly been adapted, but it needs more work to take these power 
relations seriously (World Vision researcher, development).   
  
This interviewee shows an awareness of the disempowered position in which the 
beneficiaries find themselves relative to World Vision. INGOs, being neither for-profit 
corporations nor government agencies, are neither subject to the discipline of the market 
nor are they accountable to voters.  The persons meant to benefit from development and 
humanitarian aid lack the leverage that ordinary consumers might (theoretically) have, as 
they do not pay for goods or services; or that voters might have who (in principle) can 
express their displeasure at the ballot box (Ronalds, 2010, p. 181).   
This recognition of power imbalances extended to those existing within 
communities as well, and to the concomitant responsibility of staff members, when 
undertaking community consultation, to see to it that they reach the most vulnerable (and 
typically less visible) members of the community as well as the more privileged ones 
(Chambers, 1983).  This had implications for how training in downward accountability is 
done. It would be a simpler matter to rely on local community leaders for guidance as to 
how to conduct consultation and especially whom to consult.  However, the more 
thorough approach to downward accountability implies finding out who, within a 
community, is likely to be less visible, more vulnerable and generally more powerless, 
and find ways to listen to them.  As one interviewee described it: 
I think that accountability covers so many different elements that it’s not 
something that you just need to hire one technical specialist and they can get it 
done. Or carry out a couple of trainings.  It involves quite a varied skill set: people 
who are very good at engaging with communities, listening to communities, being 
very sensitive about cultural, gender, power dynamics at community level. (World 





One interviewee expressed doubt as to whether the norms and standards that 
govern work in the humanitarian sphere sufficiently engaged this need to grapple with 
power imbalances between World Vision and beneficiaries: 
[T]here’s a larger learning process that needs to happen because – I think the 
constraint is this linkage to the [Humanitarian Accountability Partnership] 
Standards that perhaps does not take seriously enough the unequal relations 
between World Vision and beneficiaries, nor critique the very notion of 
“beneficiaries,” with the dependency that often arises from it. While it comes out 
of a genuine attempt to respond to beneficiaries in humanitarian emergencies 
more adequately and more accountable, “who” has power to set and drive 
agendas, especially those which raise deeper issues, seems not adequately 
surfaced (World Vision senior researcher). 
 
A similar concern was expressed by an interviewee who feared that a lack of 
commitment to transferring power from the NGO to the beneficiaries would turn 
downward accountability from a potentially transformational practice into the proverbial 
“tick-the-box” exercise discussed earlier:  
[U]nless you have trainers of trainers who are politically motivated and 
emphasizing the aspects of the work that are explicitly designed to transform 
power relationships at the local level and emphasize the empowerment of 
individuals – marginalized individuals and communities – it can quickly 
deteriorate when under time pressures and recruitment drives, to just go through 
the motions of consultation, if you like – documenting, catching the results, and 
getting them written up (former World Vision staff and social accountability 
expert). 
 
Interestingly, the question of giving “teeth” to accountability emerged repeatedly 
among diverse interviewees.  This was grouped under the theme of power, since the 
power to hold duty-bearers (including NGOs) accountable was considered essential to 
making downward accountability effective.  Accessibility of feedback mechanisms was 
identified as one part of the answer. This is why making such mechanisms accessible to 
the most vulnerable – women, children, landless persons, internally displaced persons, 




recurred among a number of interviews as an important factor. Confidentiality of 
reporting mechanisms was another factor that affected the effectiveness of downward 
accountability: 
[W]e see that accessible feedback mechanisms and giving people a range, so they 
can find the one they’re most comfortable with, is critical to doing that, and I don’t 
think we’ve cracked that.  So that people feel comfortable reporting not just 
exploitation and abuse, but also corruption.  I would have thought, you know, being 
realistic about what happens in the field, we should be getting more allegations of 
fraud, or exploitation and abuse, and we don’t get them. So that’s probably the 
biggest obstacle, failing, it’s where the feedback systems aren’t delivering on their 
potential (World Vision humanitarian accountability specialist and trainer).   
 
Social Accountability:  Citizen Voice and Action  
 
Related to, but distinct from, the discussion of power was World Vision’s work in 
social accountability through the program called Citizen Voice and Action (CVA), 
described earlier in pages 41 - 42. Briefly, this work, inspired by the participatory 
budgeting work conducted in several countries in Asia and Latin America in the 1980s 
and 1990s, entails training project beneficiaries in how to hold government officials 
accountable for the provision of public services.   
Three persons involved in CVA (one current staff person and two past staff 
persons) were interviewed to gain their perspectives on downward accountability as 
informed by their expertise in social accountability.  While it might seem natural that 
there would be a great deal of overlap between CVA and downward accountability work, 
in fact this appeared not to be the case – as other interviewees, not only the past and 
present CVA staffers, also revealed.  Instead, the two seemed to be kept quite separate.  
In part, this was due to the different purposes of each:  CVA was designed to train 
citizens in “project-affected areas” in how to, first, access information about the services 




accountable in case of lapses.  The constraint against applying similar training to the 
relationship with World Vision was explained as follows:  that the (unintended) effect 
would inevitably be to transfer the obligation to provide such services from local 
government to World Vision, thus inappropriately supplanting government in its role as 
service provider.  
Unfortunately, as one interviewee observed, “There seems to be a risk, in part, of 
reinventing the wheel, when we actually have a lot of learning from CV and A, and we 
haven’t adequately started applying it…” (World Vision senior development researcher). 
In addition, there were similarities in terms of the drivers of success in social 
accountability as well as downward accountability, as the following quote illustrates: 
So, if you are working with Support Office champions, maybe they can find a 
little bit of budget that then can help the National Offices to roll it out, so it works 
well.  But then with the Social Accountability Leadership Team, to have regional 
champions, to be able to say, “Okay, you know what? That sounds like a great 
idea, I’m going to take it up with the National Offices team and see if we can 
scale it up.”  That is also really, really useful for us as a model.  Because the three 
of us, the four of us, we can’t be everywhere, we just – practically, we can’t do it, 
so to have that support is fantastic. (World Vision staffer and social accountability 
specialist).  
 
In other words, the Support Offices – those country offices located in the rich 
countries and tasked with fundraising for work in the field – may be of some help in 
promoting social accountability work, but support from leadership at the regional level is 
just as, or more, important, in that it provides resources in the form of staffing.  Once 
again, as with downward accountability in the humanitarian arm of World Vision’s work, 






A Culture of Compliance 
  
Given the foregoing discussion of the importance of power and power imbalances 
in the development staff’s analyses of downward accountability, it is not surprising that 
interviewees among the development staff next pointed to the presence of a culture of 
compliance as an obstacle to the effective implementation of downward accountability.  
This phenomenon has already been touched on briefly.  To elaborate further, in this 
context, a “culture of compliance” connotes, not something desirable but rather a 
tendency to prioritize complying with rules due to principal-agent pressures, rather than 
from intrinsically valuing that which the rules seek to promote (Eyben and Gujit 2015, 
Crack 2017). One interviewee, referring to the sexual abuse scandal that erupted at 
Oxfam in February 2018, offered:  “One thing those kinds of scandals tend to highlight is 
the inadequacy of a compliance approach.  Not that compliance isn’t important, but 
compliance isn’t sufficient for accountability, and transparency isn’t sufficient for 
accountability” (World Vision researcher, development).  Instead, as scholars have noted, 
it is necessary to move “from compliance to commitment,” if authentic organizational 
learning is to take place (Hubbard, Mehan and Stein, 2006, p. 174).   
Another interview connected this issue to the setting of international standards 
and the need to prevent international standard-setting from supplanting local ownership 
of downward accountability processes:   
So, I think from where I sit, at the kind of international level… we are setting 
policies, and we’re setting standards.  But we don’t want to communicate those in 
a way that compounds this kind of compliance mentality.  We want to 
communicate these things in a way that says, “We want you to be empowered to 
analyze and think for yourself about how can you use these standards in a way 
that’s going to help you to actually produce better results” (World Vision 





This same interviewee also observed:  
 
[O]ne thing that I would say is that we actually struggle with compliance, in a 
very negative way. So, across the organization, people tend to be… too concerned 
about doing what they perceive to be the expected thing, rather than really 
thinking creatively about, “How do we solve problems and how do we achieve the 
outcomes and the results that we’re actually looking for?” (World Vision 
development staffer) 
 
Perhaps somewhat more positively, another interviewee pointed out that the 
culture of compliance could be overcome, thus preventing it from inhibiting the 
flexibility that might lead to more effective downward accountability practices:  “We 
need to incentivize staff to think outside the box of compliance, because quite often we 
have this approach, we believe it works; therefore, we’re going to roll it out exactly in 
this way. And we don’t want to promote that approach, we want to promote flexibility” 
(World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).  
A Results Orientation 
An orientation toward achieving and measuring results – sometimes known as 
“the results agenda” – was also more salient in the development data, although the 
difference was not pronounced (Eyben and Gujit 2015; Vallejo and Wehn 2016) in 
helping to explain why downward accountability might be less effective in development 
work.  The finding that the results agenda was more salient in development work was 
somewhat counterintuitive.  Interestingly, one of the more nuanced examples indicating 
an interest in results was a description of the experience of collecting data using a 
participatory method called popular benchmarks:  “We could get collective readings, not 
subject to statistical analysis but nevertheless of great value, and those were the kinds of 
data that went into the [World Bank-mandated] Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy for 




accountability expert).  In another example, an interviewee reflected on the emphasis on 
results as something mandated by donors and affecting the organization’s work as a 
whole, not only its development programming:  “I think the questions are being raised by 
the donors who are less influenced by the Rights-Based Approach, and more think in 
terms of development effectiveness and aid effectiveness” (World Vision accountability 
specialist). 
Another interviewee, speaking about the shift toward Child Well-Being 
Outcomes, recalled the process whereby these had been adopted, in this way:  “[W]e said 
actually, well, outcomes, that’s a bit rigid, so we moved more toward Child Well-Being  
aspirations, and so we said, ‘Okay, well, that’s the bigger goal,’ and we’re going to find 
our way towards those, and always be pushing for those” (World Vision development 
staffer).   
In short, the above examples show that in most cases, the consideration given to a 
results orientation in the development area was deeply contextual, and not necessarily 
indicative of an attachment to what is more commonly understood as “the results agenda” 
with its emphasis on quantitative and standardized metrics.   
Partial Convergence in Two Thematic Areas:  Safeguarding and Consultation 
Finally, the difference between the development and the humanitarian areas in the 
following two categories was almost negligible:  safety and safeguarding,  and 
consultation. In the context of this dissertation, Safety and safeguarding is a category 
developed to capture the concept of measures put in place to protect the vulnerable, and 
particularly children, from abuse. The term “safeguarding,” originally developed as a 




adults, has in recent years traveled into humanitarian discourse and received increased 
attention in the wake of the sex-abuse scandal of 2018, referenced earlier (Sandvik, 
2018).  Consultation is used to refer to the process of conferring with beneficiaries in 
order to garner their opinions as to how the development or humanitarian work in 
question should be done (or is being done).9   
Safety and Safeguarding 
With respect to safety and safeguarding, the nature of the discussion on the 
development side took place at a slightly more abstract level than on the humanitarian 
side, suggesting that the development staffers discussing safety and safeguarding perhaps 
regarded these concepts as referring to hypothetical situations rather than existing ones. 
One interviewee did flag safeguarding as a crucial issue, asserting both its importance 
and the likely underreporting of abuse cases:   
[W]here I think we have some weakness is encouraging really frank feedback that 
includes allegations of staff misconduct.  And offices have got quite a lot of 
feedback.  It’s very rare for there to be these types of allegations.  And that 
underlines the wider issue:  that underreporting of exploitation and abuse by 
beneficiaries is the real issue (World Vision accountability specialist).   
 
Another interviewee from that same professional area spoke to the issue of the 
binding nature of safeguards as something that could be leveraged to enforce downward 
accountability:  
[A]t the end of the day, you know, your job if you’re a field-level manager is 
everything from: keep your project running on time, on-quality and under budget; 
keep the government and local stakeholders happy; make sure nothing terrible 
happens… [S]o in that environment, which [issues] catch your attention?  Well, if 
it’s auditable, if it’s going to cause pain, or bring you great praise and  
 
                                               
9 Interestingly, “consultation” seems to appear nowhere in Andrea Cornwall’s Buzzwords and 
Fuzzwords, an article otherwise replete with explication and critique of bits of development 




encouragement, that is just a practical way we can use human nature to get people’s 
attention. (World Vision safeguarding expert).   
 
 In contrast, the humanitarian staff spoke about safety and safeguarding in terms of 
assuring the confidential and protected nature of complaint and feedback mechanisms:  
“[W]e have to make sure that the mechanisms that we put in place are accessible.  They 
offer confidentiality.  So that at least someone will not be victimized because someone 
raised this complaint” (World Vision accountability specialist and trainer).  This 
conforms with the broader trend observed earlier, of humanitarian work being more 
practically-focused than development work.   
Consultation 
With respect to consulting beneficiaries on their needs and desires regarding 
development and humanitarian projects, there were similar levels of convergence 
between the two sides of the organization.  Interviewees from both sides emphasized the 
importance of consulting communities before implementing projects or programs.  One 
interviewee from among the humanitarian staff illustrated this quite vividly. Interestingly, 
this person also framed consultation in terms of power relationships, much as 
development staff tended to do.  Consultation, in this view, implies ceding some power to 
the beneficiaries in order to design projects that more closely conform to their expressed 
needs: 
[H]ow can we transfer some of the power? Through consulting people on the key 
decisions that affect them.  So, before you design your [Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene - WASH] project; and before you decide, for example, where those pumps 
will be located; where the latrines will be; what the latrines will look like; where 
you put the shower cubicles, and what they will consist of… let us actually ask, the 
men and the women separately, right?  Before you sink a whole load of money into 
that project – and it’s very difficult to actually make changes once the WASH 





 Notably, the above observation also emphasizes pragmatic reasons for consulting 
and for doing so effectively:  to help ensure that the projects that are put in place have a 
chance to succeed precisely because they respond to needs articulated by those who are to 
benefit from them.  Carrying out a thorough consultation in the first place – one that is 
gender-sensitive – obviates the need to retrofit a project afterward, which would be 
difficult;  or worse, to chalk up a failed project as a mere occasion for “lessons learned.”   
 Another interviewee (carrying out humanitarian work in a fragile context), pointed 
to the need for consultation to ensure programming sustainability, saying, “Basically, 
we’re based on the ladder of [the] sustainable development process and hence firstly [the] 
community need[s] to [be] aware [of] the current condition and situation to be able to 
reflect their own problems and needs” (World Vision field staffer).  
 On the development side, one interviewee highlighted the importance of 
understanding consultation as going beyond the design phase of a project or program, to 
include collaboration with local partners and government:  “Yes, it’s broader than just 
how we design. It’s really about how we engage the communities that we’re working 
with… [W]e don’t implement just on our own, in isolation, but actually we work very 
closely in collaboration, in partnership with local civil society organizations and host 
governments” (World Vision safeguarding specialist).   
Discussion 
World Vision’s attempt to hold itself accountable to its beneficiaries has, 
arguably, been shaped by the twin impulses toward adaptive management on the one 
hand (shaped to a significant degree by having a results agenda), and transformational 




programming, which incorporates both of these. This toolkit – termed the “development 
programming approach” – incorporates transformational thinking in that it seeks to base 
the organization’s work on consultation with the affected communities. At the same time, 
it also seeks to adjust and re-design its projects and programs continually, based on 
reflection and evaluation on how programming is proceeding – thus also incorporating a 
key principle of adaptive management, iteration. The development programming 
approach also forms part of the results agenda in another way, by virtue of being centered 
on a set of objectives devised about a decade and a half ago to measure child well- being.  
Thus, on one hand, the modernizing project – understood broadly as the results 
agenda and the technocratic aspects of development and humanitarian work carried out 
by World Vision, as by so many other international NGOs – has in many respects been 
positive, in that it holds the potential for applying downward accountability mechanisms 
across the entire organization. It represents formalization of downward accountability and 
continuity across sectors and programs. In the words of one interviewee,  
[I]t grew... it was formalized as part and parcel of our programming. Where each 
and every program or project had to have accountability processes in place. So, I 
think that genuinely led to what we now have as an organization, which is: 
accountability cuts across all sectors and programs (World Vision accountability 
specialist and trainer). 
On the other hand, this person added:  
There are people who feel that it’s maybe an add-on to what they are doing. An 
add-on to their KPIs [key performance indicators] and that kind of stuff (World 
Vision accountability specialist and trainer).    
However, according to the data, the instruments used to structure downward 
accountability and collect data on downward accountability are not yet universally 




64 Child Well-Being reports indicates that in too many countries, there is little to no 
mention of the Program Accountability Framework, which, within the framework of the 
child well-being reports, and as noted earlier, is the sole instrument for collecting global 
data on how well downward accountability is being implemented. Even when staff are 
aware of this toolkit, all too often they report that downward accountability is only 
emerging, rather than growing or maturing (the three categories that the agency uses to 
assess the strength of downward accountability implementation). Where countries do 
report effective downward accountability practices, and report on them in some detail, it 
is where humanitarian responses are taking place or have recently taken place. This is 
chiefly in the areas of complaint and feedback mechanisms, and sometimes (although to a 
lesser extent), in the area of information provision.  
Also, in the development area as well as in the humanitarian, the role of senior 
leadership support for effective downward accountability implementation is key.  As one 
interviewee noted,  
So, the other thing that it depends on I think is the quality of leadership both at the 
local program level but then also at the national office.  So, if the program office 
has strong leadership, is committed to quality programming, then they’re much 
more competent and able to actually enter – or have a stance of –  negotiation 
with the funders, rather than just seeing themselves as being a conduit for funding 
activities and so on. So, I think national leadership is a really key determinant, 
really, as to whether or not logframes and plans become constrictive 
(World Vision development staffer).  
 
Performance in the areas of consultation and participation tends to lag these, by 
and large. In the interview data, when participation is cited, all too often, it tends to be 
“participation” in the sense of community members providing labor to a project, such as 
in food-for-aid projects, rather than having been involved from the beginning in 




Finally, judging from the interviews and from the wealth of organizational 
learning documents like the Development Programming Approach and others, there is no 
lack of awareness, at least among middle to upper-level staffers, of the importance of 
recognizing the power imbalance that World Vision has with respect to program-affected 
persons. Nevertheless, ensuring the flow of candid feedback in the presence of that power 
imbalance is something not easily accomplished: as noted earlier, respondents when 
offering feedback have a tendency to express gratitude for the projects, and it is difficult 
(although not impossible) for the agency to overcome that dynamic 
Conclusion 
These findings point to the limitations to implementing downward accountability 
and suggest that the presence of champions among field staff is an important factor in  its 
success. World Vision has experienced some limited success, chiefly in the area of 
feedback and complaints within humanitarian emergency aid. It is here that, 
paradoxically, the role of outside donors both prods the organization to implement 
feedback and complaint mechanisms, yet places constraints by imposing onerous 





CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS 
A Tale of Two Impulses Redux 
The story of World Vision’s adoption of downward accountability has been 
shown to be one of  complexity and some unexpected findings.  As has been 
demonstrated, somewhat contrary to expectation, it is with respect to feedback and 
complaints mechanisms and systems – rather than information provision, consultation, or 
participation – that there has been the most progress in downward accountability 
implementation.  
 However, this progress toward downward accountability is relative, as the 
majority of field offices  reported only incompletely on downward accountability 
performance.  Many offices did not quantify the extent to which downward 
accountability was being implemented, nor use World Vision’s rating system to evaluate 
how successfully it was being implemented. Furthermore, where progress did occur, it 
was found to a greater extent in humanitarian emergency responses than in development 
programs. The data from this study indicate that this is not surprising given the following 
influences that differentiate humanitarian work from development work.  First of all, the 
very nature of humanitarian work, being chiefly material in nature and short-to-medium 
term in duration, lends itself to the use of downward accountability mechanisms more 
easily than does development work, with its typically longer-term nature and aspirations 
to transformational change.  Secondly, humanitarian work is, to a greater degree, funded 
by large donor agencies and thus subject to their reporting requirements, which 
increasingly include the tracking of downward accountability. Thirdly,  because 




humanitarian community, there is a larger formal community of practice therein to 
support downward accountability practices, through peer-review mechanisms such as the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and Accountable Now. Finally, the support 
from senior leadership appears to be more prevalent in the humanitarian side, providing 
further strengthening to the implementation of feedback and complaint mechanisms and 
systems.   
As organizational learning has become a higher priority for the agency – as 
evidenced by the growing number of indicators, toolkits and training manuals designed to 
systematize and diffuse such learning across the organization – World Vision has had 
access to more tools with which to track and improve downward accountability practices.  
Here, the influence of technocratic donor imperatives is keenly felt.  Not coincidentally, 
where donor pressures are greater – again, in humanitarian aid – feedback and complaint 
mechanisms and systems are stronger.  This may not, however, extend to the other pillars 
of downward accountability.   
The lack of definition of those other aspects of downward accountability – chiefly 
consultation and participation – arguably puts them at a disadvantage with respect to 
feedback and complaints (and perhaps to a lesser extent information provision).  Briefly 
put, it may be that staff were not always able to discern when participation was taking 
place and thus did not report it as frequently.  With feedback and complaints, it was more 
often possible to know when these were taking place and to report on them, whether the 
agency was responding to them or not (i.e., “closing the feedback loop”).  Participation 
and consultation have been part of the development “toolkit” for much longer than 




would lead to greater capability for their implementation, this seems largely not to have 
been the case.  The seeming paradox is resolved if we reflect that the more defined and 
concrete nature of humanitarian aid makes possible – sometimes even requires – the use 
of feedback and complaints.   
Changes in the Foreign Aid System and in Philanthropy   
The experience of World Vision as regards downward accountability in both 
development and humanitarian work is embedded in a larger framework of changes in 
both the foreign aid system and the philanthropic sector.  The emergence of a new kind of 
philanthropy over the past two decades has been notable.  Here the term “new 
philanthropy” is used to loosely denote trends in 21st-century philanthropy.  It refers to 
various phenomena known as “strategic philanthropy,” “outcome-oriented philanthropy,” 
“impact investing,” and  “venture philanthropy” (Porter and Kramer, 1999; Frumkin, 
2003; Brest, 2010; Eikenberry and Mirabella, 2018). The development of this “new 
philanthropy” has coincided with the shrinking of the state and the ascendancy of the 
neoliberal model (Hay 2012), and that model’s ideological justification (Hall, 2013 p. 
150). The resulting contraction in the provision of public goods and public services has in 
turn been used to justify increased levels of philanthropic giving.  It has also been put 
forward as a rationale for why philanthropy must become better focused on efficiency 
and effectiveness – in short, with results (Hay, 2012, p. 2).   
The “culture of measuring outcomes” extended beyond the foreign assistance 
sector and found a home in domestic philanthropy as well.  In the United Kingdom, 
social impact bonds, whereby governments contracting with nonprofit organizations 




philanthropy in the United States promptly followed suit with the spread of similar “pay 
for success” models (Gugerty and Karlan, 2018, p. 8).   
And yet, the advent of the results agenda has, if anything, complicated 
organizations’ efforts to carry out greater accountability.  This is so for a number of 
reasons.  First of all, it is important to distinguish between a results orientation and an 
emphasis on outcomes.  The distinction is straightforward enough.  For example, donors 
may request aggregate numbers on such results as: 
[t]he number of educational curricula revised, the number of children completing 
primary education, and the reduction of maternal deaths during childbirth, among 
those at the individual level; and new or changed policies, practices, and working 
routines at the organizational level.  In other words, projects are evaluated based 
on predetermined results through the use of quantified and aggregated indicators 
(Eyben, 2011, and Green, 2010, cited in Vallejo and Wehn 2016, p. 3).   
 
Yet these results, laudable though they may be, leave out those “non-planned” changes 
that may nonetheless be attributed to the intervention being evaluated (Vallejo and Wehn, 
2016, p. 4).   
Secondly, while the advent of the data revolution has both whetted donor appetite 
for reporting on results, and made it apparently more feasible to comply with those 
requirements, there are a number of reasons why organizations still struggle to report 
meaningfully on their performance.  One is that an organization has collected too few 
data.  Another is that it has more data than it can possibly analyze given its resources – 
recall here World Vision’s realization that it had 1,800 databases, accumulated over the 
course of over sixty years, but not at that time meaningfully organized, let alone utilized. 
Finally, without collecting the right data, an organization may not know whether to 
attribute changes in outcomes to its interventions, or to other variables that might have 




[T]here is a time and place to measure impact.  But in many situations, the best 
questions to address may be ‘Did we do what we said we would do?’ 
(accountability) and ‘How can data help us learn and improve?’ (performance 
management) instead of ‘Did we change the world in the way we set out to?’ 
(Gugerty and Karlan 2018, p. 9).   
 
It is the contention of this dissertation that collecting feedback and complaint data 
in humanitarian emergency responses, when done successfully (more on that is below), 
makes it possible to address the question, “Did we do what we said we would do?”  In the 
case of World Vision, the organization is clearly using feedback and complaint processes 
for that purpose, i.e., to determine, for example, whether the material aid distributed in 
fact reached the intended beneficiaries and satisfied their needs according to their own 
(self-reported) perceptions.  Taking the analysis of feedback and complaint one step 
further, the agency is also attempting to collect and use data about the feedback and 
complaint processes to learn and improve the way it does downward accountability (the 
second question in Gugerty and Karlan’s three-question list above).  So far, so good.  
And in some perspectives, it is in that limited sense that downward accountability data 
should be used (World Vision accountability and M&E specialist).  However, donor 
pressures have led the agency to want to use the data on how downward accountability is 
done to support the broader aim of improving development (or humanitarian relief) 
performance – in short, for performance management, as the accountability and M&E 
specialist observed.  Yet it is not clear that there is necessarily a robust causal connection 
between downward accountability and development effectiveness.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
The most fruitful direction for future research to take would be for case studies to 




nongovernmental organizations.  In this way a cross-case comparison would make it 
possible to see whether the findings from this dissertation are generalizable across wider, 
and possibly more varied, experiences.   
In addition, future research could expand on the scope of this dissertation in a way 
that could yield results amenable to a comparison with those from studies of downward 
accountability practices at other INGOs.  For example, a study undertaken of downward 
accountability practices at Oxfam Australia found that “field staff display consistently 
more favorable perceptions of the organization’s existing accountability practices than do 
home office staff” (Davis, McDonald and Brenton, 2012, p. 948).  While this dissertation 
did not undertake to explore differences between the perceptions of field vs. headquarters 
staff, future research could do so and could seek to find the reasons for any such 
differences.   
In addition, given the important role played by grants and contracts as noted 
above, a quantitative or mixed-methods study examining in detail whether and to what 
extent there is any correlation between volume of grants dollars on the one hand, and 
downward implementation on the other, is warranted.  One immediate challenge faced by 
such a study would be how to operationalize downward implementation, given the gaps 
in the data described above.  As data collection and reporting improve, with the increased 
adoption of organizational learning tools – if such improvement does take place – 
meaningful correlation will become more feasible.  
Concluding Thoughts 
In the end, it seems that downward accountability, by traveling a distance from its 




21st-century aid effectiveness tool, has experienced a journey similar to that of 
participatory budgeting. In one analysis, over the course of its “international travel” from 
South to North, participatory budgeting was transformed from a policy instrument – “a 
means of orienting relations between political society… and civil society” to a device – 
“a mix of technical components… and social components”  (Lascoumes and LeGales, in 
Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2015, p 197).  This description bears interesting parallels to the 
one by Joshi and Houtzager, who contend that “widgets,” that is, value-neutral technical 
tools such as participatory budgeting and many others, “[depoliticize] the very political 
processes through which poor people access services” (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012, p. 
146)  These scholars assert that more promise lies instead in “watchdogs,” social actors 
who, within their specific historical and political contexts, engage public providers in 
efforts to hold them accountable (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012).  Whether peer review 
mechanisms such as Accountable Now constitute such “watchdogs” is another matter, 
and likely to be unsatisfying, since global organizations by definition, while not lacking 
specific historical and political contexts, lie outside national borders and therefore outside 
national-level politics of contention. 
Instead, for development and humanitarian work to be truly transformational, it 
would be necessary for the “watchdog” function to be enacted by actors found within the 
local context.  And this points to a second dilemma: the possibility that INGO-beneficiary 
relationships embody clientelistic tendencies.   
While clientelism typically refers to a relationship between those in a position to 
give political support, i.e., votes, to office-seekers, it need not be limited to the political 




2017).  Thus, Roninger’s definition is one that could have relevance to the structure of 
INGO-beneficiary relationships: 
Clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power 
and exchange, a nonuniversalistic quid pro quo between individuals of groups of 
unequal standing.  It implies mediated and selective access to resources and 
markets from which others are normally excluded (Roninger, 1994).   
 
The relationships are helpful to the persons involved in projects and programs – 
the beneficiaries – because they have need of the material goods and services that INGOs 
provide.  They are beneficial to the INGOs because this work is their raison d’être, and 
thus, not insignificantly, their justification for raising funds from donors and the public 
(Barber and Bowie, 2008; Bornstein, 2001; Yuen, 2011).   
The analogy arguably breaks down, however, when it characterizes the 
relationship as one involving a quid pro quo between the parties, particularly one in 
which goods and services are essentially exchanged for votes.  Naturally, such is not the 
case here, as INGOs are not political parties.  Nevertheless, it is hard not to glimpse 
aspects of clientelism in the relationship, as when data reveal that feedback tends to 
consist mainly of the expression of thanks, as noted earlier.  Kelsall and Mercer (2003), 
conducting fieldwork in Tanzania, found that while World Vision project beneficiaries 
welcomed opportunities for what outsiders might term “empowerment,” they might not 
necessarily have perceived them as being desirable in the same way:  
 [W]hile the poorest might express desires for an increased share of the benefits 
[World Vision Tanzania] provided, they expressed few signs of wanting to be 
“empowered” in an individualistic sense.  Behind their statements one could 
discern a desire for increased control over their lives, but this could equally be 
understood in terms of gaining increased access to patrons, as to becoming “self-
directing,” “self-sufficient,” or “autonomous.”  Extrapolating, we might venture 
that both empowerment and development are interpreted locally in an idiom of 
clientelism, which sutures the divide between rich and poor (Kelsall and Mercer, 




 Beyond this particular country context, other analysts as well have come to see 
“civil society, including Northern NGOs, as new sources of, and vehicles for, clientelistic 
largesse” (Whaites, 2000, p. 138).   
 The quest for greater downward accountability, then, takes place in a larger 
context in which structures more complex than the power balance inherent in INGO-
beneficiary relations complicate the implementation of accountability mechanisms and 
systems.  Seen from a perspective close to the grassroots level, existing ways of 
understanding and enacting relationships between the powerful and the powerless may 
undermine such attempts.  Yet paradoxically, seen from the framework of those 
structures that fund and sustain humanitarian and development work, technical 
requirements and the responses to those requirements may – in the humanitarian context 
– make possible the effective collecting of feedback and complaints, if not always more 
thoroughgoing and authentic processes of consultation and participation.   
Policy Recommendations 
Given the state of affairs outlined above, what should be done regarding 
downward accountability?  Some desirable policy recommendations might be as follows.  
First of all, donors would do well to adopt longer timelines for downward accountability 
reporting.  The organizational learning tools described above are only beginning to be 
diffused across World Vision not only horizontally, but more importantly, vertically, 
“down” to the field level.  As has been shown, implementation has been uneven.  On the 
other hand, data collection on downward accountability practices at World Vision began 
only about five years ago, and absorption of changes in the use of organizational learning 




learning (MEAL) framework, LEAP 3 – has operated on a slower timeline than that of 
the typical donor agency.  Thus, the recommendation for donors is the classic one of 
calling for them to recognize that genuine change takes time, and to adjust their timelines 
accordingly. While some are beginning to do so, more needs to be done in this area.    
As to recommendations for World Vision:  it is desirable to (continue to) join with 
other INGOs, through channels such as Doing Development Differently, to push for just 
such a shift in donor frameworks and timelines.  Despite the competitive pressures that 
INGOs experience in the field, as vividly described above, with respect to policy 
dialogue and particularly with respect to contributions to academic and policy research, it 
is still possible to work in coalition with other INGOs – indeed such work is not 
uncommon.     
In the meantime, other more modest changes can be implemented internally.  
These would involve collecting data more systematically and in a way that would make it 
easier to assess progress over time – something that has been complicated by staffing 
changes in the past.  Quantifying such data in a standardized fashion would also be 
desirable, as it would make comparisons across countries and regions more feasible.  
In addition, a study of how World Vision’s social accountability work, CVA, 
might inform its downward accountability work is recommended.  One pragmatic area of 
exploration would be to see what downward accountability data collection systems might 
learn from the CVA data collection systems, which have a longer history and are likely to 
be more thoroughly developed.   
All of this is not to neglect the need to continue training the staff who implement 




and expansive, and raises consciousness about the power imbalance inherent in the 
relationship with project-affected persons and the corresponding need to correct that 
imbalance by ceding power.  This also requires, not surprisingly, increased resources, of 
time as well as money.  Here it is as well to give the last word to an interviewee with 
significant experience in designing and conducting such training across a number of 
countries. This interviewee remarked, “As costly as it is to run face-to-face trainings, I 
mean costly in terms of time and money for me to be there, I think that without that 
foundation it is more difficult to implement” (World Vision humanitarian accountability 
specialist).  The interviewee also made the following observation, which illustrates keen 
awareness of the dichotomy between mere technical training and a fuller understanding 
of what a transformative approach requires:   
I start by training people on the concept.  The concept involves these two things:  
the definition [of accountability] and the discussion on the responsible use of 
power…  
 
So, for example, if we implement the project without involving people and then 
we don’t invite them for their feedback and complaints, and act on those, is that 
actually the responsible use of power?   
 
So once [staff] people have this information – it’s an intangible thing, but if I’m 
actually there with people, training them face to face, I can get a sense of when it 
goes from the head to the heart.   
 
And if it only stays in the head and it doesn’t reach the heart, I don’t think that 
they will actually use their hands and feet to … support the implementation and 
actually make changes happen (World Vision humanitarian accountability 
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Fundraising offices appear 
in italics.  
 
Child sponsorship offices 











General Role Location Date of Interview 
Accountability Officer United Kingdom February 19, 2018 
Academic Expert United States March 4, 2018 
Senior Leadership United Kingdom April 4, 2018 
Safeguarding Expert United States April 11, 2018 
Accountability Officer United Kingdom April 11, 2018 
Development Officer United Kingdom April 4, 2018 
Social Accountability 
Expert/Director 
Australia May 7, 2018 
Former External Relations 
Officer 
South Korea April 13, 2018 
Field Officer South Korea June 19, 2018 
Program Officer South Sudan June 6, 2018 
Former Staff Trainer Australia April 23, 2018 





Canada June 18, 2018 
Academic Expert United Kingdom July 11, 2018 
Social Accountability 
Expert 
United Kingdom July 2, 2018 
MEAL Expert/Director Australia August 8, 2018 
Humanitarian 
Accountability Staffer 
Canada August 6, 2018 
Field Officer Myanmar July 31, 2018 
Social Accountability 
Expert 
United States August 9, 2018 
Senior Leadership, 
Humanitarian Aid 
United Kingdom August 21, 2018 
Field Officer Myanmar August 27, 2018 









The 58 Field Offices That Included Downward Accountability Data  
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TITLE: Transformational Development 
 
PURPOSE: Poverty is a surmountable condition of deprivation, vulnerability and broken relationships, 
which threatens human survival, involves unacceptable human suffering and prevents people 
from fulfilling their God-given potential. Transformational Development is how World Vision 
responds to poverty and vulnerability as we follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ to 
promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the 
Kingdom of God.  
 
Transformational Development is both a vision and a process. The vision is “life in all its 
fullness” for every child; girls and boys, families, communities and societies living abundant lives 
characterised by dignity, justice, peace, and hope. The process is a transformational journey of 
shared learning and holistic change, through which people discover God’s love and purposes 
for them as they work with others to address injustices and improve and sustain child well-
being.  
 
The purpose of this policy is to establish the core principles of Transformational Development 
that inform all World Vision’s work across all entities and in all contexts. The principles of 
Transformational Development are applicable to other ministry policies and provide the 
framework that brings all areas of work together into a coherent whole, focused on the 
sustained well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable. 
 
POLICY: The pursuit of Transformational Development requires all World Vision entities and 
programmes to: 
 
Recognise God is already at work in the process of human and social transformation: 
God is at work in the world to reconcile all people and the whole of nature to Himself. 
World Vision recognises that God’s work is displayed wherever people show 
compassion to those who suffer, relationships are reconciled and people are enabled to 
live with dignity, justice, peace and hope. World Vision staff take the time to understand 
what God is already doing, and to join with God’s work through life, deed, word and 







Prayer and discernment are vital to the success of Transformational Development. 
Acknowledging God as the author of transformation, World Vision teams actively engage in 
prayer and discernment to understand how God has been working, and to seek direction and 
strength from God for strategy, planning and implementation. 
 
The goal of Transformational Development is “life in all its fullness”; the holistic well-being of 
girls and boys within thriving families, communities and societies. Transformational 
Development requires that the spiritual as well as the material, social and political root causes 
of child vulnerability are understood and addressed. Spiritual nurture is integral to our holistic 
approach of human development.  We respond to God’s profound love for children through 
our relationships and actions, with the desire that children in any context might experience 
fullness of life.   
 
Restored identities and relationships are central to the pursuit of ‘life in all its fullness’. Broken 
relationships and a marred human identity are at the root of poverty and injustice. Restored 
identity and relationships, centred on God’s love, bring hope and can transform individual lives 
and entire nations. We recognise that it is impossible to achieve sustained well-being of 
children without addressing the gender inequalities that are the source of injustice and poverty. 
Through Transformational Development, girls and boys of all backgrounds, ethnicities, beliefs 
and abilities are valued, listened to, included and nurtured within peaceful, reconciled and 
gender equal families, communities and societies. 
 
Empower children, their families and communities to plan and control their own 
journey of transformation: 
Transformational Development is the responsibility of the people themselves. World Vision’s 
role is to empower girls and boys, especially the most vulnerable, with their families and 
communities, to envision, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate their own development 
processes in partnerships with local governments, businesses, and civil society.  World Vision is 
committed to facilitating community engagement that promotes the dignity and full participation 
of females and males as equal in the sight of God. 
 
Families are the primary social units and the basis of civil society.  Our work supports families 
to strengthen their resilience and improve livelihoods, enabling them to provide and care for 
children. World Vision programs promote transformed lifestyles and relationships between 
women, men, girls, and boys that enable children’s well-being and prevent violence and 
discrimination. 
 
Children play a key role as agents of transformation. World Vision will build children’s ability to 
participate, taking into account their age, maturity and context.  We uphold children’s rights to 
be listened to; to express their opinions on matters that affect them; and to freedom of 
expression, thought, association and access to information, while respecting the roles and 
responsibilities of parents and others in authority. 
 
World Vision’s contribution to a community’s journey of transformation will always be limited 
and time-bound. Throughout World Vision’s involvement, there will be a continuous focus on 
developing local leadership, seeking to strengthen communities’ resilience and capacities to 
maintain and build on gains in child well-being and sustainable development after World Vision’s 







Identify, include and benefit the Most Vulnerable Children within each specific context: 
The most vulnerable children are those most affected by extreme deprivation, serious rights 
violations, abusive or exploitative relationships, disabilities, and vulnerability to disaster.  World 
Vision embraces the challenge of prioritising, including and empowering the most marginalised 
and deprived girls and boys and their families.  
 
World Vision will go to where they are, listen carefully and work respectfully with them to 
understand and address the root causes of their vulnerability and build their capabilities, 
decrease their vulnerabilities and enable their equitable access to services. Staff will work to 
enable vulnerable people to be treated with dignity, not pre-judged or portrayed as victims, 
incompetent, or in need of medical care. 
 
Child Protection prevents and responds to exploitation, neglect, abuse, and other forms of 
violence affecting children.  World Vision upholds children’s rights to protection from all forms 
of abuse and violence, especially gender-based violence, and all practices that undermine the 
dignity of girls, boys, women and men and their right to protection from physical, sexual and 
psychological harm.   
 
World Vision expects that working with the most vulnerable girls and boys and their families 
will lead to mutual transformation, where attitudes and beliefs about the spiritual, social and 
political nature of vulnerability are challenged and changed. The values, beliefs and practices of 
World Vision staff are challenged and changed, just as those of community members, leaders, 
partners, governments and supporters are.  
 
Recognise that the causes of child vulnerability are complex and require humility, 
adaptability and active mutual learning, rooted in ongoing relationships: 
The complex nature of child vulnerability requires that Transformational Development 
processes are flexible; that design and implementation are merged through rapid cycles of 
learning and adaptation; and that there is a real focus on achieving results. 
 
World Vision’s approach to Transformational Development requires programme staff to be 
rooted in positive relationships with girls and boys, their families and duty bearers and 
committed to mutual learning together. These relationships are characterised by a humility that 
recognises there is always more to learn; curiosity at how change happens within a context; and 
accountability to those we serve. Through this listening and learning attitude, new approaches 
and innovations are sought, identified, tested and shared. 
 
World Vision’s technical interventions contribute to a locally owned vision of child well-being. 
They are jointly identified and designed with stakeholders in each context and build on local 
government and civil society capabilities. Technical interventions meet internationally accepted 
sector-specific standards and guidelines, which are carefully adapted to local contexts through a 
process of iterative learning, ensuring they have an impact on the root causes of child 
vulnerability and lead to the progressive fulfilment of children’s rights at each stage of their 
lifecycle. 
 
Because global issues and systems affect poverty, World Vision maximises its influence on 
international organisations, and seeks to engage donors and supporters deeply in their own 
transformation, and to increase their prayer and actions on behalf of vulnerable children. 




active in improving child well-being. Transformational Development requires identifying and 
collaborating with a range of existing organisations including those of different faiths or 
ideologies, celebrating our shared values of justice, love and hope. We embrace the risk and 
rewards of partnering with those who are different to ourselves.  
 
In working with partners, World Vision’s preferred role is as catalyst and convenor, 
connecting stakeholders to better impact key child well-being issues and efforts. 
 
A nurturing family, community and society is required for children to thrive.  We recognise, 
respect and strengthen others’ legitimate roles in upholding the rights of children and 
contributing to their sustained well-being.  This includes empowering children, families, 
communities, civil society oragnisations, government and the private sector to work in 
partnership on projects that support child well-being.  
 
World Vision promotes relationships with and between partners that are transformational, by 
living out the principles of mutual benefit, transparency and equity. 
 
World Vision believes that the Church is God’s primary instrument to transform lives and 
address the spiritual causes of poverty and injustice. For this reason, local churches, where they 
exist, are indispensable partners in the work of Transformational Development. World Vision 
works in ways that strengthen and enhance the local church’s engagement in and capacity for 
ministry with vulnerable children. 
 
Recognise that God desires the transformation of systems and structures so they work 
for equity, justice and the well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable: 
 
World Vision works with and strengthens governance systems, policies and structures at all 
levels, helping to make them more transparent, accountable and effective in delivering on the 
rights of their citizens. 
 
Citizens, communities and civil society organisations are equipped and enabled to engage in 
collaborative, constructive dialogue with national and local government officials and service 
providers to hold them accountable for upholding children’s rights and the provision of quality 
services against existing plans and policies. 
 
World Vision seeks to enable donors’ and supporters’ own transformation as they participate 
with communities to improve the lives of their children. Opportunities are provided for donors 
and supporters to engage deeply and to increase their prayer and actions on behalf of 
vulnerable children.  
 
The WVI President or his/her designee may develop further detailed management 
policies to implement this policy.  
Such management policies are also authorised to revoke the Partnership Policy on 
Programming Effectiveness in Long-Term Local Programming (BD/09/57), after having 






Children’s well-being refers to positive relationships, healthy individual development (involving 
physical and psycho-social health, cognitive, social and spiritual dimensions), and contexts where 
all children experience safety, social justice, and participation in civil society. World Vision’s 




aspirations:  that each girl and boy enjoys good health; is educated for life; experiences the love 
of God and their neighbours; and is cared for, protected, and participating.  
 
The most vulnerable children are those most affected by extreme deprivation, 
serious rights violations, abusive or exploitative relationships, disabilities, and vulnerability to 
disaster. The more vulnerability factors children experience, or the longer they 
experience any one of these factors, the more vulnerable they become. 
 
The Church is the global body of Christ-followers. (WV Faith and Development Guiding Frame, 
2017) 
 
Holistic means positive change in the whole of human life:  materially, socially, psychologically 
and spiritually. (Myers, 2011) 
 
SCOPE: This Partnership Policy applies to all World Vision entities, including VisionFund and World 
Vision microfinance entities. It is relevant to all operational contexts.  
 
This policy supersedes the Transformational Development Policy (BD/02/65) approved by the 
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Transformational Development: How WV Promotes Transformational Change 
 
Poverty is a combination of suffering, deprivation, vulnerability and broken relationships 
that prevents people from fulfilling their God-given potential. Transformational 
Development is how World Vision responds to poverty and vulnerability and works 
towards a vision of “life in all its fullness” for every child in every context with the 
exception of a Category III emergency response.  This means girls and boys living 
abundant lives, within transformed families, communities and societies characterised by 
dignity, justice, peace and hope, as God intended.  It is a journey of shared learning and 
change. 
 
TD involves 3 layers of change.  World Vision programmes are designed specifically to 
improve the well-being of children, especially the most vulnerable. The question is, what 
happens after those projects have ended? Are families, communities, governments, and 
local organisations able to maintain and build on the gains made for child well-being? 
There are specific actions that World Vision can take to increase the sustainability of 
project outcomes; by increasing local capacities, strengthening partnerships and networks, 
increasing accountability, building resilience and restoring broken relationships.  Our 
Christian identity means that we do not stop at the sustained well-being of children. We 
believe God is calling us to go deeper and seek the transformation of families, community 
and society.  
 
A thorough analysis of the root causes of poverty and vulnerability will eventually uncover 
the deeper, often hidden, social, cultural and spiritual issues that prevent children from 
enjoying life in all its fullness. These issues manifest as cultural practices, social norms, 
or power dynamics that keep people trapped in poverty. WV is called to engage at this 
deeper level, to understand and address these hidden root causes and to promote lasting 
transformation. This is the third layer of change. 
 
The core principles of Transformational Development, summarised below, inform all 
World Vision’s work across all entities and in all contexts.  
 
Listen - We listen to God, seeking to discern His voice and guidance. God is already 
there, in the community, working to reconcile all things to Himself. He has been present 
and working well before WV ever arrived; we join His work. We listen to the people we 
serve. We use participatory assessments to ensure participants, including children, are 
involved in the decisions that affect their lives.    We seek to address the immediate needs 
of the most vulnerable, as well as understanding and addressing the underlying root causes 
of vulnerability, restoring broken relationships and building social cohesion.  
 
Reach - We embrace the challenge of prioritising, including and empowering the most 
marginalised and deprived girls and boys and their families, regardless of ethnicity, 
religious affiliation or gender. We do this because in the Bible, we see God has a bias to 
the poor. He expects us to care for and protect the vulnerable and marginalised. We work 




depravation, abuse, and exploitation. We include them in decision making and ensure they 
are benefitting. 
 
Empower - We create opportunities for beneficiaries to influence and increase their sense 
of ownership over programme decisions. We hold ourselves accountable to those we serve. 
Our work promotes the dignity and full participation of females and males as equal in the 
sight of God.  
 
Connect - World Vision cannot change the world on our own. To see deep and lasting 
change, we have to be good at working together with others. We work with others on inter-
agency assessments and implementing consortia. We work with and support partners who 
share our desire to uphold the rights of children and and promote peace and protection. We 
partner with local and national government; with churches and faith-based organisations; 
with the private sector as well as other NGOs and CBOs. We strive for relationships with 
and between other organisations that are characterised by equity, transparency and 
mutual benefit.   
  
Challenge – By definition, fragile contexts are places where governance systems are 
broken or at best, fragile.  The ability to “challenge them” is highly variable in context. 
There may be no institutions left to challenge, or challenging those institutions that do 
exist may put staff or beneficiaries at risk. Often the powerful figures in a community or 
the duty bearers are the perpetrators of violence themselves. In spite of the risks, we still 
seek to re-build a relationship of accountability between service providers and 
beneficiaries because that is a critical requirement for work “on” fragility towards 
resilience and recovery.  Where possible we also share data from the front line to advocate 
for peace and child well-being at the national and international levels to influence 
behaviour and policies that affect children.  
 
Adapt – The contexts where we work and the problems WV staff are working to solve are 
complex, and it is often difficult to predict the outcomes of our actions. Programme staff 
need to have the space and agility to use their understanding of context and close 
relationships with communities to work flexibly towards a shared vision for child well-
being in response to the changing situation.  We use short cycles of action and learning, to 
ensure that our programmes remain relevant to rapidly changing contexts, and they produce 
the desired results. 
 
These six principles of Transformational Development are put into practice in local 
programmes using the Development Programme Approach, the Fragile Contexts 
Programme Approach (FCPA), or the Urban Programme Approach as appropriate in 
context. At national level, they are reflected in Field Office strategy, the Community 
Engagement and Sponsorship Plan (CESP) and Technical Programmes. 
 
 

















Stage 1:  Preparing  
 
World Vision prepares to engage the community by learning about the program area and 
by defining World Vision’s identity in the area.  This stage is made up of assessment and 
the first step of the Critical Path.  Both are carried out mainly by World Vision staff. 
There is limited interaction with communities.  		
Stage 2:  Engaging and visioning together 
 
In the second stage, World Vision staff engage with communities and local stakeholders 
to find out who they are and what is currently being done to improve child well-being and 
to address vulnerability in the area.  This stage culminates in the development of a 
community-owned vision and priorities for child well-being.  This typically is co-
facilitated by World Vision and other local stakeholders committed to child well-being in 
order to ensure that it is locally owned and led rather than driven by World Vision…  
 
Stage 3:  Planning for partnering together  
In the third stage, World Vision and local stakeholders work together to develop detailed 
project plans to address the child well-being priorities that emerged from Stage 2.  The 
key outcomes of the stage are agreements on what will be done; what each stakeholder, 
including World Vision, will contribute; and how stakeholders will collaborate… 
 
Stage 4:  Managing and transitioning together 
 
The final stage includes the implementation and eventual transition of shared projects and 
the program.  During steps 7 and 8, monitoring and learning systems are established that 
can be led by the communities and stakeholders… Baselines and evaluations are 
conducted in a way that builds the capacity of local stakeholders. Transition refers to the 
ending of World Vision’s involvement in a share project or program… 
 
Excerpted from The Handbook for Development Programs, World Vision International, 













Categories appear in boldface and codes follow below each category. 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
    
Complaint and Feedback - General Complaint and Feedback - General 
Accountability is foundational to World 
Vision's work 
Closing the feedback loop 
Accountability broadens beyond information 
provision to the other three pillars 
Collecting and acting on feedback is more 
advanced 
Complaint and feedback mechanisms Complaint and feedback 
Closing the feedback loop Complaint and feedback are doing well in some 
cases 
Complaint and feedback Complaint and feedback are not systematized 
Complaint and feedback are weak Complaint and feedback are weak 
Complaint and feedback is a newer pillar Confidentiality 
Confidentiality Dealing with negative feedback 
Face-to-face Face-to-face 
Feedback mechanisms Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions Food assistance as vehicle/context for downward 
accountability 
Positive feedback Formal vs. informal feedback 
Service provision Multiple feedback channels 
Technology - cell phones Operational complaint and feedback is easier to 
implement 
  Positive feedback 
  Sensitive complaints are difficult to handle 
  Sensitive issues 
  Type of feedback matters 
    
  Complaint and Feedback Mechanisms 
  Complaint and feedback mechanisms 
  Helpdesks 
  
Mechanisms need to be complementary (i.e., of 
various types) 
  Suggestion boxes 
  Technology - cell phones 





DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
Compliance Culture Compliance Culture 
Avoiding devolving into a tick-the-box exercise Compliance culture 
Compliance culture Focusing on deliverables rather than processes 
Program accountability becomes 
instrumentalized 
Tick-the-box 
Tick-the-box   
Flexibility   
    
Consultation  Consultation 
Collaboration Being close to the field is important 
Consultation Community-led decision-making 
Consultation is lacking Consultation 
Context matters Consultation includes needs assessment 
Flexibility Consultation is lacking 
  Consultation is strongest 
  Context matters 
  Cultural factors 
  Field-led  
  Translation issues (concepts of accountability) 
    
Funding and Resources Funding and Resources 
Child sponsorship Department for International Development 
(DFID) 
Department for International Development 
(DFID) 
Donor community growing fast in a fragile state 
Donor influence is strong in humn. work Donor influence is strong in humanitarian work 
Donor pressures [in development context] Donors 
Donors Donors lag in responding to feedback 
Donors have short time-frames Early start (in building in accountability) is 
crucial in a humanitarian emergency 
Funding External funding comes with reporting 
requirements 
Funding fluctuations Funding 
Grant funding Funding fluctuations 
Pressure is always there, even with private 
funding 
Grant funding 






DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
Resources Pressure to spend money 
Resources are needed Resources 
  Resources are needed 
    
Humanitarian Humanitarian Aid 
Accountability started in the humanitarian side Accountability started in the humanitarian side 
Accountability in humanitarian contexts can lay 
the ground for social accountability 
Child Well-Being Report 
Core Humanitarian Standards Core Humanitarian Standards are superior to the 
Program Accountability Framework 
Fragile contexts Core Humanitarian Standards 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership Difficulties of accountability in a fragile state 
Humanitarian emergency response Fragile states 
Humanitarian side = pragmatic Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
Humanitarian side strong on accountability Humanitarian emergency response 
Humanitarian standards (various) Humanitarian side = pragmatic 
Humanitarian side good on complaint and 
feedback 
Humanitarian side strong on accountability 
INGOs have capacity for accountability in 
humanitarian emergency but governments don't 
Humanitarian standards (various) 
Learning loops Lack of propensity to question authority in an 
illiberal society 
PAF developed by humanitarian side People in the humanitarian world have been 
equating accountability with feedback and 
complaints mechanisms 
  Post-distribution monitoring 
  Pre-distribution 
  Wider humanitarian community 
    
  Information Provision 
  Information provision 
  Information provision by itself insufficient 
  Information provision is not systematized 









DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
Management issues Management Issues 
Information provision Accountability cuts across all sectors and 
programs. 
Area Program Accountability is everyone's responsibility 
Capacity-building Area Program 
Champions Burdensome nature (perceived) of accountability 
tools 
Clustering ADPs is not efficient as expected Capacity of national staff in inverse proportion to 
opportunities for jobs elsewhere in the economy 
Development Programme Approach Capacity-building 
Doing Development Differently Champions 
DPA linked to accountability Development Program Approach 
DPA linked to PAF Feasibility 
Had to adjust PAF to fit DPA Food Programming Management Group 
Leadership    Formalization of downward accountability 
procedures 
Leadership buy-in Inconsistency in reporting on accountability 
Logframes Internal capacity 
Systematization Lack of institutionalization 
Training Lack of international exposure among national 
staff 
  Lack of management 
  Leadership   
  Leadership buy-in 
  Logframes 
  Mainstreaming accountability 
  Management 
  Mission creep in accountability reporting 
  National Offices 
  
Senior leadership supporting program 
accountability 
  Staff capacity 
  Standardization 
  Systematization 
  World Vision's federated structure 








DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF  
Organizational Learning 
Design  Applying the PAF to development work 
Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Awareness of organizational learning tools is 
lacking 
Evaluation Design  
Influencers of aid industry trends Design, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Isomorphism within one INGO Evaluation 
LEAP 2 to LEAP 3 is a radical change Global Centre 
LEAP 3 not promoting accountability to donors Global experts 
Leveraging the interest in external systems Isomorphism within one INGO 
M&E Local centers of excellence 
M&E becomes MEAL M&E 
MEAL M&E becomes MEAL 
Metrics MEAL 
Organizational learning tools Metrics 
Organizational culture Organizational learning differs between 
humanitarian and development groups 
Organizational learning Organizational learning tools 
Organizational learning tools Organizational culture 
Program Accountability Framework Organizational learning 
Theory of Change Program Accountability Framework 
  Rapid assessment 
  Tools 
    
  Participation 
  Participation 
  Participation is lacking 
  Participation is strongest 
    
Power Power 
Advocacy Accessibility 












DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
Citizen Voice and Action Accountability means giving up power 
Communities using CVA methods vis a vis 
World Vision 
Advocacy 
Contrast between CVA and program 
accountability 
Agency 
DPA linked to Transformational Development Asking communities how they want to give 
feedback 
Duty-bearers Building a CBO from scratch 
Empowerment Chauvinism and bigotry among staff 
Few linkages between CV&A and acct. Collaboration with CVA 
Gender Conflict between the CBOs and the community 
Inclusion of the most vulnerable Duty-bearers 
Key difference between CVA and program 
accountability 
Empowerment 
Lack of collaboration with CVA Inclusion of the most vulnerable 
Listening Lack of collaboration with CVA 
Multiple accountabilities Lack of inclusion of the most vulnerable 
National leadership Participatory budgeting 
Ownership Partnership 
PAF linked to CVA Power 
PAF linked to Transformational Development Power - the responsible use of 
Participation Power imbalance 
Participatory approach in monitoring and 
evaluation 
RBA 
Participatory budgeting Traditional leaders 
Partnership Transferring power 
Policy advocacy Transformation 
Power Visioning 
Power - the responsible use of   
Power imbalance   
Program accountability leading to social 
accountability   
Rights-based   
Root causes   
Seeking linkages between CVA and program 
accountability   







DEVELOPMENT WORK  HUMANITARIAN RELIEF 
Sustainability   
Teeth of accountability   
Traditional leaders   
Transferring power   
Transformation   
Transformational Development   
Transparency   
We have tried to really discourage using the 
Citizen Voice and Action approach on World 
Vision,   
    
Results Agenda Results Agenda 
Child Well-Being Cases exist where accountability is successful 





Incentives Influencers of aid industry trends 
Indicators Outcomes 
LEAP 3 seeking greater efficiency Research 
Outcomes Results 
Popular benchmarks Benchmarks 
Research Standards 
Results   
Standardization   
    
Safety and Safeguarding Safety and Safeguarding 
Oxfam scandal impact Levers 
Safeguarding Oxfam scandal impact 
Safety (from retaliation) Safeguarding 
  Safety (from retaliation) 
  Trust 
    
  Training 
  Training 
  
Training in the "why" of accountability is crucial 






APPENDIX H  







NGO1:  Involvement of affected stakeholder groups in to inform the  design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes.  
 
Sustainable change will only be achieved if affected stakeholders develop ownership of 
the process and its results.  Please describe the involvement of affected stakeholder 
groups.   
How does your strategy translate into specific roles/decision making power of e.g. people 
affected by your programs or campaigns? 
In which formats and frequency do you engage stakeholders: e.g. surveys, focus groups, 
community panels etc.? … 
 
NGO2:  Mechanisms for stakeholder feedback and complaints to programmes and 
policies and in response to policy breaches.  
Do you have a written feedback and complaints handling policy in practice? 
How many and what types of formal complaints did you receive?  Who is responsible to 
act upon them, in what time frame? Have most formal complaints been resolved? 
Can you provide evidence that your complaints policy is well known and has led to 
positive management response? 
 
NGO3:  System for program monitoring evaluation and learning (including 
measuring program effectiveness and impact).  
Please describe how you monitor and evaluate impact and progress against your strategic 
objectives.  
How do you publicize results and put program adjustments into effect? 
Can you provide evidence that MEL led to positive management response?  
 
NGO4:  Measures to integrate gender and diversity into program design and 
implementation, and the monitoring, evaluation, and learning cycle.  
 
Diversity is not just a question of fairness, but also a potential quality driver.  It enriches 
implementation strategies by inviting different views; it allows tapping into more 
networks and broadens the basis of acceptance; it fosters resilience that monocultures do 
not tend to possess.  
What systems do you have in place to identify stakeholders that risk being excluded from 
your work due to e.g. disability, ethnicity poverty, illiteracy, age, gender?  
How does this inform the planning, implementation and evaluation of your work? 
Have you set yourself specific targets?  What has been achieved so far? 
 
NGO5:  Processes to formulate, communicate, implement, and change advocacy 
positions and public awareness campaigns.  
Advocacy and public awareness-raising have become an increasingly important part of 
NGO work.  At the same time public criticism in regard to NGO legitimacy and 
effectiveness is rising.  Good accountability for advocacy can address both criticisms.   
Do you have a published process for adopting public policy positions ensuring that they 




How do you ensure meaningful stakeholder participation in your advocacy work? 
How is corrective action taken when appropriate?  Can you provide examples?  
Identify the organization’s process for exiting a campaign. 
 
NGO6:  Processes to take into account and coordinate with other actors.   
 
Complex situations, numerous actors and fast-moving targets are a reality for most 
NGOs.  Strategic and effective coordination with the activities of other actors is 
important to reduce duplication, leverage impact and improve cost effectiveness.  
What systems do you have in place to avoid duplication and identify opportunities for 
engagement with others to improve and leverage your effectiveness? 
Can you provide evidence that these systems work well in practice? 
Who are your key stakeholders in such a process (e.g. governments, rights-holders, 
multilateral institutions, NGOs, business, donors etc.), and what role do they play? 
How do you ensure that partners also meet high standards of accountability?  
 
Excerpted from Reporting Guidelines:  Based on GRI NGO Sector Supplement 3.0 Level 














Date (of interview): ___________________________________  
Location (city where interviewee is located):_______________  
Respondent’s Name: __________________________________  
Gender of Respondent: M F  
Approximate Age of Respondent: 22-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+  
 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me. The purpose of this research study is to 
produce findings about potential causal mechanisms behind the adoption and the 
implementation of policies and practices to promote accountability to beneficiaries. 
 
As noted in my letter to you, this interview may take about 45 minutes to one hour, and 
all data will be kept strictly confidential. Before we start, I would like to ask your 
permission to record the conversation with this digital recorder so that we don’t miss any 
of the important parts of our conversation.  
 
[After oral consent is given, audio recording begins.]  
  
We are going to start with a few questions about the attributes of your organization and 
about your position in the organization. Then will we move into more substantive issues 
regarding program accountability. 
 
Regarding any foreseeable risks or discomforts resulting from this study, the study 
involves no more risk than the risks you encounter in daily life. 
 
While there may be no direct benefit to you from participating in this study, the indirect 
benefit of participating will be knowing that you helped researchers better understand the 
drivers of program accountability at a leading international NGO.  Additionally, and 
ideally, this understanding may help to inform World Vision’s future efforts at advancing 
program accountability.  
 
Personal and Organizational Attributes  
 
First, can you confirm for me where in the organization you work (e.g., at World Vision 
headquarters, a regional office, etc.)?  
 
Would you please describe the specific role you play in World Vision?  
 
How long have you been in your position?  
 










What previous experiences informed the decision? 
 
What were the steps that you recall that led to this decision? 
 
What was the rationale for undertaking program accountability? 
 
What obstacles initially stood in the way of the decision?  
 
How were these obstacles overcome, to the extent that they were overcome?  
 
If (since the time that World Vision  first adopted program accountability), thinking about 
program accountability has changed in your organization, how has it changed?   
 
Which staff persons or departments are those championing program accountabilities?   
 
What issues do they face?  
 
What staff incentives exist to promote program accountability? 
 
What staff incentives do you think should exist for this purpose, that currently do not (if 
any)? 
 
How has the process of federating affected the adoption and/or implementation of 
program accountability, if it has?  
 
Now I’d like to hear about how the program accountability that you described above is 
put into implementation at World Vision . 
 
Of the four pillars of program accountability at World Vision  (information provision, 
community consultation, promotion of participation, and collecting and acting on 
feedback), which do you consider the area(s) in which the most progress has been 
achieved?  Why? 
 
What successes and failures have you perceived in the areas that you identified? 
 
How effective do you find the provision of information and/or training to World Vision  
staff about program accountability measures?   
 
I’d like to focus now on the fourth pillar, collecting and acting on feedback.   
 
What successes and failures have you perceived in this area?  What are the reasons for 
these?  
 






What are your impressions about any resistance or challenges to these mechanisms? 
 
Where such mechanisms have been successful, what do you think are reasons for this 
success? 
 
What do you think it would be most important for WVI to learn about program 
accountability? 
 
What do you think is the most effective way for this learning to take place?   
 
What are the implications for other INGOs?  How do you think their experiences might 
echo or differ from yours?   
 
Finally, is there anything else that you would like to add? Do you have any questions for 
me, or would you like clarification about anything that we have discussed? 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
